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ABSTRACT

This study analyzes sources of instability in the formal authority of administrators in large U.S. universities, the perspectives by which campus executives attempt to cope with these problems, and the effects on present and future executives' legitimacy. The findings of a survey of attitudes held by 526 executives in 69 large and prestigious universities indicated that "institutionally conservative" responses were found to be associated with business-finance job specialties, lack of an earned doctorate, lack of graduate study in arts and sciences, minimal experience in teaching and research, length of time as an academic administrator, lack of current teaching duties, participation in interuniversity administrative meetings, Republican political preference, religiosity, conventional Christian religious preference, and age. Attitudes, backgrounds, and current involvements were reported for four major executive jobs: presidents, business-finance executives, academic vice-presidents or deans, and student affairs executives. In addition, the dynamics of recent breakdowns in campus executives' legitimacy were analyzed, and suggestions made about the probable future of university administration. (Author/AF)

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THE OFFICIAL PERSPECTIVE IN ACADEME

University Administrators' Views on Authority

Contract title: Administrative Orientations in the Large University

Terry F. Lunsford

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Resume

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in Higher Education - Berkeley

The Official Perspective in Academe: University Administrators' Views on Authority

Terry F. Lunsford
June 1970

The study analyzes sources of instability in the formal authority of administrators in large U. S. universities; the perspectives by which campus executives attempt to cope with these problems; and the effects on present and future executives' legitimacy.

Sociological and administrative writings on authority, personal observations of administrative deliberations, intensive interviews with campus executives, and a survey of large-university executives were used as sources of data and analysis. Survey data included responses to 38 opinion items on issues of university governance, information on personal and academic backgrounds, and current preferences and involvements of the executives.

Respondents were 526 "high" executives (60% useable responses out of 869 mailed) at 69 large and prestigious universities of the United States.

"High" administrative executives of large U. S. universities are seen as holding official power precariously, because of pressures in their job that separate them symbolically and socially from faculty members, students, and the central ideals of academic life. These forces also encourage the emergence among executives of an "official perspective" on matters of university governance, which emphasizes the political neutrality of executives, the importance of "the institution" as an end in itself, and the trustworthiness of executive "discretion" in making decisions for others on the campus.

In a survey of attitudes held by 526 executives in 69 large and prestigious universities, "institutionally conservative" responses were found to be associated with lack of an earned doctorate, lack of graduate study in arts and sciences, minimal experience in full-time teaching and research, length of time as an academic administrator. lack of current teaching duties, participation in inter-university administrative meetings, Republican political preference, religiosity, conventional Christian religious preference, and age. Attitudes, backgrounds, and current involvements are reported for four major executive job-groups: presidents, business-finance executives, academic vice-presidents or deans, and student affairs executives.

Dynamics of recent breakdowns in campus executives' legitimacy are analyzed, and suggestions are made about the probably future of university "administration."

The findings should be useful to all persons concerned with university governance, as indications of important effects due to the numbers, increased official powers, and social isolation of exectuives as a status-group on the large U. S. campus. The study also should interest researchers concerned with questions of leadership, structure, and legitimation in complex organizations generally.

PREFACE

Large universities of the United States are in a crisis of administrative authority. To understand it we must examine problems of formal authority in general.

Formal authority is best seen as a relationship of persons in social statuses: a relation of unequal power, legitimated by beliefs. Leaders typically try to justify their own power, and bargain implicitly over its scope and uses. Authority involves "consent" by followers. However, this consent can be manipulated by leaders; it is collective not individual; and it applies mainly to the relationship rather than to the leaders' specific commands. Leaders often obscure these facts by public statements that merge facts and norms, rely heavily on ambiguous abstractions, and exaggerate the consensus and shared interests of followers.

Formal authority has long been precarious in universities, where it competes with ideals of expertise, academic freedom, and consensual governance. Universities' recent growth in size, public importance, and visibility have created new strains for administrators, as have university executives' increasing numbers and isolation from faculty and students. One result is a loss of informal supports for academic executives' formal power.

In response, academic executives have developed a complex belief-system to justify their power. This "official perspective" includes these elements: A double standard on rule-following is affirmed as between executives and university members generally. Heavy reliance is laid on executive discretion in decisions, within vague jurisdictions. Interests of an entity called "the institution" comprise an all-purpose criterion for discretionary decisions. The ideal of an "academic community" is treated as if it were an acknowledged reality. Executives are said to have little power, and to act mainly as spokesmen for consensual decisions discovered by "consultation." Executives are said to be very trustworthy and talented decision-makers, who make no moral compromises despite the necessity for official secrecy and public untruths. Executive "leadership" is seen as vital to "integration" and "rational problem-solving" in the university.

Among 526 respondents to a 1968 survey of executives in 69 major universities, "institutionally conservative" responses were found to be associated with: business-finance job specialties, lack of an earned doctorate, lack of graduate study in the arts and sciences, few years of full-time teaching-research experience, many years in university administration, no present teaching duties, attendance at meetings of administrators, Republican political preference, religious commitment, orthodox Christian religious preference, and age. Academic vice-presidents and liberal-arts deans were the least institutionally conservative job-groups; presidents and student-affairs executives showed mixed response-patterns. Presidents shared strong academic backgrounds with academic vice-presidents and deans, but shared present commitments and administrative experience with business-finance officers. Presidents also sided with business-finance officers on issues more than twice as frequently as with the academic officials.

The official perspective is a typical response of university executives to their central dilemma: how to maintain pragmatic, "political" relations with many competing groups while publicly justifying their actions in "rational," "non-political" terms. This perspective has failed in its purpose and exacerbated administrators' problems since it was publicly challenged by the 1964 Free Speech Movement at Berkeley.

University executives in the future may rely more on campus "legal" processes to validate or supplant executive judgments. But they probably will also have to become more openly "political"--appealing to specific constituencies for affirmative support, articulating more specific policies, and following those policies more consistently. Because most faculty and students are accustomed to non-participation in campus governance, developing these institutional bases of leadership will require much effort and inventiveness.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to help clarify the crisis of authority that exists in most large universities of the United States. That crisis first became publicly visible in 1964, when student protestors in large numbers openly challenged the legitimacy of administrative power at the University of California in Berkeley. But the roots of the crisis lie deeper in the past, and reach to the basic character of universities as social orders. This study focusses primarily on one key element in the current crisis: the origins, content, and consequences of a specific belief-system, or perspective, as to the bases of university administrators' authority.

This focus was chosen in part because of the central place given to belief-systems in the most influential modern analyses of authority (see Chapter II). But it was chosen also in the hope that the study will have some effect on the actions of large-university executives. The study attempts to show how social relationships in the large university subtly shape the beliefs of its leaders, without their being aware of it, and how those relations in their turn are shaped by the beliefs, in an ongoing, dynamic interaction. By this means, we hope to illuminate the realities of organized authority for all members of the university.

The structure of this report is as follows: Chapter II attempts to establish a basic theoretic frame within which the dynamics of administrative authority can be understood. Chapter III analyzes the special situation of high executives in the specific setting of large, modern universities in the United States. Chapter IV discusses the idea and content of the "official perspective" with which university executives have typically responded to their situation. Chapter V compares the perspectives of sub-groups among the executives who responded to a questionnaire survey in 1968. Chapter VI summarizes the relation of the "official perspective" to current disputes about campus authority, and describes the origins of the present crisis. Chapter VII attempts to state broadly what the study suggests about the future of large-university "administration." Appendix A contains tables discussed in Chapter VI. Methodological details and alternative analyses are discussed in Appendix B.

The study had its inception in the period immediately following the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley, when I was asked by two research Centers at Berkeley* to collect materials on the protests and to outline some of the research issues that they had raised about the governance of universities. In the course of that study

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*The then Center for the Study of Higher Education, and the Center for the Study of Law and Society.

(Lunsford, 1965), I became increasingly interested in exploring further several impressions that were then widespread on the Berkeley campus: Protesting students and university administrators clearly had widely disparate viewpoints, not only on the immediate issues being contested, but about campus authority relationships generally. In addition, however, it seemed to many persons that most key administrators lacked any real awareness of the diverse views on these matters held by the critical factions and informal leaders among students and faculty members at large. At the time, it was easy to ascribe this to the fast-moving, turbulent pace of campus events, and to the hotly polemical character of student protestors' demands and assertions. But informal observations and theoretical considerations suggested that more basic phenomena of university organization underlay and helped to engender these short-run relations of open conflict.

As the study progressed, this early insight gradually ripened into a set of related propositions which may be briefly summarized as follows: Executive position in large universities constitutes a determinate and consequential status today, with characteristic demands and satisfactions that are markedly different from those faced by most faculty members and students in their daily experience. These demands tend to encourage certain limited and typical viewpoints about authority relations in universities, and this tendency is reinforced by personal associations among administrators, in relative isolation from contacts with teachers and students. The views thus reinforced serve the purposes of executives both as persons and as organizational functionaries, by "making sense" of their actions and staving off challenges to their authority. In some situations, however--and especially those in which issues of authority are raised directly--their characteristic views seemed to handicap administrators, preventing them from responding flexibly to demands for change.

Interviews with a small number of major university executives made it clear that there is a considerable diversity of views among them, and a strong disinclination to be viewed as sharing a characteristic "party line" with other campus executives. The dominant impression that emerged from these early interviews and from reading administrators' writings was that executives tend to speak and think much more alike than they perceive to be the case. But it also became evident that many persons talk about what "most administrators" think and say, while many others deny that any describable viewpoints can be ascribed to "most administrators." An empirical survey of attitudes among the "top" executives of the nation's major universities seemed necessary if discussion were to move beyond polemical assertions and denials. The present report is based on the results of that survey, on the interviews and written materials preceding it, on personal observation of several university administrative councils in action, and on discussions with a variety of persons about early formulations of parts of the analysis.

Strong feelings surround most issues of authority today, and none more than the issue of power held by university executives. For that reason, a few words about the unwritten premises of this study may not be amiss at this point. The analysis presumes no "conspiracy theory" of administration, and no simple notion that executives hold all or most of the power in a complex organization like a university. University executives are seen here as fundamentally like other actors, in most ways that are relevant: They act as they feel they must, based on their own life-experiences, usually with a sincere conviction of their own personal competence and good will. In their own view, they are primarily problem-solvers, and they deal with problems as they encounter them.

It is a premise of the study, however, that executives are unlike other persons in at least one important way: Executives hold formal power in a putatively "rational" social structure. This position of power sets them apart despite its "rational" legitimation, for it remains power nonetheless. It gives their perspectives on university life a special importance that none can evade without resigning his executive position. Our human sympathy for administrators should not blind us to the fact of their power, or to the problematic character of its legitimacy, any more than our seeing it as power should imply that it must be abused. Neither should compassion obscure the fact that executives, like the rest of us, exercise choice amid a complex of social and personal commitments. Their dilemmas are somewhat more difficult than most, but their choices are also more consequential for the fates of other persons. Precisely because administrators are human, the study and criticism of administration is a continuing right and duty of all who live under it.

During the formulation and writing of this report, I have been helped substantially by study and discussions with Philip Selznick, Reinhard Bendix, Martin Trow, and William Kornhauser of the Department of Sociology at Berkeley, and by discussions with Troy Duster, T.R. McConnell, Harland Bloland, and other colleagues at the Center for Research and Development in Higher Education. Burton R. Clark was especially helpful in early formulations of the research design, and Sheldon L. Messinger made helpful comments on an early analytic statement. Julie Hurst and Karen Houston were of great help in processing the survey data and compiling the bibliography. Mildred Bowman, Lucille Carpenter, Catherine Pernish, Alexandra Rauch, and Ann Sherman very cheerfully and competently worked on the various typescripts. Support for the research reported herein was provided by the Center in cooperation with the U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

I am grateful for the help and support of the Center and of my colleagues at the University during the study. Naturally, none of these scholars and agencies is reponsible for the conclusions reached in this report. Neither do all of them agree with its interpretations, which are solely the responsibility of the author.

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OF FORMAL AUTHORITY

It is a premise of this study that, to understand the crisis of modern universities, we must first examine the nature and dynamics of organized authority in general. Specifically, we shall argue that university officials, like others who hold high "executive" positions, are faced continually with a dual problem: (1) how to make creative use of the power bestowed by their positions, and (2) how to get others to accept the uses they make of that power. Our study thus begins with a general analysis of formal authority and proceeds thereafter to the distinctive difficulties that university executives have in wielding it. The "official perspective" described in Chapter IV is seen as a response of university executives to the difficulties in their situation--a response that sometimes increases those difficulties instead of easing them.

AUTHORITY AS THE LINKING OF POWER AND BELIEFS

Our analysis of authority will rely heavily on the much-discussed, often-distorted theory of Max Weber (1947, 1954, 1958, 1961). Authority, in Weber's classic formulation, is a kind of power,* based on a social position or status, and "legitimated" by a set of beliefs shared between those subject to the power and those who exercise it. These beliefs allow those who are governed to accept their leaders' power over decisions affecting all the members of the "order," or organization.

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*Weber (1954) defined power as "the possibility of imposing one's will upon the behavior of other persons [P. 323]," despite their resistance.

Structures of legitimated power in this sense are a pervasive feature of modern social relations (Boulding, 1953). They include all of what today are known as "formal organizations," ranging from the nation-state and its legal subdivisions to the many special agencies, "private" corporations, and voluntary associations chartered by them. One of these many formal organizations is the modern university.

LEADERSHIP "BARGAINING" AND SELF-JUSTIFICATION

Some contemporary theorists using Weberian insights have emphasized the "institutionalized" character of authority, as a distribution of power embedded in a "social structure," and supported by "normative patterns" and values widely accepted in the society.* Among other things, this has served to focus on abstract norms and "functions", de-emphasizing the dynamic ways that leaders and followers interact, each party using available norms and values to legitimate his own power or to question that of others. Weber himself was explicit that holders of de facto social power "or even of any advantage of life" always feel the necessity to justify their advantage by the claim that it accords with a "natural" order of things, or that it is used only for the pursuit of collective goals. In actual cases, he made clear, these justifications are only variably true; in the "dubious cases," the justification serves to maintain the leaders' power nonetheless.*

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*See, eg., Parsons, 1960, Pp. 177-198; and Blau, 1964, Pp. 211-212; cf. Crozier, 1963, Pp. 160ff; Etzioni, 1964, Pp. 59-67.

Some modern analysts have taken clear account of the need for a holder of legitimated power to work actively in the support of his power--whether his intent is to use that power for narrow, special interests or for his best estimate of the public interest. Thus Barnard (1938) saw that executives in a business or governmental organization must display certain personal qualities, and must justify their actions in acceptable ways, if their subordinates are to continue ascribing to them the legitimacy that converts naked power into authority. Blau (1963) has usefully described some of the means that leaders use to "bargain" with their followers (e.g., by representing their interests to others, or tacitly overlooking the breach of nonessential rules) in an ongoing process of "exchange," whereby some official power is relinquished so that what remains can be legitimated. In this process, Blau implies, leaders regularly make use of "rational" arguments, and of "institutionalized" norms and values. Crozier (1963) is explicit on this point, in his perceptive discussion of the "battle between subordinates and supervisors" for areas of "discretion" over the work with which they are concerned. In this continuing context, Crozier argues, supervisors regularly use "both...rationalization and bargaining, to gain as much cooperation as they can for what cannot be rationalized [pp. 160-161]." Etzioni (1964) has pursued the argument so far as to treat rational arguments as "normative power," one of three major types of resources that organizational leaders have for securing subordinates' compliance.

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*See Weber, 1965, P. 336; 1958, P. 220.

In attempting to secure "cooperation," leaders frequently create generalized explanations (myths or ideologies) which encourage governed groups to accept the conditions of their governance as inevitable, desirable, or both. Such myths may interpret a specific organization's character and distinctive mission to its members, helping to inpsire organizational loyalty, cooperation, and "identification." Myths may be used to justify specific administrative decisions, or they may merely support a leader's general "right to decide," regardless of the specific decisions he makes. Both uses of myths may enhance an organization's "competence" to pursue a particular version of its "mission."* Normally, however, they also help to preserve the power of its incumbent leaders, and so are self-serving as well as organizationally useful.

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*See Selznick, 1957, P. 152; 1969, Pp. 30-31.

Unless the leaders who justify a distribution of authority are themselves resigning their incumbencies, they are necessarily in a position of asking others to accept their own power. This usually is not explicitly stated; it may even be explicitly denied. Typically, followers are urged to continue obeying the laws, regulations, and decisions under which the incumbents hold power. And the reasons given for such obedience usually are impersonal ones: upholding law and order, avoiding anarchy, preserving a framework within which shared interests and collective goals can be efficiently and effectively pursued. Nonetheless, the self-justifying character of all such justifications by incumbents--and by others who have interests vested in the _status quo_--is always implicit as a possible source of suspicion, contention, and conflict between leaders and followers.

COMPLEXITIES OF "CONSENT"

Viewed in this general way, authority is widely said to rest on the voluntary "consent" of subordinates, who make a "social contract" to accept the established power of some governing group or structure.* Weber (1947) extended this view from politics to all forms of organized authority, delimiting his use of that term to relationships which include at least some "minimum of voluntary submission [p. 324]" to the commands of another. Barnard (1938) similarly applied the concept of consent to the authority structures of modern corporate organization. He argued that "The decision as to whether an order has authority or not lies with the persons to whom it is addressed [p. 163]," even though orders falling within a limited "zone" are routinely accepted. Simon (1965) followed similar reasoning, saying that authority is exercised when an "individual, relaxing his own critical faculties, permits the communicated decision of another to guide his choice [p. 151]." (Emphasis added.)

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*See Pitkin, 1965, 1966.

Explicit and Implicit "Consent"

Viewed in this way, authority is inescapably "political," in the sense that it rests on the ultimately unexaminable judgments of those who "vote" (however passively) to accept it. Some structures of authority are explicitly political in this sense: Leaders advocate specific policies, which they argued will produce "results" in their followers' terms, and they claim legitimacy through an election process, by which the unexaminable judgments of the governed may be periodically expressed. "Administrative" executives, however, are not explicitly accessible in the same way to the judgments of those they govern. Instead, administrative leaders rhetorically treat their advocacy of policies as official "decisions," and/or recommendations to "higher" authorities, explictly denying direct connections to their subordinates' political judgments.

These differences substantially affect the content of their legitimacy—myths, the use of these myths in justifying leaders' actions, and the processes by which legitimacy breaks down. As Simon (1965) and others have noted, administrative leaders use such conceptions of an organization's "formal structure" to "prevent the development of organization politics--struggle for influence and authority--to a point that would be deleterious to the functioning of the organization [p. 149]." Because of the self-justifying character of authority, however, a typical effect of such efforts is to uphold the power of incumbent leaders as well.

Consent, Coercion, and "Critical Faculties"

The language of "consent" summons images of freely willed, informed and affirmative decision, made spontaneously and without coercion. On such images, arguably, rests much of its force as a critical distinction between authority and power. Consent is far from a simple phenomenon, however, even as used by theorists of authority.

First, it is clear that while authority exists, it is power; the leader has a "power of sanction" over his subordinates, and can use it to pressure, coerce, or bargain with them over the continuance of his right to decide.* Moreover, the leader's position of "authority" lends special weight to his "communications" to subordinates, and helps to convince them that his views (for example, of what serves their interests) are probably correct. Thus the relation of authority is not without its coercive, involuntary aspects.*

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*See Blau, 1963, P. 312; Simon, 1965, Pp. 130-134.

Blau (1963) has dealt with this implicit "paradox" by noting that the "consent" on which authority depends is not "voluntary" for individuals, but only for "the collectivity of subordinates;" for "the individual subordinate it is the result of compelling social pressures [p. 312]." Simon has similarly observed that "perhaps the most important" of the "factors which induce acceptance of authority in organization" is the individual's apprehension of the "social disapprobation of his fellows [1965, p. 131]."

Second, authority is often discussed as if it involved "obedience" to a number of isolated "commands," to each of which a new "consent" is given. Some of Weber's (1954) formulations are susceptible of such an interpretation. For example:

> To be more specific, domination [authority] will thus mean the situation in which:
> The manifested will (command) of the ruler or rulers is meant to influence the conduct of one or more others (the ruled) and actually does influence it in such a way that their conduct to a socially relevant degree occurs as if the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake. Looked

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*Much empirical research on attitudes has shown that "agreement" to, or conformity with, pre-set opinions and actions can be produced experimentally by the use of implicit social pressures and ambiguous stimuli. See Walker and Heyns (1962) and references cited.

> upon from the other end, this situation will be called obedience [p. 328]. (Emphasis in original)

At other points, however, Weber (1947) clearly refers to authority as "a relation of command and obedience [p. 326]." (Emphasis supplied) This relation may have "originated in a formally free contract," and today each subordinate usually has the "formal status... of a party to a contract [p. 325]" with an employer. But within such a relation, decisions of the leaders typically are "obeyed purely as such regardless of particular content [p. 326]."

Simon (1965) defined authority as "a relationship" between individuals, in which the subordinate "sets himself a general rule which permits the communicated decision of another to guide his own choice...without deliberation on his own part on the expediency of those premises [p. 127]." (Emphasis in original deleted.) At another point, Simon (1965) referred to the subordinate's "relaxing his own critical faculties [p. 15]" as to whether the decision should guide his conduct. In other words, the "consent" involved in authority is not a consent to each command as given, but to a continuing "relation" with superiors, in which certain decisions of leaders will be followed without choice at that point on the part of the subordinate. Acceptance of authority, in this view, is specifically the "abdication of choice [p. 127]" over each decision as it occurs.

In summary, the idea of authority as power based on consent is more complex than its common usage suggests. Instead of being an all-or-nothing phenomenon, consent was treated by Weber as a variable, having degrees: a minimum of "voluntary submission." Further, it is a dependent variable, which can be "induced," caused, or partly determined by factors within the manipulation of human actors. Among the most important of these is the "social pressure" created by the collective opinions of subordinates, which may be influenced by leaders to "induce" continuation of a "relationship" in which their decisions are followed "regardless of particular content."

LEGITIMACY AS FACT AND DESIDERATUM

Clearly, then, a powerful tool of leadership for maintaining its power--to whatever ends--is the subtle influencing of subordinates' opinions concerning authority. If authority is under little strain, active efforts to this end may not be necessary. Weber (1954) and others have noted that a distribution of power is most stable when it is taken as "natural" and implicitly "deserved" by those who hold it. However, Weber argued, every "stable" structure of authority has available "grounds upon which there are based the claims of obedience [p. 335]" made by leaders and these "grounds" may have to be argued explicitly when questions of legitimacy arise.

Inducing "Consensus"

In such a situation, much leadership communication may be implicitly directed to the support of social pressures favoring established relationships. More specifically, we shall suggest, much authority depends in good part upon the leaders' ability to convince _each_ subordinate that _most_ _or_ _all_ subordinates do affirmatively accept existing authority structures, so that any individual has little chance of persuading them differently. But "communications" directed to this effect are greatly bolstered if they suggest, rather than assert, the fact of consensus. And they are strongest if they convey the view that right-thinking people generally accept existing social arrangements, because of their propriety under moral norms that all subordinates share. Where these impressions are achieved, each subordinate is induced to accept the effective inevitability of existing leaders' power as a social fact, which rests on the opinions of those involved but exerts an external moral constraint upon each of them.*

If most members of an organization have very little information about actual events in the organizational life, and communicate only infrequently with one another, the leadership has maximum opportunities to shape each member's opinions by characterizing that life, its relation to collective goals, and the predominant opinions of the membership. This situation, in which each individual is largely ignorant of the views of others in his social context, has been called "pluralistic ignorance" by Scheff (1966) to distinguish it from genuine "consensus." At its extreme, pluralistic ignorance or "false consensus" can mean that "no one in a community agrees with a view, but everyone thinks that everyone else does," so that "the effect on behavior is sometimes the same as if everyone actually agreed [pp. 3, 14]." Some less extreme degree of pluralistic ignorance concerning authority-relations seems quite likely to prevail in many large, complex, and impersonal modern organizations, in which work-rules tend to restrict and isolate interactions,* and the rhetoric of "administrative" authority treats the established power-relations as independent of even the collective "consent" of participants.

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*See Durkheim, 1938, Pp. 1-10.

"The Order" as an Operative Fact

The most common vehicle of self-justificiation in modern legal-rational authority relations is a structure of rules, which is said to embody the social contract that individuals "are" not free to break. In the theory of "legal authority," according to Weber (1947), "obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order." Legal authority thus rests typically "on a belief in the 'legality' of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands [p. 328]." Such belief assumes "the existence of a 'legitimate order'" (emphasis supplied), toward which the subordinate feels "a sense of duty." The relation of this "order" to specific "rules" is complex:

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*Blau and Scott (1962) suggest the assembly line as a model for "managerial planning of the production process [P. 247]" because it avoids many contacts between workers that result in uncertainties, and provides an "impersonal" form of work-control as an alternative to regular "hierarchical" supervision.

> The subjective meaning of a social relationship will be called an 'order' only if action is approximately or on the average oriented to certain determinate "maxims" or rules. Furthermore, such an order will only be called 'valid' if the orientation to such maxims includes, no matter to what actual extent, the recognition that they are binding on the actor or the corresponding action constitutes a desirable model for him to imitate [p. 124].

An order which "enjoys the prestige of being considered binding," Weber said, had "legitimacy [p. 125]."

Hart (1961) has elaborated such a conception by distinguishing between "primary rules" of social conduct and the "secondary rules" that grant powers to persons to make and enforce rules for those in a "legal system" that is treated as having "existence."* Hart's formulation is useful because it distinguishes clearly between (1) rules that explicitly regulate conduct ("primary" rules), (2) rules that implicitly regulate conduct by stating whose explicit formulations shall be treated as "primary" regulators, and (3) the abstract notion of a "legal system" treated as an existent reality.

Most legal authority, both "political" and "administrative," is based in existing "orders," which members are told they should accept in order to serve their own interests. Most modern formal organizations are characterized by their leaders and supporters as "functional" or "rational" social structures, serving special, stated purposes. As Weber (1947) indicated, these orders are seen as "valid" or "legitimate," not by virtue of traditional custom or absolute religious norms, but as purposively constructed networks of relations among men, deliberately planned as "rational" instruments of whatever particular goals their members and supporters determine.* As such, each purportedly "functional" organization becomes to some degree a value in itself. "It" is instrumental to other values (as are all values except the ultimate), but still a value, with its own distinctive imperatives to be served.

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*See Hart, 1961, Pp. 58, 89-95.

"The organization" as such is routinely identified as an existent entity in its own right, and actions are shaped and oriented by reference to "its" needs and interests, not merely to stated goals in a social vacuum. At the same time, "the organization" typically is conceived to affect "its goals" only as a "means" to their achievement--more or less effective and efficient, but implicitly never destructive of them.**

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*Simon (1965) has made it clear that notions of "rationality [P. 76]" are at least as complex as those of "consent." But there has been relatively little analysis, among modern students of authority, of the relations between the "collective" interests of members in an organized group and their distinct or individual interests. Cf. M. Olson (1965), Bendix and Lipset (1966), Dahrendorf (1959) and deKadt (1965).

**Numerous studies by sociologists have concluded that organizations tend not only to become ends in themselves, but to "displace their goals," becoming the primary "goals" of their participants. See Merton, 1957; Messinger, 1955; Sills, 1957; and references cited. The point here is a somehwat different one: All organizations are "values" independent of their formally avowed goals, since they require action to be guided and constrained for their maintenance.

This generalized notion of all formal organizations as "functional" or "legal-rational" rests, as Weber (1947) indicated, on the conviction that "any given legal norm may be established by agreement or by imposition, on the grounds of expediency or rational values or both, with a claim to obedience at least on the part of the members of the corporate group [p. 329]." These must be "rules which are formally correct and have been imposed by accepted procedure [p. 131]." However, in theory they may create any of many authority structures of equal legitimacy, and these may be designed to serve whatever purposes are desired.

In practice, the processes by which rules are made or changed, goals are formally avowed and altered, powers are regularized, and operative meanings are given to these abstractions--all these are complex and uncertain "political" processes. They involve clashes of important interests, cloudy human judgments, the mobilization of "public" opinions, and unexaminable "votes"--as well as shared understanding and "rational" abstractions. The encompassing theory of formally correct rules and accepted procedures seems to ignore or deny these complexities.

A similar effect may be ascribed to the rhetoric of administrative authority generally, which treats each organization implicitly as a social fact affirmatively established and accepted by the great majority of its current constituents. Such an "order," in theory, exists only at the voluntary behest of its supporters and participants, and can be changed at any time if "they" consent to it. In a complex modern organization, of course, the categories of constituents and participants themselves are many and vague, their interests and commitments are diverse and shifting, their communication about organizational change is at best sporadic and indirect. In practice, most decisions about change or stability in organizational relationships are made by leadership groups, who must interpret what the critical constituencies will require or accept. This may be hard to learn, and important rules are not easily changed even by such leadership groups. But for justifying existing authority, the conceptions of rational, functional rules and indefinite consensual adaptation have considerable utility.

JUSTIFICATION BY STRUCTURED AMBIGUITY

As suggested above, a relation of command and obedience may be justified in terms relating specific decisions to norms and their collective accepteance. Or the relation may be supported primarily by more general abstract formulations--justifying a right to decide without reference to the particular content of the decisions. Our attention in this study is directed primarily to the origins and content of an ideology of the latter kind--an abstract, rational justification for not justifying particular decisions. Several things about such ideologies need mention here.

The Uses of Abstraction

Abstract explanations of human action share with other explanations the quality of seeming to help us understand and better deal with events. Such understanding is always partial, however, in at least two ways. First, abstractions are typically general, categorical sets of terms. On their face, they often purport to encompass important common features of separate particulars. But they are of necessity highly selective, always omitting more about the particulars then they explain. As descriptions of complex events or processes, therefore, they are always gross distortions. This does not mean that abstract explanations are useless, for they are often efficient means for connecting the meanings of different parts of our experience.

Second, however, the relation between an abstract concept or proposition and its referents is always problematic. As scholars know, it is much easier to state general propositions than to give examples of what they mean. In the social sciences, at least, the relations between theoretical statements and concrete "indicators" is frequently a matter of considerable disagreement among members of the research community.

This double character of abstractions--whether they be rules, theories, or informal explanations of everyday action--means that they are both aids and obstacles to understanding. Their capacity to act as semantic blocks, as stopping-places for thought, must be taken clearly into account. If abstractions are viewed as potential ideologies, with the capacity for serving specific social purposes, this quality becomes especially important. Terms and concepts that engender the all-important impression of a general understanding of events, when understanding is actually partial and biased, have obvious ideological utility.

Another characteristic of abstract explanations that is now coming to be better understood is their circularity. Thomas Kuhn (1962) has made this point clearest in his discussion of "paradigms"--those "accepted examples of scientific practice," composed of "law, theory, application, and instrumentation together," that underlie "particular coherent traditions of scientific research [p. 10]." It is these complexes of thought and action that produce "awareness of anomalies" and lead to major changes in science, Kuhn says, since theories alone always fit observed phenomena imperfectly, but are susceptible of "numerous articulations and _ad hoc_ modifications...to eliminate any apparent conflict [pp. 77, 90-93]." In scientific use, conceptual models are checked regularly with direct observations of phenomena, within a "coherent tradition" of research. Hence, Kuhn has argued, each paradigm has its time of discovery, its period of maximum usefulness in explanation, a period when "anomalies" build up in its explanations, and its point of discard for a newly discovered analytic model.

The point, for our present purposes, is this: As long as it is not continuously tested against open experience, every conceptual system is a closed system, providing plausible and "rational" understanding for all "examples" of its purported subject matter. And even when efforts are continually made to check the adequacy of abstractions against experience, that adequacy is historically and socially conditioned.

Abstract explanatory models, then, are by their very nature both partial and ambiguous, both helpful and obfuscating. They are born, prosper, live, and fade out of common social use. They are not likely soon to disappear from the social scene. They may be manipulated to specific purposes. And, if well-constructed, they have an inherent quality of self-justification because they seem to tie up all the ends, to account for everything, unless rigorously examined for their degrees and areas of inadequacy.

"Rational" Management and the Burden of Proof

In social organization, these characteristics are important because abstract explanations are widely used to mediate social interaction. This is particularly true in modern "legal-rational" organizations, which rests heavily on abstract rules and conceptions of social "orders" or "systems."* In some formulations, "management" has even been said to be "scientific",** and in universities the mantle of scholarly and scientific "reason" is sometimes drawn over all aspects of the university's organization and administration. There is a certain plausibility in treating some management as "scientific," if emphasis is placed on the flexible, pragmatic character of managers' judgments, and on their readiness to adapt through practical "experiments" with ways of doing things. But two major differences between authority and science must be pointed out, since they are critical for the quality of managerial pragmatism.

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*See Hart (1961): "The rules are constitutive of the sovereign....[P. 75]."

**Cf. Bendix, 1963, Pp. 274-287; R. Brown, 1966, P. 217.

First, "science" as a value-system involves a heavy burden of proof on the "authority;" he must justify ("verify") his conclusions by rigorous statements of their concrete grounds in observation, and his procedures in making those observations. In the language of modern statistics, he must find reasons to "reject the null hypothesis," or the norms of his practice require that he accept it. Similar statements could be made for common-law judges, at least on the appellate levels, who must write "opinions" relating their decisions to received bodies of law and experience. Obviously, scientists and judges vary in the manners and degrees by which these norms are observed in practice; that is true of all norms. The point is that administrative authority, as a set of claims to obedience, involves no such burden of proof on the superior--rather the contrary. In administration, the burden of proof in case of a disagreement* is on the subordinates, who usually find that burden unsupportable. This is partly because subordinates typically are under considerable disadvantage in trying to prove the inaccuracy or unwisdom of officials' accounts: They are largely unorganized, have little access to organizational records, may enjoy few skills of inquiry and argument, and have other occupational tasks that require their substantial attention. In part, however, it is because on many vital organizational issues there can be no effective "proof"--even by the most skilled and equipped of advocates. Many organizational decisions involve time-pressures and imponderable causes of human action that cannot be sorted out convincingly even after the fact. On such matters--and on any issues that managers can induce their followers to *treat* as such--"administration" is an institutionalized burden on subordinates to prove the unprovable. In such cases, the administrator wins the argument, unless a compromise agreement is reached. And he is under no general normative constraint to compromise. In theory, officials do not compromise; they decide, and bear "responsibility" for their decisions.

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*Simon (1965) calls this "the right to the last word [P. 129]."

These considerations, themselves abstractly stated, are designed to highlight some of the *implicit* ambiguities and ideological opportunities in using abstract and general justifications for decision-making power. Concrete examples of the part these play in university administration are discussed below. However, several more specific kinds of ambiguity require discussion at this point.

Normative Ambiguity in Social Explanations

Abraham Kaplan (1964) has pointed out that:

> The language of behavioral science is often marked by *normative ambiguity*, allowing for interpretation both as reporting a value and as making a valuation. This

> ambiguity is obviously present in statements about what is "normal" or "natural," but it may also be present in such less obvious cases as "lawful" or "rational [p. 378]."

"What is worse," Kaplan goes on, "normative ambiguity is only temporarily removed" by changing the terms used; new terms "soon become equally value-loaded in a society permeated by the same ideals and interests [p. 378]."

Broad concepts such as "human nature," Kaplan says, are especially liable to be "used both for statements of fact and for judgments of value."

> In particular, the range and plasticity of human responses may be prejudged to be limited in just the ways required to defend and rationalize a status quo. Locke's liberal political philosophy and Hobbes' absolutism both were derived from what they each conceived to be the "nature" of man. In quite the same way the Marxist conception of "classes" is made an instrument of social doctrine rather than of social science. But the fact that a concept is used badly in one way does not of itself imply that the concept cannot be put to good use in another way [p. 80].

These ambiguities and their uses are important for administrative executives, since they must induce their followers to "produce" for the organization, and must justify their powers of decision if they are to retain them. Both plans of action and justifications of power inescapably involve explanations of individual and organizational behavior. Thus the executive, willy-nilly, is a social engineer, and as such he has need of social and psychological "theory"--rough, changing, informal, and pragmatic though it be. To convey his plans and their rationales to others, the executive must make some more-or-less general assumptions about what people and organizations are like, what causes them to act as they do, how their actions can be changed. Unfortunately, for such official purposes, few dependable theories of human action are so far available, and the available ones are hard to apply. Thus individual executives must do their best based on their insight, cultural wisdom, fragments of theories they have read, and what seems to work. Moreover, they must make decisions involving conflicts of interest, strong feelings, and unequal benefits and contributions; therefore, the interpretations placed on their actions by others are quite likely to be normatively loaded.

Executives are not without resources in such a situation, however, and one resource most frequently used is the rhetorical device of implicit normative ambiguity.* As Kaplan (1964) implied, the term "normal" may mean either what most people do, or what one should do--perhaps because it has been "found" to be "best" by the test of collective experience. Similarly, the term "rational" can suggest a calculation of relations between ends and means or it can be taken to describe behavior and relationships that are "proper" because they are based on such calculations.

Administrators who use terms such as "rational problem-solving" to describe their style of wielding power have a powerful rhetorical tool in the implicit valuation such terms contain--the more powerful because it is implicit. What occurs in such cases is that a norm or ideal shared by speaker and audience (knowledge of means/ends relations) is used as a general term to describe the existent facts of an act or a relationship. "Ought" is used for "is"--but without signalling the difference. We shall argue later that this rhetoric importantly affects the character of authority in the university, and its breakdown.

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*Examples of this device are given below in detail; here our focus is on the character and advantages of the device itself.

"As If:" The Implicit Subjunctive

The relations of "justifying" and "explaining" may become clearer if we consider again one of Weber's attempts to define authority. In a relation of authority, or "domination," Weber (1954) said:

> The manifested [rule or decision] is meant to influence the conduct of one or more others (the ruled) and actually does influence it in such a way that their conduct to a socially relevant degree occurs as if the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake [p. 328]. (Emphasis altered.)

This "cumbersome...'as if' formula," as Weber called it, has done little to clarify the meaning of authority in subsequent scholarly discussions.* It may illuminate our present discussion, however, because it recognizes the normative ambiguity inherent in all rules and commands,* and hence in all normative systems.

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*Simon (1965), for example, talks of the subordinate allowing "the communicated decision of another to guide his own choice [P. 151]," without the "as if" formula included. Simon does note in passing that "administration is not unlike play-acting," involving a structure of organizational "roles [P. 252]." He also concedes that his book has combined discussions of "a practical science of administration (the study of what administrators 'ought')" and a "theoretical" science or "sociology of administration (the study of what administrators 'do') [P. 62n]," with some chapters being "concerned primarily with" each.

Just as many purportedly descriptive terms carry normative loadings, purported rules or commands typically imply a host of facts--for example, that they are understood by those subject to them, that they can be carried out, and so on.** In extended formal networks of social relations, such as legal systems, we frequently "act as if" things were true when we know very well that they are not. For example, we use the "legal fiction" that a corporation is a "person," in deciding what rights and obligations (should) attach to human persons. In the absence of dependable knowledge about why persons act as they do, such fictions serve as stipulated facts, allowing us to communicate with some dependability because all of us assign approximately the same meanings to the fictions. Treating them "as if" they were true, then, serves some widely shareable purposes.

But using fictions as truths necessarily dilutes the advantage of communication based on a close link of symbols to subjective experience. Specifically, using fictions requires that the communicants know the "code"--what terms are considered fictions, what "untrue" meanings are to be assigned them, in what situations and for what purposes they are to be used "as if" true. Again, the law provides a ready illustration: Laymen universally are mystified, and typically make gross errors of inference, when they first encounter the special "terms of art" and "technical" meanings that lawyers and judges employ with familiar ease to establish legal rights and duties. What causes the mystification is that laymen (by definition) do not know the "code" that lawyers use implicitly to interpret their terms in a relatively uniform way. They do not know how to act "as if" relationships were to be described by the "artificial" language that lawyers accept when dealing with "the law."*

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*Current sociological use of the term "norm" illustrates this ambiguity. Gibbs (1965), in reviewing its meanings, has included both "conventions" ("collective evaluations" of behavior "in terms of what it ought to be") and "customs" ("collective expectations as to what persons actually do") [Pp. 589, 592].

**See Barnard, 1938, P. 165. Fuller (1964) has discussed similar issues in specifying some of the inherent requisites of a "system of governing human conduct by formally enacted rules [P. 55]."

In the same way, every explicitly constructed and "conventional" structure of meanings, such as those that legitimize a structure of social power, has its narrow, special "code," which must be known and accepted before it can be used in communicating--or in believing.

Weber spent many years studying these systems of meanings, and wrote prolifically about their evolution from received traditional and religious doctrines toward claims based on notions of "rationality" and the companion notion that he called "formalism."* The "legal-rational" model he described, and which he apparently expected to prevail in the foreseeable future, involves several apparently factual "claims:" The structure of the "order" is seen as established (ultimately, on a consensual basis) by a "gapless" system of explicit rules, which has been designed and can be altered as necessary to serve collective purposes. Decision of leaders are "in principle" either applications of formal rules, or the result of the leaders' calculation of the best means to "objective" common goals. None of these claims is strictly true; they are only true "in principle." That is, they are idealized, simplified versions of the complex reality of political, legal, and administrative processes, offered and accepted (when they are accepted) not as literal truths but as normatively ambiguous justifications for a structure of power. In their descriptive and explanatory aspects, such claims rest implicitly on the notion that leaders and followers use the same code in interpreting fictions as truths.** As norms, they enjoin both leaders and followers to operate in "good faith"--that is, to try acting in the proper "as if" manner to the best of their abilities.*** We shall attempt to show later that both of these characteristics have become important in the current challenges to administrative authority in the university.

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*Kelsen (1967) has taken the leap of elaborating "the law" as a total view of society, which need not go outside itself for justifications. His work illustrates the possibilities for self-containment and circularity that may be inherent in all conceptual systems. This approach to law contrasts with that of legal "realists," who insist on viewing rules as parts in a more complex social-cultural process. See Llewellyn, 1960; Frank, 1963.

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*See Bendix, 1962, Pp. 385-399.

The Importance of Informally Shared Meanings

These considerations underscore the critical role that may be played in social organization by informal patterns of interaction and communication. Social orders require for their existence, not merely shared meanings; they require many *implicitly* shared meanings. This is especially true where formal rules are few, or are vague and must be freely "interpreted" in "application." Where shared meanings are rich and detailed, interpretation of the "spirit" of rules and decisions is made relatively easy, even where *interests* conflict. Informal adjustments will make many explicit interpretations unnecessary because they are implicitly understood, and the result is accepted as "fair."*

**Strictly speaking, according to Weber (1947), the "meaning" involved in a "social relationship" is "never a normatively 'correct' or metaphysically 'true' meaning." A social relationship "consists exclusively in the...probability of action in some definite way appropriate to this meaning. It is vital to be continually clear about this in order to avoid the 'reification' of these concepts." Nonetheless, social relationships, and all "social action," involve "a subjective meaning" which the actor "attaches" to his action, a meaning that "takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course [Pp. 118-119]." For our present purposes, it is not necessary to pursue this argument, since the familiar example of legal fictions should serve to make the point.

***In his famous essay on "Science as a Vocation," Weber (1958) seems to suggest that in some areas, such as science, he personally advocated freedom of the individual from all controls except the strong normative one to "abstain" from confusions of "fact" and "value"--to the best of his ability. He does not deal explicitly with the problem that such abstention is always difficult and often impossible, given the best of intentions.

Where a diversity of cultural backgrounds, activities, and associations attenuates the meanings implicitly shared, the task of leaders becomes very much more difficult. Lack of informal understanding can easily result from a functional division of labor, including the division into leaders and followers.

Where implicit understanding fails, the belief that existing powers are legitimate may also be threatened. Attempts by leaders to restore secure legitimacy may also be undermined, since their justifying claims will be interpreted with codes different from the one intended (implictly) by its proponents. This predicament may be seen as one major source of instability in large and differentiated organizations. Its antidote is often sought in prescriptions for vastly improved "communication" between leaders and followers, or at least between contiguous layers in a hierarchy.** It is also, plausibly, a basic source of the increasing explicitness and formalization that Weber foresaw in complex modern organizations: The rules of the game simply have to be stiuplated more openly, and some members' interpretations of them must be made legitimate, or order breaks down. It is this process also to which we may ascribe much of the high abstraction found in modern justifications of authority.[x]

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*Selznick (1964) has described some of the problems that result from increasing uses of formal rules where informal norms are attenuated. On the uses of informally shared meanings for decisional processes, see Goss (1963), Bendix (1947), and Llewellyn (1960); on implicit meanings more generally, see Polanyi (1964, 1967).

**See, e.g., Blau and Scott, 1962, Pp. 242-244.

In Chapter IV we shall examine some of the specific abstractions typically favored by modern university executives, and shall discuss the ways that these are woven into a perspective that supports administrative authority on the campus. First, however, let us look at the distinctive problems of formal authority in the large-university setting.

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*See Durkheim, 1933, Pp. 171, 287, 362.

CHAPTER III

BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITY IN UNIVERSITIES

Administrators in universities, as in other organizations, are charged with a variety of duties, which have been described in many ways (cf. Stoke, 1959; Kerr, 1963). Our focus here is not on the details of those duties but on the administrators' authority--their official power to make decisions "for" the organization, which others in the organization must follow.

In this chapter we shall look at some of the characteristics of hierarchic, rule-based authority in the specific setting of modern U.S. universities. Our aim is to provide a basis for understanding the dilemmas that campus administrators face, the ways that they attempt to meet them, and some of the effects of those attempts.

ENDURING SOURCES OF STRAIN

First, let us examine some of the conditions which have led to the current period of crisis. Bureaucratic authority has long been insecure in the academic setting, due to its competition with a complex interplay of professional and consensual principles.

Expertise and Academic Freedom

Much has been written about the conflict of "professional" and "bureaucratic" bases of authority in organizations that use high expertise (Blau & Scott, 1962). Stoke (1959) has eloquently given the flavor of this opposition, with which academic executives must contend daily:

> ...The aggrandizement of the executive person in American life is a widespread phenomenon; in education, it represents for a faculty a philosophical inversion of values.... It exalts legal authority above intellectual authority by giving the administrator, armed with legal power only, control over the scholar, armed with wisdom and knowledge. It somehow suggests that police power is superior to the power of thought [pp. 156-157].

Universities are, in some ways, extreme cases of "professionalized" organizations, since the acquisition and selective transmission of esoteric knowledge are central to their mission. One consequence is that standards of scholarship and methods of instruction are the almost exclusive province of specialized academic disciplines, which expect and tolerate relatively few intrusions from "higher" officials or managers (Clark, 1963; Etzioni, 1964).

Interlaced with the esoteric qualities of specialized research are traditions of "academic freedom," which tend to be especially strong in the major centers of research. These traditions cast a halo of uncertain scope over much of academic life. They provide an added reason for administrators to avoid trying to supervise research or teaching in any direct way--lest the detached perspective of the scholar be subordinated to official orthodoxy.

Consensual Forms and Traditions

Faculty orientations to consensual government also influence university authority, and consensual forms constrain the acceptance of hierarchic, rule-based authority in administrators. The formal responsibility of faculties for curriculum, degree requirements, and standards of work is a collective one, held by the faculty as a whole and typically exercised through its elected "senate" and/or standing committees. Consensual, even explicitly political, processes are inescapably involved here. It is true that genuine faculty participation in campus-wide academic policy is sorely attenuated in the large universities (where faculties may number 1500 or more), and that much policy has been taken over the separate academic departments. Still, collegiality survives in decision-making within departments. And, although the academic rank of the participants introduces a hierarchic element that is not without force, it is widely believed that the professional ideal of content-oriented discussion along formally equal professional colleagues is dominant in many departmental decisions.

These present-day practices and beliefs are enhanced by long-standing images of the university as a "community of scholars," a "body of equals," without managers or even permanent executives. Such "democratic" models, drawn (with some idealization) from the experience of prestigious European universities, had considerable force during the confrontations of presidents and faculties a half-century ago. They have not entirely lost their impact today.*

"Mixt" and Unclear Jurisdictions

One classic response to conflicts between specialties is a separation of powers and jurisdictions, a division of "labor" and of its control. As suggested, this device is firmly entrenched in the university setting, causing some observers to refer to its "unique dualism" of controls (Corson, 1960). But the problem of administrative authority is not solved thereby.

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*See Cattell (1913); Laski (1948, Pp. 348-360); West (1906); Daiches (1957); Presthus (1965, Pp. 20-24).

For despite their formal separation, "academic" and "nonacademic" spheres inescapably impinge upon one another, so that their borders and interrelations become blurred. Many years ago, President Eliot of Harvard (1911) made note of those "mixt questions" involving both "science" and "a right proportioning of expenditures" in the university's budget. Gould (1966) has more recently pointed to this area--where budgets and institutional forms affect substantive programs--as the critical point of ambiguity and conflict between universities and government officials. His remarks might well have been applied to the relations between faculty members and administrators (see Etzioni, 1964). In the view of Harold Stoke (1959), former president of Queens College, this interweaving of problems and interests is inevitable:

> ...At one stage in our institutional development it was generally believed that some division of power might be achieved....But such dividing lines have become steadily less useful and more indistinct. Every "academic" matter seems to involve "administration," and every administrative action seems to affect an academic interest. A faculty might use its authority to vote higher entrance requirements--but at the expense of reducing needed enrollments? The administration might be offered a million

> dollars for a new school--shall it ask the faculty whether to accept [pp. 122-123]?*

The difficulty is augmented by the very absence of a clear technical separation between faculty and administration in the processes of governance. The "academic senate" and the administrative hierarchy have their formal and separate existences on most major campuses, hence their "symbolic" separation also. But frequently there is no simple and understandable division of specific responsibilities. A classic statement of this fact was provided by the Byrne Report on the University of California at Berkeley (1965):

> In some areas the [Academic] Senate is a legislative body making basic policy, which the administration then carries out. In other areas, the administration makes basic policy, and the responsibility for implementing it is left to faculty committees, either appointed by the administration, with the advice of the Senate, or appointed by the Senate itself. In still other areas, the administration makes policy and also attends to the problems of implementing it.

Specialization Without a Specialty

Attempts to separate "administrative" and "academic" spheres of control also bring other problems. As his tasks become more specialized, the university executive must face the question of his own expertise, in his own specialty. He can legitimately claim information and experience that his faculty colleagues do not share about the typical problems and specific exigencies of institutional management. And this is important for his authority in faculty eyes, because "competence" in one's job is what the faculty specialist honors above most other things.

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*And see Horn (1962): "There is a twilight zone of authority and responsibility between the administration and the faculty that few colleges or universities have worked out satisfactorily. Given the peculiar nature of academic man and the special conditions which prevail in the academic community and inhere in the educational process, this problem may never be solved [P. 77]."

But the special competence of the academic administrator is highly precarious and contingent. In the first place, there is no esoteric specialty of "higher education" as an activity that academic men generally will acknowledge today, and in which university administrators might claim a trained and systematic "competence" akin to that of an academic discipline. Second, no expertise in "governance", administration, or management is accepted by most academic men as a specialty that might undergird the special functions that administrators have come to perform. Thus university specialists in administration today cannot convincingly claim, as a group, any distinctive expertise which might clothe their bare, formal positions with "professional" legitimacy. In the highly professionalized organization that is a university, this alone means that their authority itself is always more or less precarious.*

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*The problem of how to "train" university administrators, and whether distinctive administrative skills exist, has long been of concern to academic executives. Cf. Burns (1962); L. Wilson (1958); A. Henderson (1960), Bolman (1964); Etzioni (1964). Stoke (1959) saw this problem as a source of faculty-administration conflict: "Personal relations and personal acquaintance appear to play an important part, and no established type of either training or experience seems to govern administrative selections [P. 157]."

These facts lend credence to a fond faculty view, lately adopted by students (New York Times, 1965), that administrators in a university probably should not "manage" at all, but should simply act as "caretakers"--charged to provide the conditions that academics need for their work, but which they do not wish to spend time maintaining. The implied lack of respect can reinforce prevalent prejudices against administrators' competence in general: Every campus has heard faculty members comment that the only academics who turn to administration are those who were not fully "competent" in their scholarly work, or who are motivated by desires for personal power and prestige (Petry, 1958). Such ideas form important parts of academic mythology, and take their toll of administrative authority.

THE NEW STRESSES OF "SUCCESS"

These dimensions of the faculty orientation to formal authority have not changed dramatically over the years. But major changes in the social context of university administration have intensified the difficulties of the university executive.

The Impact of Growth

The rapid growth of student enrollments and faculty research contracts has brought in its train a vast expansion of the numbers of university faculty members and university administrators.

Large numbers of persons are now involved in each of the two specialized "types" of tasks and positions.*

The visibly growing numbers of "administrators" on the campus play their own part in creating faculty-administration tensions, especially in periods when money for increased faculty salaries is said to be unavailable. More importantly, the existence of large numbers of persons engaged in primarily administrative work helps to lay a foundation for the formation of new group-processes, the separation of "administration" and "faculty" into separate working units, and the creation of a distinctive subculture around administrative tasks and assocations.

New Clients, New Costs, New Importance

Growth in numbers has been accompanied by new demands on the university. Students have flocked to enroll at the major campuses because a postsecondary education is now recognized as necessary for most occupations carrying money and prestige in a technologically advanced society. The university's economic importance as a producer of highly trained manpower is now similarly apparent. Since the dramatic success of atomic-weapons research in World War II, quite basic and hitherto esoteric inquiry has been viewed as a newly promising tool of national power. Spurred by the 1957 triumph of Soviet space technology in launching Sputnik I, government agencies and foundations have rushed to support a host of university-run projects in engineering and the natural sciences. These new demands for advanced education and research have brought with them new and upward-spiralling public costs, so that "higher education" is now the largest single item in many state budgets, where it competes with increased demands for other state services. University professors now find themselves in much demand as consultants to industry, commerce and government. And, in some communities, location of a new university campus nearby is highly valued and sought, as a source of new payrolls, well-educated citizens, and "clean" industry.

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*A 1965 study of university administrative growth concluded that, contrary to popular conception on many campuses, the proportion of administrators to total faculty members has not increased notably, varying between 16.3 and 17.2 percent over a sample of 97 diverse institutions (Hawley, 1965). Using a somewhat different set of definitions, the U.S. Office of Education has reported figures similarly suggesting a relatively stable proportion of "general administrators" and "faculty and professional staff." (U.S. DHEW, 1964). However, it is clear that the number of administrators on any large campus involves scores of persons at the least, and may run to several hundreds.

The effect of these developments on university life is that the stakes are up: The academic world has a new visibility to the general public, and is a prime source of news for the media of mass communication. New constituencies clamor for services from the campus; new loyalties, affiliations, and commitments are entered by academics in university departments. The university has become deeply enmeshed in the social and political life of the larger society--vital to its processes, affecting and affected by its policies, vulnerable to its controversies. Decisions of professors and university executives alike have greater impact on the lives of individual young people, and on the national and local economies. At the same time, the diversity of orientations within the university is greatly increased, and agreement on a single policy throughout the institution becomes more and more improbable. As the "management" of the university becomes more consequential, its management in a simple sense becomes more difficult and less likely (Clark, 1968).

New Demands for Accountability

Moreover, because universities are so highly visible, so costly, and so dependent on state and federal funds, they are coming under ever-closer scrutiny by government officials. This means greater pressures to justify drains on the public purse--to "cut the fat" out of campus budgets, to set "formulae" for state appropriations, to require that faculty members carefully allot their time among projects differently funded, to emphasize "efficiency" through "cost-benefit" analyses of university programs. Where once academic bookkeeping approached a happy chaos, today it begins to approach a business model. Where fiscal rules once could be treated as "mock bureaucracy" (Gouldner, 1964), today many of them must be taken seriously.

Administrators become the conduits of these newly felt demands to the academic practitioner, and must search for ways of transmitting them in a form appropriate to the flexible and informal traditions of academic work (Rourke & Brooks, 1966).

Complex Administrative Specialization

Such changes have helped to advance the division of labor within the administration, and to sharpen the separation between "administrative" and "academic" tasks on the large campus. Faculty members tend more to be concerned with, and effectively control, the university's "substantive" or directly goal-oriented activities: teaching, research, and professional consultation. More and more administrators find themselves excluded from such work. Even many "academic" vice presidents, provosts, and deans of large campus units, although customarily recruited from the academic ranks, find that they must give up trying to teach or to remain current in their academic specialities, and must devote their energies exclusively to the problems of institutional support and coordination.* Other administrators lack the experience of faculty membership, and bear "nonacademic" responsibilities entirely. An increasing number of university executives spend most of their time coordinating the work of other administrators, and have little official reason for direct contact with either faculty members or students.

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*Some persons still play intermediate roles, of course. The academic dean of a college within the university may still actively teach, as will most department chairmen. Research institute directors, immersed daily in substantive problems and determined to keep their administrative duties to a minimum, are an emerging group called "managerial scholars" by some (see Sieber & Lazarsfeld, 1966, Pp. 151-208; also Etzioni, 1959, Pp. 43-67). Many senior faculty members find themselves becoming inveterate committeemen, doing "administrative" work much of the time, and leavening their "faculty" loyalties with strong doses of executive responsibility. From these ranks come many a dean or vice president; from the faculty-committee "oligarchy" comes much support for policies of the "administration" in times of crisis (see Clark, 1961, P. 298). But substantial groups of persons in every major university either work full-time in administration and are effectively committed to it, or do as little of it as possible and have little sense of responsibility for it.

These forces have produced two related developments that are critical for university authority. The first is the emergence of new patterns of association, and hence new group perspectives, among administrators and others on university campuses. The second is a symbolic separation of "the administration" from the substance of university life.

DIVERGING SOCIAL WORLDS

Executive Isolation in the University

University executives and faculty members are increasingly isolated from each other in their daily lives, while each is encouraged toward contacts mainly with his own "kind." The administrator, especially a "high-level" executive of a prestigious and fast-growing institution, is a chronically busy man. The sheer volume of the demands upon him, and the number of faculty members on his campus, make it effectively impossible for a vice president or "executive dean" to meet regularly with any significant portion of the institution's faculty.* Much less can he get to know many of them personally, forming lasting ties. Often, an administrator's duties require him to make official judgments about competing faculty interests, and he can no longer expect the free and collegial interaction he may have enjoyed with his colleagues when he was primarily a faculty member. O. Meredith Wilson (1965), when President of the University of Minnesota, put it this way:

> The position of a university administrator is austere and lonely because though to be selected as chancellor he must be trained as a scholar, he must cut the bridges between him and the scholarly community when he accepts his new post. The chasm created is a real one, though not of his choosing. The faculty may urge a candidate because he respects learning, but the moment he becomes an administrator, they have a guild obligation to suspect him. He no longer can sit with them in judgment to determine the fate of students; he will now sit in judgment on them....[p. 8].

Campus executives do not ordinarily emphasize such barriers to communication when speaking on their own campuses. (Wilson was a visiting speaker.) However, a long list of academic administrators have written sadly about the isolation to which high-ranking university executives (especially presidents) are subject.

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*See Kerr (1963): "As the institution becomes larger, administration becomes more formalized and separated as a distinct function; as the institution becomes more complex, the role of administration becomes more central in integrating it; as it becomes more related to the once external world, the administration assumes the burdens of these relationships. The managerial revolution has been going on also in the university [P. 28].

Samuel B. Gould (1967), now President of the State University of New York, has written eloquently:

> If the university's leadership rests with the academic administrator, all manner of hurdles conspire to make his tasks difficult, if not occasionally impossible. The typical educational administrator today is caught up in such a frenetic set of circumstances that he is mercilessly and effectively alienated from the world of thought. This state is not usually voluntary on his part: He struggles manfully to organize his life, with time for reading, for contemplation, for cultural refreshment. Yet, as time passes and every day seems full of urgencies, he becomes captive to the calendar of appointments that ebb and flow every 30 minutes like accelerated tides; to the round of committee meetings on budget, buildings, book purchases, benefactors, and bottlenecks; to the academic and social rituals; to the annual conferences and conventions.... [p. 9].

Such effects may be greatest in positions like President Gould's present one as head of a multi-campus university "system." However, by the account of some campus executives, the problem is by no means confined to such posts. Lawrence Kimpton, when Chancellor of the University of Chicago, wrote in a report to his faculties that:

> ...a good dean is a very pleasant thing to have around, but he shares the weakness of the head of the institution--he rarely knows what is going on because he is too little directly confronted by the faculty (Corson, 1960).

And Stoke (1959), put the problem poignantly when President of Queens College:

> No matter how much each might wish it otherwise, the evolution of the colleges and universities is forcing presidents to be managers and faculties to be scholars. For presidents there is a law of primacy: The more insistent administrative duty drives out the less insistent intellectual interest....Eventually his preoccupation with "housekeeping", however irritating and deplorable it may

> be to a new president of scholarly interests, weans the mind and creates a mood of resignation. The phenomenon is universal; the process, longer and more painful for some than for others [p. 125].

Richard Sullivan (1956), while President of Reed College, made a 1954 study of "administrative-faculty relationships" in 18 diverse colleges and universities. In his published report, he pointed to the "conflict of principles" involved in calling both for "open and rapid communications" and also for a "clear and orderly definition and delegation of authority."

> As the latter does take place, it frequently is attended by an increase in remoteness of the principal officers. This in turn decreases the possibility of immediate, direct communication. The only resolutions of the dilemma that I observed [in the course of the study] seem to be in the use of principles of representative government [p. 318].

And Logan Wilson, a sociologist by profession, wrote of these matters in abstract language as long ago as 1942:

> Heterogeneity and sheer size break down elasticity of structure and informality of relations as the social system becomes more formalized. A corps of secretaries insulates the president from faculty contacts; many of his lesser functions are delegated to deans, who in turn have assistant deans....[p. 81].

Campus Executive Councils

Robbed of full and free communication with their faculty colleagues, campus executives do not simply stop communicating with anyone. Both work and propinquity encourage them to communicate with their administrative "colleagues," and new patterns of association are thereby created.

On most large campuses, a dozen or so high-level administrators meet regularly in an "administrative council" sharing perspectives on specific problems of university management.* Administrators' discussions of these councils tend to treat them simply as organizational tools, without unanticipated effects (Dodds, 1962). However, such councils, and the "kitchen cabinets" that emerge within some of them, may well be among the major forces shaping university executives' perspectives in their daily working lives. Not infrequently, personal ties are formed around working associations and these may be explicitly encouraged to help create an administrative "team." On some campuses, this group is routinely talked of by its members as "the Central Administration."

It seems clear that groups variously called administrative councils, cabinets, and the like are important policy-making bodies, not just presidential advisers, passive recipients of information, or conduits of policies to be implemented. Edward H. Litchfield (1956), when Chancellor of the University of Pittsburg, noted the power of consensus in such a group:

> ...In our institution, the vice-chancellors and assistant chancellors in charge of primary staff and supporting areas meet several times a week to consider major decisions in almost exactly the same way that a committee in

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*For a business-like description of business-like administrative council meetings at Michigan State University, see Norton-Taylor, 1967: "A corporate executive looking at the organizational chart would feel he was on familiar ground at the outset [P. 162]."

> a corporate organization would function. Great care must be taken to make certain that such a group does not exercise choice, for this, in large measure, should be reserved for the chief executive, although such a group tends to develop a consensus which, more often than not, becomes the chief executive's choice. In any event, the group participates actively and significantly in the other steps in the decision-making activity, for it does assist in defining issues, in casting up alternative solutions, and in deliberating on them. Such a device, of course, has assets in respect to communication and coordination which are above and beyond its role in decision-making [p. 494].*

During the interviews conducted in this study, there were frequent acknowledgments that "policy" is routinely made in a council of campus executives. Here is one example:

> The Cabinet is the important group; we keep detailed minutes on it. It's our day-to-day policy team. The Administrative Council here is the Cabinet plus the deans. It meets once a term. It advises the president; mostly it gets information after the decision is made....The President usually meets with the Cabinet immediately after the [Board] meeting. (Executive assistant, state university.)

Another executive assistant, himself a tenured professor on special assignment, also made it clear that a smaller group within his campus's administrative council was the critical one:

> After a few meetings you single each other out, the few who tend to keep their cool, for example, when things

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*Cf. Millett (1962, P. 195): "To the extent that [a council of deans and other administrative officers] does in effect represent faculty points of view or is considerate of those points of view, this arrangement may be satisfactory in practice. But a group of this kind is often apt to forget, or to fail to distinguish, when it is making a decision preponderantly one of academic concern and when it is making a decision preponderantly one of administrative concern. Faculty members often desire an elected consultative committee...."

> get hot....[Do we feel strong loyalties to each other after solving a number of problems together?] Sure, you wouldn't be human if you didn't think you were a bunch of pretty good guys....

And the president of a state university discussed similar complexities at his institution:

> The Cabinet meets weekly. Yes, it's a policy-making body, doing the administrative work of the institution. There are no votes; I make the decisions, and I am rarely reversed....I also have a "kitchen cabinet" that is pretty intimate. After five o'clock, they'll stop in, tell a few dirty jokes, or laugh about things that have happened....

"Outside" Associations

High-ranking university executives also find themselves "marginal men," destined to associate frequently with university trustees, state legislators, alumni delegates, Federal bureaucrats, and other civic leaders. Some accommodation to these groups' ways of thought becomes almost inevitable. Indeed, university administrators typically find that they share with these groups common concerns for institutional "responsibility" that are frequently far less salient among their faculty "colleagues." Honest conviction thus helps to solidify the contacts begun in ritual courtesy and insitutional ceremony. For some administrators, the respect and even awe accorded them when they meet the outside world as university spokesmen contrasts pleasurably with the lower prestige of administrators inside academe. These contacts therefore add their bit to shaping the administrator's perspective on university life;

he becomes more aware of the "reasonableness" of many nonacademics' views.

Inter-campus Ties

Increasingly, also, university officials meet their opposite numbers in other institutions away from their campuses, at meetings of the many regional and national boards, commissions, advisory councils, inter-university groups, and "professional" associations of administrative specialties. Literally scores of voluntary groups are peopled principally by campus administrators. Their meetings are at once Rotary conventions and "scholarly" conferences for the participants. Some of the administrative specialty-groups work deliberately in these sessions to develop "professional" identities, and foster self-conscious sharing of "expertise" or "viewpoints" on problems typically met by their members (Nygreen, 1966). At other meetings, deans or presidents "represent" their universities, and the focus is more general. Here one hears speeches on "educational policy" problems, business-like discussions of relations with the Federal Government, and more or less rueful jokes about the problem of being "hated by everyone" back home. At both types of meetings, corridor talk and after-meeting conversations over drinks usually turn to the "politics" of campus, inter-campus, or support-source relations, and to the characteristic, persistent dilemmas faced by the administrative group to which the speakers belong.

Through such interactions confidences are exchanged and perspectives compared. The participants come to realize (often with some relief) that others face problems similar to their own, and that they, too, have haltingly approached similar solutions. Thus the range of alternative administrative actions and postures is defined, and shaped for future reference. Group processes and identities are established, and later are maintained by long-distance phone calls, jet trips, and correspondence.

Attempts to Rebuild "Communication"

Some university executives have tried to overcome their separation from "academic" affairs by renewed efforts--to get better "information," to "communicate" more "personally" with students and faculty, to remain involved in their academic specialties, even to teach a course occasionally. These devices help to reimmerse the academic executive in the activities and ways of thinking typical to the nonexecutive life, renewing his sense of the academic subcultures. But the pressures of time and of more clearly "administrative" work are strong obstacles. Overwork is one answer: A large university president stated with evident pride, during an interview, that he spends most of his evenings and many of his weekends at "informal" social gatherings with faculty and students from his campus, for the specific purpose of "keeping in touch" and "finding out what people are thinking." Others actively cultivate personal friendships with representatives of influential faculty groups--hoping that these will not be seen as "palace cliques" by those who are not included.

More acceptably, dozens of advisory groups and "administrative committees" of faculty members are created, to give assurances that administrative actions will not stray too far from "representative" faculty opinions. A related device is the cultivation of oligarchy and bureaucracy within the faculty itself (Clark, 1961) through the proliferation of academic-senate committees--aided, where possible, by key faculty members of the Committee on Committees. But these tactics also have their limitations. They must be handled delicately and with great skill, lest they backfire in resentment against administrative "manipulation" of faculty government.

A safer technique has gained currency lately: the appointment of respected faculty members as part-time "special assistants" to the chief executive. These men help him keep in touch with the special problems of the day, and speak his piece from a vantage point closer to the "pure" academic status. This tactic is especially inviting where administrative "arbitrariness" and the legitimacy of authority are specifically at issue, as in the "student affairs" area today. Even here there are hazards. One popular philosophy teacher, who was among those closest to student activist leaders, later became his campus's prime symbol of the "cooptation" that "inevitably" occurs when one enters administration--

thereby "proving" to student activists that "responsible cooperation" with administrators was incompatible with independent judgment.

SYMBOLIC SEPARATENESS OF ADMINISTRATION

The specialization of tasks, the restriction of associations, the visibility of executive status, the unwelcome burden of conveying accountability--all of these conspire to accentuate the separateness of "The Administration" as a distinct and even alien segment of the university. Significantly, this segment is peculiarly identifiable with a classic ill of bureaucracy: displacement of organizational goals by "the organization" itself (Merton, 1957). Not only are the demands of the formal organization now greater, and "The Administration" distinctively associated with them; this often appears its only domain. Thus it becomes easy for faculty members and students to blame "The Administration" for all bureaucratic excesses, such as "red tape" or the constraints due to general rules. "The Administration" becomes prominently associated with growing "outside" pressures on the university, in many academics' minds. The symbolic gap dividing "The Administration" from the substance and authenticity of daily academic life is thereby widened, and this has its force in making the gap a real one.

Such symbolism flourishes especially well when members of an association know each other very little as individuals, losing detail and texture from their acquaintances, so that broad styles and stereotypical features of actions must be relied on in forming judgments. In today's large university, radical shrinkage of informal contacts has produced just such a result, reducing to broad stereotypes the knowledge that most administrators have of most faculty members and students--and *vice versa*. A major effect, in the context of the other changes mentioned, has been to erode the informal relationships between administrators and faculty members, relationships which engendered and sustained the trust necessary for an easy exercise of administrative authority, and which muted potential conflicts in the university of an earlier day.

The problems created by this conjunction of tasks, associations, and symbolic unity within "The Administration" have one further manifestation that is important for their authority. These events have laid a basis for the development of an "official perspective"--a set of generalized justifications for executive authority in the university--growing out of and associated with the tasks and experiences that university executives share. This perspective will occupy our attention in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THE OFFICIAL PERSPECTIVE OF UNIVERSITY EXECUTIVES

Faced by erosion of the informal bases for their formal authority, and encouraged by their growing isolation as a cadre of managers, university administrators have tended to evolve a distinctive view of academic governance that expresses their shared concerns and purposes. While helping them to "make sense" for *themselves* out of the complex imperatives they experience, it also serves to shore up their weakening legitimacy, and thereby supports their continued exercise of power.

This chapter will describe and discuss the "official perspective" of large-university executives in the United States. First, however, let us suggest what is meant by such a "perspective," and present evidence that the notion has some validity.

THE MEANING OF AN "OFFICIAL PERSPECTIVE"

We shall use terms such as "official perspective" and "administrative perspective" to describe a more-or-less integrated set of concepts and arguments that are frequently used to rationalize and thereby justify the exercise of formal authority by executives. The meaning is approximately that used by Weber (1947, 1954) when he referred to the "mutually inter-dependent ideas" and the "principles of its legitimation" to which every exercise of "domination" must "appeal" for "self-justification." Instead of the "ultimate principles" to which he devoted his attention, however, we shall concentrate on somewhat more specific conceptions--the formulations (still very abstract) that have actually been used by academic executives in recent years to cope with the problems they face.

Pragmatic Development of Ideology

It is not assumed here that most modern executives have a clear "philosophy," or a well-worked-out set of principles by which they justify their decisions and their right to make them. Instead it seems probable that most American executives are self-styled pragmatists, eschewing rigid "dogmas" or "ideologies" for "experimental" adaptation to circumstances (White, 1957). The meanings they attach to their official actions, and the conceptions they develop as they explain and justify these acts to others, are products of their cultural backgrounds, their current associations, and the pressures of their official tasks. Thus a "perspective" is worked out pragmatically in action, as leaders attempt to make sense of their experiences and learn what their associates will accept as making sense to them.* Moreover, executives work with the recurrent dilemmas of personal and social interests, conflicting codes of morality, and imperatives toward both symbolic regularity and organizational "results," with what they feel is far too little time for reflection.

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*See Bendix (1962): "Weber recognized that much behavior is meaningful and yet not the result of conscious deliberation. The conventional behavior that men in a society take for granted is very often meaningful; it makes sense to them. 'Making sense' is actually a better translation of the German Sinn [used by Weber in this connection] than the term 'meaning' which tends to have a poetic or philosophical connotation, such as the German word Bedeutung [P. 474n]." For an attempt to elaborate the concept of a "perspective" as worked out in action, see Becker, Geer, Hughes & Strauss (1961, Pp. 435-443).

Thus, in practice, the degree to which executives have a clear notion of what their "perspective" is, varies subtly and is difficult to document. How far an executive believes consciously in the perspective that emerges in his public statements, even most executives themselves probably are not sure. As one university dean wrote at the end of his questionnaire:

> I cannot find a consistent pattern in my answers. This, I think, reflects the ambivalence in academic administration decision-making as opposed to business or other administrative situations. I am really surprised at my own answers!

Similarly, there is little reason to suppose that most leaders are constantly questioning the legitimacy of the authority-structure within which they wield power, or the propriety of their own incumbencies. If they think about it at all, Weber (1958) suggests, there is usually available to them an ennobling rationale for their power. In a bureaucracy, every decision is explainable "in principle" as either the application of a rule or a calculation of the best means to "objective" common goals. Thus, whatever their "motives" (Weber, 1947), which will usually move them to keep their power, leaders can with some plausibility feel "selfless" (Chinoy, 1950) in their use of power for "the common good."

This does not change the fact that these justifications serve to maintain the leaders' own power. In practice, and from the point of view of informed observers, the degrees to which their actions empirically serve specific purposes are extremely varied, and dependent on circumstances far more complex than their general justification by "functional" bureaucratic principles. Thus the ennobling justifications worked out in all sincerity by executives, as they deal pragmatically with the problems of leadership, serve not only purported common purposes but special, factional purposes as well. For executives, they are self-justifications, the ideology of a socially positioned group.

In part because of this uncomfortable fact, university administrators tend (as we shall see) to deny that anything like a patterned "perspective" is characteristic of academic executives generally, or that executive position carries any constraints on action and viewpoint that cannot be surmounted simply by acts of individual effort and determination. For this reason, it seems worthwhile at this point to review briefly some of the theoretical and empirical studies focusing on the phenomenon of "perspectives" that are characteristic of leadership groups.

Theories of a Leadership "Perspective"

Our term "official perspective" is taken from the writing of the American jurisprude Edmond Cahn (1963), who described the "imperial or official perspective" with which he saw most "legal philosophy" as imbued. "In this perspective, one assesses the factors of freedom and security from the point of view of the official processors of government [P. 5]." Most thinkers on law and government, he suggested, had "developed their theories while observing the ways of empires, kingdoms, aristocracies, and republican oligarchies [P. 4]." This circumstance led them to "appraise the factors" involved in a social decision from the point of view of the needs of the social "system", and of those charged with "processing" persons as bureaucratic units in a functional scheme. "The official perspective is not confined to despotic and tyrannical regimes," he said; its user's "motive may be kindly and benevolent." It is to be found wherever decisions turn upon the needs of "systems" as such, as distinguished from those of the specific persons involved.

Cahn called for "shifting the focus" of official decisions from the concerns of "processors" to those of the "consumer of law and government," who must live under the conditions imposed by institutions. He argued that the law's primary concern should be for "concrete experiences of the members of the community," especially those who "are powerless to protect themselves." This meant, he said, no "simplistic formula...no lazy hierarchy of values" for deciding among the diverse and often conflicting "felt needs" of persons. It meant only the avoidance of an official "bias" giving primary weight to "administrative convenience," a decision's impact on "possible future cases," and the "needs" of legal systems over those of human beings [Pp. 1-15].

Cahn's primary concern was the bias he saw in judicial decisions and legal criticism. Other writers have focussed on the impact of a growing "manager" class in administrative organizations. Karl Mannheim (1936, 1940), the most influential sociologist to have studied the "social conditioning" of men's ideas, saw the division into managers and managed as a basically consequential aspect of modern production-organizations. He foresaw the development of greater "rational" capacities in managers as a result of their demanding tasks, and lesser capacities in operatives who must dependently accept others' management. However, he also described a "fundamental tendency of all bureaucratic thought...to turn all problems of politics into problems of administration."

> [This tendency] may be explained by the fact the sphere of activity of the official exists only within the limits of laws already formulated. Hence the genesis or the development of law falls outside the scope of his activity.

As a result of this "socially limited horizon," Mannheim argued, the "administrative, legalistic mind has its own peculiar type of rationality." "Every bureaucracy tends to generalize its own experience" and confuses the specific legal order that it represents with order in general. As a consequence, all "irrational" social forces are ignored, "and when these nevertheless force themselves to the fore, they are treated as 'routine matters of state'." Even "the eruption of collective energies in a revolution" is regarded as "an untoward event within an otherwise ordered system," rather than as "the living expression of fundamental social forces...." The consequence of such tendencies, Mannheim (1936) said, is a basic though implicit, conservatism, singlemindedly protective of the status quo that the particular bureaucracy represents.

Mannheim's arguments drew heavily on his observations of "bureaucratic conservatism" among the intellectually oriented officials of German states. But similar tendencies were seen by the German-French-Italian writer Robert Michels (1915) during his study of European socialist parties. In a far-reaching and passionately stated book, Michels (1915) detailed a number of circumstances that, he said, inexorably separated the elected leaders of mass democratic-reform movements from their followers--as direct results of their activities and associations as leaders. Their change in tasks (in the specific case, from manual to intellectual work) led to a "profound psychological transformation" in these leaders. New knowledge of organizational "rules and regulations" and of "the economic side" of industrial organization helped to give them a sense of personal separateness and of obligations distinct from their followers. The necessity for working with outsiders, Michels said, means that the leader of an organization critical of society "accommodates himself to the existing order." He acquires a "conscientious conviction" that party policies should be moderated lest they become "ineffective" and "endanger gains made." Tenure in office is important to leaders' competence in serving their followers' interests; however, tenure itself brings on "a tendency to isolate themselves," as a distinct working group. This isolation feeds on and reinforces an "oligarchical mode of thought," such that the leader "imagines that he knows the needs of [his followers] better than these do themselves." The leaders thus may attempt to remain in office, not from any simple "lust for power," but because of their "great devotion to duty," and the "sincere conviction of their own value...to the common cause [Pp. 102-104, 229-230, 277-278, 301-306]."

Among contemporary sociologists, Merton (1957) has described the effect that structural influences may be expected to have on the "personality" of the bureaucrat, whose work demands strict adherence to formalistic rules and impersonal "secondary" relations between officials and their clients. By contrast, Bendix (1952) emphasized that bureaucratic positions involve imperatives toward initiative and risk-taking as well as formalistic rule-following--a point that is important to our present concern with "rule-skeptical" university officials. But Bendix (1963) has also detailed the uses to which specific ideologies of organizational relations, such as the "human relations" theory of Elton Mayo, have been put to induce an "ethic of work-performance" in industrial workers.

Selznick (1943) has theorized that, as a general matter, "bureaucrats, like every other social type with a power-position to maintain, construct an ideology peculiar to their social position [Pp. 52-54]." (Emphasis in original.) Among the "general characteristics" of this ideology he specified (a) "...the idea that any opposition immediately places the very existence of the organization in jeopardy;" (b) arguments for "centralization" of control in the interest of "the professed aims of the group as a whole," (c) calls for "collective submission to the collective will," based on "the notion that the group has the democratic right to abdicate its power" to leaders, and (d) a general tendency "to don the mantle of conservatism, with its many variant expressions justifying the maintenance of existing conditions." (Emphasis in original.)

March and Simon (1958) dealt with similar issues, but less directly, in their discussion of "problem-solving and persuasion" as "analytic" ways of handling organizational conflicts. They distinguished these modes from "bargaining and politics"--the latter being processes that (1) make visible the "status and power differences in the organization," and (2) "acknowledge" or "legitimize" a "heterogeniety of goals" among members of the organization. These authors hypothesized systematic tendencies for managers to distort the true situation by insistence on treating all problems as "analytic" ones:

> Because of these consequence of bargaining, we predict that the organizational hierarchy will perceive (and react to) all conflict as though it were in fact individual rather than intergroup conflict. More specifically, we predict that almost all disputes in the organization will be defined as problems in analysis, that the initial reactions will persist even when they appear to be inappropriate, that there will be a greater explicit emphasis on common goals where they do not exist than where they do, and that bargain-

> ing (when it occurs) will frequently be concealed within an analytic framework [P. 131].

At another point, these authors specified the hypothesis that "similarity of present positions" in an organization affects "the extent to which goals are viewed as shared [P. 70]."

In an earlier work, Simon (1965) argued explictly that systematic biases are produced by administrative positions. He observed that sub-unit administrators tend to have narrow "identifications" and "focus of attention" as a result of "their position in the structure." He argued for 'trying to "transfer allegiance from the smaller to the larger organizational units, and from the narrower to broader objectives [Pp. 204-218]." He did not consider explicitly that a special, narrow "focus of attention" might attach to the position of administrators whose concern is the "larger organization unit" as such. But he described a general and "all-pervasive" phenomenon of individuals' "identification with group or with function" which creates a recurrent problem of "reconciling the 'role-taking' that the organization imposes on individuals with the achievement of goals transcending these particular roles [Pp. 201, 206]." And he specified that the ambiguity inherent in "the higher levels" of administration makes the problem especially important there:

> At the lower levels of the hierarchy, the frame of reference within which decisions is to take place is largely given....At the higher levels of the hierarchy, the task is an artistic and an inventive one. New values must be sought out and weighed; the possibili-

> ties of new administrative structures evaluated. The very framework of reference within which decision is to take place must be constructed.
>
> It is at these higher levels that organizational identifications may have their most serious consequences.... At the higher levels, identifications serve to predetermine the decision, and to introduce among its assumptions unrecognized and unverified valuations [Pp. 217-218].

Empirical Studies

Persuasive empirical evidence also exists for the notion that leadership positions tend to have systematic effects on the viewpoints of their occupants. Dearborn and Simon (1958) adduced empirical data showing that "each executive will perceive those aspects of a situation that relate specifically to the activities and goals of his department [Pp. 140-144]." Detailed surveys by Stouffer and his associates (1949) showed that military officers consistently tend to perceive a greater degree of company pride and respect for rank among enlisted men than was reported by the enlisted men themselves. The authors ascribed these differences in part to a "psychological" tendency "to project one's own attitudes upon the men [P. 393]." However, the many differences of "perspective" between the two groups could "in no case" be "accounted for simply in terms of differences in background characteristics [Pp. 394-395]." They concluded that "a class patterning of views," stemming from "the basic social system of the Army [P. 395]," created inescapable "barriers to communication" which were "augmented by the fostering of status differences and phsycial as well as social distance between officers and men [Pp. 396-397]."

Gouldner (1947) found that workers who became trade-union leaders--especially unmarried workers whose associations tended to stay within the union--became oriented to union concerns in ways that conflicted with broader social and cultural values. One group, the "progressive" leaders, placed great importance on "responsibility" to a new "calling"--leadership in the union as a "superpersonal" agency through which one could work for "his 'principles' and for 'humanity'."

Lieberman (1956) reported similar findings from a controlled longitudinal study comparing workers who became foremen or shop steward with those who "had not changed roles." He found that

> the experimental groups underwent systematic changes in attitudes after they were placed in their new roles, while the control groups underwent no changes or less....The workers who were made foremen tended to become more favorable toward management, and the workers who were made stewards tended to become more favorable toward the union [P. 401].

Foremen who later reverted to the worker's role "tended to revert to the attitudes they had previously held while they were in the worker role," while those remaining foremen either maintained their pro-management attitudes or strengthened them.

This brief review should suffice to indicate that the phenomenon of a "perspective" characterizing leadership groups is not a new or fanciful idea among students of social organization. The scope and importance of such perspectives remain vague, however, as do their precise origins in a complex of personal, social, and cultural forces.* The issue before us at present is how far an "official perspective" is characteristic of formal leaders in the large, complex universities of the United States. Thus an army, with its emphasis on formal rank, is not a university, and inferences cannot be simply drawn from one organizational setting to the other. Nonetheless, visible differences in statuses, tasks, and associations can be observed in academic settings. And some organizational characteristics implied by earlier theorists--such as the precarious support and the commitments to social criticism involved in social-reform movements--are frequently said to apply to universities also.

The Effects of Isolation on Academic Executives

Few empirical studies have thrown direct light on the effects of leadership positions in academic life.** However, as we saw in the last chapter, the problem of executive isolation from academic contacts and pursuits has often benn noted by university administrators themselves. In their reflective writings, campus executives have also repeatedly referred to systematic effects deriving from this isolation.

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*Haire (1966, P. 179). The general phenomenon of social influences on attitudes and perceptions is familiar by now to psychologists and other social scientists (Walker & Heyns, 1962). There is continuing exploration and debate on the respective importances of "tasks" (Breer & Locke, 1965; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), "roles" (Linton, 1945; Sarbin, 1968), "reference groups" (Shibutani, 1962), the "communication of norms" (Newcomb, Turner & Converse, 1965), and other explanatory variables.

**Grambsch and Gross (1968), using abstract statements of alternative university "goals," found very little disparity between the rankings of these goals by administrators and by faculty members.

After his 1954 study, Sullivan (1956) described a risky lessening of "communication" as one major result of the academic executive's "remoteness" in his new "occupation." He observed that "individuals change when they begin to wield authority, and individuals change under the imposition of authority:"

> The former may move either toward impatience of indecision, and the latter develop defenses and aggressions, torpor and restlessness. The president may forget in time that an admission of infallibility does not make him less than human, or he may increase his original susceptibility to vacillation. Over time the faculty may increasingly resent either arbitrary decisions handed down from on high and rebel, or may go to seed under wavering and uncertain leadership [P. 324].

C. C. Bowman (1946), after "recent experiences as an administrator-professor hybrid", argued for a view of "administrators and professors" as "social types," each of which "moves in an environment that molds the mind and the personality" with resultant "misunderstandings."

> ...Each group lives in its own environment and develops habits and attitudes appropriate to the demands of that environment. The professor becomes a narrow specialist.... As a man of immediate affairs, the president or dean must deal with persons and situations as they are. The practical man is not a reformer. He tends to believe that the status quo (in which he plays a leading part) is essentially sound....Of course a few minor improvements are needed, he will admit [Pp. 680-681].

As a sociologist, Logan Wilson in 1942 saw social effects as inevitably resulting from the administrator's separate and elevated status:

> ...[In] America there is a high premium on executive work; this being true there is a strong tendency for other parts of the social structure to be assimilated to such a dominant part. Academic men, like other men, relish authority, so that functional cleavages easily turn into relationships of superiors and subordinates [P. 86].

Wilson went on to emphasize that constraints are inherent in administrative positions, even for persons who have a "first-hand understanding of the scholar's point of view:"

> ...What should be stressed is that administrators are under situational imperatives to place emphasis upon practical efficiency and even short-cut methods. These imperatives may result in actions ranging from mild paternalism to complete tyranny, with regents or trustees lending support to or forcing 'business-like methods [P. 87].'* (Emphasis supplied.)

Benezet (1962) has repeatedly warned of a "tendency" in executive positions that comes very close to what we have called "organizational bias":

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*A number of writers have seen the problem of executive isolation as one of "time." In some cases the concern has been time for "communication," as in Sullivan's article, for "keeping in touch with his faculty or with his students" (Corson, 1960, P. 61); in other cases it has been time for "reading, for contemplation, for cultural refreshment" (Gould, 1967), "time to think" (Benezet, 1962, P. 108) or "presidential time for education" (Dodds, 1962, P. 60). Corson (1960) arguing that the problem of the president's time was due to a "tendency to devote his time to the wrong things [P. 78n]," implicitly de-emphasized the force of the "situational imperatives" described by Wilson (1942, P. 87).

> Similarly, among the greatest struggles the president may have will be the fight between the increasing tendency toward institutionalism--the preserving function--and the hardy defense of institutional hazards such as free inquiry and expression on the campus [P. 108].

And Harold Stoke (1959), in his insightful book on _The American College President_, found "the fundamental source of conflict" between faculty members and administrators in the fact that different "activities" are "vested in different persons who are exclusively occupied with their own particular division of labor [Pp. 152-153]." Stoke went on:

> The college president's concern is the institution; the concern of the faculty is the care of a field of knowledge of which they are the trustees....The view of each gradually becomes crystallized into _a habit of looking at things_ which is automatically evoked when administration and faculty come into contact [P. 155]. (Emphasis supplied.)

On the basis of these studies and descriptions, the idea of a special "perspective" associated with administrators remains a complex one. It may be summarized for our present purposes as follows: Positions of official leadership, through the activities and associations they entail, affect their occupants' "identifications," communication patterns, and ways of thinking. By honest conviction, most executives incline to conservative postures where their own organizations are concerned. These convictions are frequently expressed in ideological form--to serve their organization's goals, to safeguard its existing authority structure, to maintain their own power as its official representatives. Doubt and guile are largely unnecessary to this process; instead, leaders develop "habits" of thought, implicit definitions of what is true and necessary, that justify a wide range of executive discretion in the name of the common good.

These facts are of great importance for relations of authority, as we shall argue in a later chapter. At present, however, let us turn to the first element in the official perspective of university executives.

LEGITIMACY OF RULES OR OF JURISDICTIONS?

Discussion of "bureaucratic" authority conjures up thoughts of formalistic rules, and of petty bureaucrats who follow them slavishly to the detriment of human needs (Merton, 1957). Max Weber (1947) saw bureaucratic, or legal-rational, authority as basing its claims for legitimacy on a structure of rules, rather than on the sanctity of tradition or the personal qualities of a "charismatic" leader. Some of these rules create administrative offices with delimited jurisdictions and specified duties; others lie "in principle" behind most decisions that administrative officials make on behalf of their organizations. However, rule-following is only one imperative under which administrators work: Weber (1954) argued that every legal order must balance its adherence to formal rules with actions based on ethical norms, political or economic expediency, and other "substantive" criteria. At least equally important in modern "functional" organizations is the assurance of reasonable "results" in terms of the organization's avowed goals. This complex of imperatives requires much initiative, enterprise, and discretionary judgment of the executives who bear its burden (Bendix, 1952). It may not be surprising, then, that executives of the complex modern university seem to be much more concerned with the wise use of informed judgment than with the correct following of formal rules.

Rules as Executive "Guidelines"

Most high-ranking university executives are "rule-skeptics (Hart, 1961)." One finds relatively little discussion in the literature of academic administration on the importance of rules for decisions. However, university executives interviewed in this study quite typically expressed the belief that rules should properly enter university life only as broad "guidelines," setting approximate limits within which most issues are determined by informed discretion and by the many rough compromises of "human relations." Because they provide an important background for later analysis, let us look in some detail at representative replies of interviewees when they were asked what place, in general, rules should play in university administration:

> (a)--You have to have rules. And you have to enforce them, but you work for orderly change in the bad ones. It's not fast enough for [some students], but we were working on the speaker's rule before the students were. It was left over from the McCarthy days before I came. The confrontation that the students provoked made the [Board] vote me down. We would have solved it more quickly without the pressure. (President, state university.)

(b)--Your purposes shouldn't necessarily be written down. An administrator has to deal with the objective purposes as he sees them. (Chief business officer, state university.)

(c)--I think the rules are too codified now. But they can be a very helpful crutch in making decisions....For example, how to award honorary degrees, and whether that has to go to the Faculty Council. ...Too often, you can see the development of "parties" on such issues, and parliamentary law is used as a weapon....(Assistant to the president, state university.)

(d)--We work within rules constantly. The board has many rules, and so has the legislature, so many that a lot of our discretion is taken away. Even the vice-president's prerogative to waive [degree requirements] has been taken away. It's now held by the Board. They even *audit* the degree requirements now, *to the credit hour*! (Registrar and admissions director, state university.)

(e)--...If there is a chance of someone getting hurt, I would make an exception. Otherwise, a secretary could do my job. I'm afraid of administrators who won't make exceptions. If you structure the university very firmly with rules, administrators become regulators, not educators. I'm an *educator*. We all need to deal with *individuals*. For example, admissions is under my supervision. If it was run objectively, no Negroes and no rural people would get in....An educator moves more slowly in decision-making. He must collect the facts, he goes about it in a scientific manner, as I learned to do it in freshman science. You identify alternatives and see the consequences of each.

...When you ask if you should make an exception, you should ask: Who would be hurt by the rule? Would [an exception] make the person less responsible, more delinquent, less mature? Or would it harm others? Are you making an exception for a guy who's going to cause trouble, who's really a disorderly cuss? ...You have to think about the name and prestige of the university. Would you be keeping around a mediocrity?

We need policies rather than rules, guidelines to decisions with a minimum of regulation. We should emphasize education, and leave [other problems] to the courts.... (Vice-president, state university.)

(f)--I see the need for some rules. They need to be stated much more clearly in some cases. ...The courts today are saying that you must be able to understand the rules. I agree. University rules are moving away from *in loco parentis*--"you behave" within the pattern--and *I am* for that. That's not appropriate for a university--or for parents. But I'd try to minimize the number of rules. The more rules and the more specific ones you have, the less you need administration. A clerk can just open the book and [apply specific rules]. The administrator has a responsibility to adjust himself in thousands of ways to deal with problems of individuals as they come up.... It takes ability, authority, and courage to deal constantly with the exceptions. The deans often want to apply rules literally....We get fewer appeals up here from the colleges that deal with students individually; the others produce dozens.... (Academic vice-president, state university.)

(g)--The NSA and some others are calling for more specific rules on students, I see, and philosophically I agree. But we've worked on this for about six or seven years, with some good attorneys, and there's [no good way to do it.] You'd have to get all the state, city, and University rules and hand them out to the students; it gets absurd....So we use the general conduct rules, but we enforce it realistically for the age in which we live.... (Chief student-affairs officer, state university.)

(h)--You should really talk to [the secretary of the governing board] about that....You need some rules for consistency. But the administrator should be responsible for bypassing them when necessary. They should be guidelines, not handicaps, to administration....The lawyers and the activists are putting us in a tight bind, and it leads to actually curbing our freedoms and the safeguards, partly from over-interpreting the rules, correct interpretations but on rules that were never intended to go that far....The university is part of the community. It lives by the regularity in the system....You should try to make [rules and their interpretations] a learning experience for the kids. They lack patience.... (Vice-president for research, state university.)

(i)--They provide continuity. That is more important as your personnel change. They tell the successors what went on before....You need more rules some places, and less in others....I would change some of them. You have to be continually ready for change.... (Public relations officer, state university.)

> (j)--Laws are as good as the men who administer them--not the other way around. I think we should change some of the political speech rules, so we don't have so many things that are wrong, and then establish some clear procedures for handling violations....But right now the [new, student-faculty-administration] Rules Committee is a politically dead issue. Nobody respects it, or pays any attention to it.... (Special assistant to president, state university.)

In these comments, a number of themes may be discerned. In general, the executives interviewed agreed that a university's rules should be loose "guidelines," applied or dispensed within the informed discretion of the appropriate administrator. Most important to this task are the administrator's personal qualities and his interpretation of individual situations (e, f, j). An emphasis on rule-following is seen as equating administration with the work of "a secretary" or "a clerk (e., f)." Rules are thus viewed primarily as constraints. They are associated with governing boards, legislatures, and others who make rules restricting the discretion of administrators--or with subordinates who apply existing rules too literally (a, d, e, f, g, h). "Some" rules are seen as necessary for a minimal order ("consistency," "regularity," "continuity,") in university and society (b, i). But these executives see a need routinely to use both rules and exceptions for individual and organizational purposes. Even high-ranking university officials see themselves as "educators," with the duty to use rules as "learning experiences" for young people--doing what is best for them, even (apparently) if it means punishing them or denying them short-run benefits (e, h). In some cases, a critical question is how an exception to a rule would affect the organizational interest (e). In another case, the purpose is to prevent others' using technicalities as a "weapon" in a factional dispute (b). A distinction between what is "philosophically" correct and what is practically workable is noted, providing a justification for broad rules "realistically" interpreted (g).

In summary, these executives tend to rely on their own implicitly benevolent judgments and those of their colleagues, made within the spirit of broad rules or policies, and guided by largely unwritten purposes as they "see them" (b).

The Double Standard

Replies to more specific questionnaire items revealed an added dimension to the campus executive's view of rules. Doubtless inspired in good part by recent disputes over student-conduct rules, large majorities of the survey respondents affirmed the importance of strict rule-observance by university members generally, and an unambiguous "law and order" stand by the university officialdom. (See Table 1.) Thus, almost two-thirds (62%) of the respondents agreed that "Open flouting of university rules is always wrong, not only technically but morally, since it encourages disrespect for university authorities and for rule of the law." Over three-fourths (80%) agreed that any official university stance other than an explicit "stand against all law-breaking" encourages individuals to disobey

TABLE 1

Rule-Following by Administrators and Others

Item		Agree*	Disagree*
2.	Open flouting of University rules is always wrong, not only technically but morally, since it encourages disrespect for university authorities and for the rule of law.	62%	30%
31.	Universities must explicitly take a stand against all lawbreaking; any other stance implicitly encourages each individual to obey only those rules he happens to agree with.	80%	15%
24.	Every university official must know when to ignore a clearly applicable rule, because its literal application would be unjust.	69%	20%
5.	Selective enforcement of campus rules is sometimes justified--for example, when an official finds it necessary to disperse an illegal sit-in demonstration by disciplining its leaders.	66%	20%
21.	Rule-violations cannot be justified on this campus, since officials are always ready to hear grievances and to make exceptions to rules where they are reasonable.	53%	31%
27.	Campus "due process" restrictions serve mainly as legalistic obstacles to the orderly operations of the university.	11%	79%

*N = 526: 60% usable responses from mailing to 869 top administrators in 69 major universities.

rules they do not agree with.* At the same time, two thirds (66%) of the respondents agreed that "selective enforcement of campus rules is sometimes justified," as against only one-fifth (20%) who disagreed. And a similar 69% agreed that university officials "must know when to ignore a clearly applicable rule" in the interest of justice. Only about a tenth of the respondents (11%) went so far as to affirm that campus due-process restrictions, which serve as restraints on administrative discretion in the interests of individuals charged with the rule-violations, "serve mainly as legalistic obstacles" to university operations. Somewhat surprisingly, over a quarter (27%) of the respondents agreed that mass civil disobedience could sometimes awaken new moral awareness on a campus; however, almost two-thirds (61%) opposed this view.

Taken together, these propositions would seem to indicate that about two-thirds of the respondents favor strcit interpretations of rules binding on members generally, but see pragmatic adjustments in rules by university officials--either to stop campus disorders or to do justice to individuals--as necessary and proper. The result is a double standard applied to rule-following within the university, with one standard for "members" and another for university officials. Apparently, campus executives are seen here as enforcers (policemen, prosecutors, judges) of the campus "law."

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*This issue was a heated one during the FSM events at Berkeley. University officials insisted that the University could not remain neutral on issues of civil disobedience, when technical violations of the law are used to plead a purportedly higher moral cause. University policy, they said, must officially proscribe lawbreaking in all its forms, as a general matter. Student protestors argued that such a policy placed the University in an unnecessary and untenable position as an advocate in disputes over law and morality, and in effect made the University an enforcement agency of the state (Lunsford, 1965, Pp. 29-33).

The Uses of Rules

Where an executive operates within a set of rules but has discretionary authority to suspend or make exceptions to those rules, other criteria besides the rules themselves must guide his decision to invoke or suspend, and these criteria cannot always be specified, even by the decision-maker himself. As suggested above, broad discretion of this kind may be necessary whenever "administrators" are charged with "getting results" for a special-function organization--as when a business executive must make a fast judgment about a competitive investment opportunity. Such discretion may also be required to do "justice" to individuals whose special circumstances do not fit the specifications of a rigid rule-system. In the latter context, of course, even "middle-level" campus executives break or make exceptions to formal rules every day--often in the interest of an individual. For example, a student may be allowed to register late without a penalty fee if a family crisis has created "extenuating circumstances." But such private and individual situations are not the only ones in which the power to suspend is relevant, and the rules in question are not always so mundane as a registration schedule. Still, many campus administrators take the power to suspend as implicit, even in more consequential cases.

For example: In a 1965 meeting of administrators, faculty and students from many campuses, a nationally known dean of students from a major university told of a recent incident in which his president had forbidden a Communist Party spokesman to lecture on the campus, amid state-wide controversy over the subject. The dean was then asked how his campus had answered a recent survey concerning whether speakers were allowed on the campus regardless of their political views (Williamson & Cowan, 1965). He replied that the admission of all speakers to the campus was his university's general policy, but that he always understood such policies to be subject to the president's discretionary suspension. The president had exercised his discretion in this case, the dean said, because he had decided it was "not the time" to allow a Communist on campus in view of public objections. After making his own contrary recommendation known, the dean had accepted and enforced the president's decision which had resulted in a substantial student protest (what he called "a little Berkeley").

This incident involved a central issue of free expression on a campus, which may not have been covered by a written rule at the time in question. However, other observations suggest that, in controversial matters at least, academic executives typically see rules as routinely to be used for what they take to be organizational ends. At one administrative council that was directly observed, for example, it was decided after heated discussion that certain rule-changes being demanded by protesting student groups must indeed be made. But the changes would be refused, the president suggested, so long as the administration was "under pressure" from student disruptions. They would be made several months later as a part of a "general review" of the university's student-conduct regulations, when the "heat" of publicity from the student protests had dissipated. During the discussion preceding this decision, one campus executive stated explicitly that some rule-changes beyond those demanded should be made as what he called "window-dressing," to indicate the flexibility and reasonableness of the administrative group. His remark was received with nods of assent from several other council members, and its intent was effectively incorporated in the final decision.

In a similarly routine fashion, one major public university's general counsel stated during an interview that his only recent review of his institution's ban on political speakers had involved advising the president that no _legal_ reason existed for such a rule--and that _the administration_ could, therefore, violate it with impunity at any time that it wished (for example, by inviting a presidential candidate to make a campus speech).

The Uses of Law and Order

Much administrative rhetoric today suggests that university administrators are concerned with the impartial maintenance of "law and order" on the campus, without concern for broader political or moral implications of its rule-enforcement activity. For example:

> The University of California assumes responsibility for the preservation of law and order upon its campuses. The University deplores disrespect for the law on the part of any citizen, whatever their organizational ties.

The implication of such rhetoric is that "law and order" are parts of a single concept, not meaningfully to be treated in separation. Administrative officials who mete out punishment to rule-breaking students, for example, are depicted as impartially determining what existing rules require, in light of the "relevant circumstances."

Such theories of law-enforcement have, of course, a long history. Whether judges "find" or "make" law when they apply and interpret rules is not likely to be settled soon; arguably, they usually do both, in varying mixtures. As to "circumstances," it is probable that every legal system has somewhere in it a conception of the "reasonable man," whose normal, "prudent" judgment provides an ideal standard against which the legal order may judge its members. However, in the Anglo-American legal tradition such uncertainties are hedged around by requirements of due process, including a heavy burden of proof upon the rule-breaker's accuser, and final decision by a tribunal that is institutionally independent of the dispute. These safeguards of individual liberty, against the interests of order, are typically absent in university "judicial" procedures.

In fact, as we have seen, many university rules--especially those concerned with student conduct--are extremely vague and broad, and university executives tend to consider exceptions more important than rules. The broad, judgmental latitude provided by the "*in loco parentis*" doctrine fits easily within this orientation, and its effects are perpetuated by administrators who view themselves as "educational leaders," using rules or their suspension as "learning experiences" for immature students. Thus emphasis on "the rule of law" in the university is primarily an appeal for voluntary conformity to broad understandings of the internal harmony that "the institution" needs to survive and prosper. In the balance between "law" and "order," university executives tend to see the first as primarily a means to the second.

The Legitimacy of Jurisdictions

Beyond their reliance on explicit, "primary rules of obligation (Hart, 1961)," administrative decisions may draw legitimacy from the existence of a set of delimited jurisdictions, created by "secondary rules," within which each official's decisions are made. Such a basis allows for the discretion necessary to decisional flexibility, but it also envisions, in theory, a type of restraint on that discretion, by setting limits on its scope. This device is well-nigh universal in the theory of modern organizations. Weber (1947, 1961) saw the formally correct enactment of a hierarchy of "offices," each with its allotment of "impersonal duties," as a major characteristic of bureaucratic administration under "legal authority." He expected that legitimacy within such official jurisdictions would be supported (1) by office-holders' general competence based on training and experience in the specific tasks of office and (2) by purported reliance in their decisions on specific rules or on "'functional' considerations of expediency."

The claim of jurisdictional legitimacy is popular among university executives. Skeptical of specific, detailed rules in the determination of decisions, academic executives are more comfortable relying on a rough division of labor, with cordial and cooperative relations among the occupants of different "offices."

Unfortunately for the academic executive's purposes, however, university "jurisdictions" lack most of the clarity, exclusiveness, and impersonality associated with them in theory.* As noted above, "administrative" and "faculty" spheres of responsibility are separated in a general way, but frequently not in matters of specific detail. Specialization in "administration" as such carries with it no readily-recognized special expertise. And, precisely when controversy arises over the legitimacy of a specific decision, the lack of clear limits and specialized expertise can prove quite fatal to a claim of jurisdictional correctness.

For these reasons, official jurisdictions have provided less secure legitimacy for university executives than many readers of

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*Survey responses corroborate this. Almost two-thirds (64%) of the executives responding agreed that "A major problem of university governance today is lack of clear, consistently-followed lines of delegated authority." See Table 3. Some respondents noted they prefer such "problems" to those of over-formalization.

Weber's work might suppose. Official judgments are therefore frequently justified on an even more general basis--the calculation of what will best serve the interests of "the institution" as a whole.

"THE INSTITUTION" AS AN END

Faced with the difficulties of relying on rules and jurisdictions as sources of "rationality" for their decisions, academic executives make great use in their thought and speech of "the institution" as a criterion of judgment. Here is an excerpt from the chapter about academic presidents, in a widely read book on campus administration:

> ...The president must care more deeply than anyone on the campus for the whole insitution as well as every one of its parts. .../This/, in fact, may be his final qualification to preside. In his faculty, and perhaps in his administration, there will be many intellectually more gifted than he. The president will keep his hegemony over them by his vision of the whole (Benezet, 1962, Pp. 108-109).

Dodds (1962), using slightly different language, makes the same point:

> The president must bear in mind the welfare of the college or university in the large. He can be sure that his overview will conflict with the individual interests and personal ambitions of various members of the faculty, clustered, as they are, about special fields, departments, or component schools and colleges.... /P. 51/.

In our survey, similarly, the largest proportion of agreement to any single item--86 percent of all respondents--was given to the general proposition that "A responsible administrator places the best interests of his institution above those of any specific individual or group." (See Table 2.)

Especially at the higher executive levels, then, the concept of "the best interest of the institution" provides a standard for the academic policy-maker that parallels "the public interest" and similar conceptions in more explicitly political settings. It provides a color of "rationality" for the complex judgments of the executive by providing an "objective" standard of judgment--even if it is hard to define that standard unambiguously (Lynd, 1939; Allport, 1933).

Weber described such criteria of judgment as marking an important difference between bureaucracy and the "pre-bureaucratic forms" of administration, which constituted, he said, "a realm of mercy, and of personally motivated favor and valuation." In bureaucratic administration, he said:

> ...The specifically modern and strictly 'objective' idea of 'reasons of state' is upheld as the supreme and ultimate guiding star of the official's behavior.
>
> ...[The] sure instincts of the bureaucracy for the conditions of maintaining its power...are inseparably fused with the canonization of...this by no means unambiguous ideal; [however] *in principle* a system of rationally debatable 'reasons' stands behind every act of bureaucratic administration, that is, either subsumption under norms or a weighing of ends and means [P. 220]. (Emphasis added.)*

The ambiguity latent in the concept of "the institution" is important to its usefulness. Like "reasons of state" or "the public interest," the term provides a focus for cognition and carries some meaning for its users. But it retains much room for adjustment and variation in the concrete meanings that leaders give to it in the course of decision. Thompson (1963) has suggested that, as groups grow larger, leaders tend to speak less to individuals and more to the mass, the group _membership_ as a whole, obscuring or ignoring differences among members. "The institution" provides a still more vague and global focus--merging persons, groups, goals, activities, and relationships both formal and informal into one complex whole. It is this _ideal construct_ that serves academic executives as their "objective" criterion of judgments when no specific rule of conduct is available.

The Merger of "The Organization" and "Its Goals"

One important consequence is the rhetorical re-integration of

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*The words "in principle" are important here. In accordance with his use of ideal types for analysis, Weber was not saying that all executive decisions are _in fact_ based on such norms or means/ends calculations, but that _insofar as_ administration is bureaucratic, it involves decisions made on such bases. March and Simon (1958) note that "promoting the general welfare" is a nonoperational goal, common in government administration, which invites the substitution of other goals that are more useful in guiding behavior /P. 156/. See also Michels (1915) on the ideological uses of such conceptions: "The magic phrase with which the leaders invariably succeed in stifling embarrassing opposition in the germ is 'the general interest.' In such circumstances they exhibit a notable fondness for arguments drawn from the military sphere. They maintain, for instance, that, if only for tactical reasons, and in order to maintain a necessary cohesion in face of the enemy, the members of the party must never refuse to repose perfect confidence in the leaders they have freely chosen for themselves /P. 224/."

"the organization" and "its goals." After all, the argument runs, the organization is not a separate "thing," but instead is a necessary prerequisite to the achievement, or even the pursuit, of its goals. Any abstract distinction that obscures this fact irresponsibly ignores the hard practicalities of social life. The idea that "the organization" may "become an end in itself" by "displacing its goals" is thus rejected (Merton, 1957). In the formulation of one state university president:

> The...administrative organization of a college or university is not an end in itself. The purpose of administration is to facilitate the objectives for which colleges and universities exist: teaching, research and public service [Horn, 1962, P. 57 and see Millett, 1962, p. 179].

These objectives, also typically stated in abstract terms, are taken as existent, well-understood guides to decision. As Kerr (1963) put it:

> The ends are already given--the preservation of the eternal truths, the creation of new knowledge, the improvement of service wherever truth and knowledge of high order may serve the needs of man. The ends are there; the means must be ever improved in a competitive, dynamic environment [P. 38].

In such formulations, "organization" or "the administrative organization" of the university is de emphasized in importance. It is normatively identified with "its goals," emerging as merely "the means" (and purportedly always a flexible, changeable means) to the ends "for which colleges and universities exist."*

The Merger of Individual and Group Interests

One aspect of university "organization" that has received much attention is the structural division between administrators and faculty members. At the turn of this century, there was much public discussion of this division, and of its relevance to "business-like" methods of university management (Veysey, 1965). Some administrators' arguments then were blunt and to the point. For example, the following description of "a proper division of labor" for the university, signed by "One of the Guild", has been ascribed to David Starr Jordan (1900), first president of Stanford University:

> If we are to accomplish even a fair part of all that is easily possible, educationally, in the next century, we must separate quite sharply the work of instruction and the work of administration. The prime duty of the occupant of every college chair, and of those who are his assistants, is to give themselves unreservedly to research, to investigation, and to instruction....Hence, the general policy of the institution, its relations to the outside world, its connection with secondary or preparatory schools, the requirements for admission, the requirements for degrees, the discipline of students--all properly fall within the executive department, to be determined by the president and by the trustees; and a

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*Parsons (1960) and others have defined formal organizations by reference to the collective pursuit of stated goals. March and Simon (1958) have specified that it can by no means be assumed the participants in a formal organization share the same goals. University executives appear to be acutely aware of this. The academic vice-president at a state university, when asked about the importance of university goals, said: "The idea of commonly accepted goals is unrealistic. You have to persuade small groups that the institutional goals serve their partisan goals. We have to stand up for the institutional goals, but we actually spend a lot of our time honoring and granting legitimacy to [the goals of] sub-groups in the university."

> wise faculty will be glad to have these burdens taken from their shoulders... [P. 491].*

Here, as above, executive power over large areas of university life is said to be necessary for a university to accomplish its goals. But this formulation also links the division of powers to the interest of a "wise faculty" in pursuing research and instruction free of "executive" duties.

Jordan was widely known as an autocrat. However, a similar argument is made in many subsequent formulations that portray administrators as merely "enablers" or "facilitators" of the essential academic work which is done by others. Here is Millett's (1962) more recent view:

> ...A college or university cannot function, or would not long be able to, without the specialized and full-time endeavor of those who seek to free the energies of faculty and students for the pursuit of learning. Administration exists not to dominate faculty or students but to serve them. The restraints imposed are, *or should be*, those which are the minimum requirements of an organized society having common purposes and common needs... [P. 180]. (Emphasis added.)

The language of "specialized" organizational "functions," used here by Millett, is frequently employed today to argue (with implicit normative ambiguity) the necessity of administration-faculty solidarity *within* a division of powers. In such arguments, "is" and "ought" may become almost indistinguishable to the unpracticed eye. For example:

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*See Brubacher and Rudy (1958, P. 357 and note 96).

> Fortunately for educators who have administrative functions, however, most professors are dedicated both to their jobs and to the institutions they serve. There is no real antithesis of interests, as is sometimes found elsewhere between employers and employees. All who serve the college or university directly are employees bound together by many kindred interests in a high calling. In the final analysis, it may be seen that collegiate administration is essentially a teamwork function... [L. Wilson, 1955, P. 692].

Here is a blend of empirical assertions about the things to which professors "are dedicated" and normative prescriptions for the "real" interests of these groups, capped by a conclusion as to what kind of "function" college administration "is." Thus right reason and the opinion of "most professors" coincide to show both the moral and rational validity of faculty-administration "teamwork." Put another way, the implicit premise of such a statement is this: Since separate administrations are necessary for the university to do its job "properly," the "real" interests of all members will be served best if both faculty and administration try to *act as if* the separation created no gulfs between them.

The Power of Decision as "Vertical Specialization"

Such theories of social order have a long and complex history, going back at least as far as Thomas Hobbes' justification of state power on the ground that it is necessary to avoid "the war of all against all." A more modern version is found in Herbert Simon's discussion (1965, p. 9) of "vertical specialization" (the "division of decision-making duties") as analogous to "horizontal specialization" ("the division of work"). In Simon's (1965) words:

> Authority has been described as a relation that secures coordinated behavior in a group by subordinating the decisions of the individual to the communicated decisions of others. Thus, the exercise of authority in a group makes possible a large degree of separation of the decision-making processes from actual performance, or what might be called vertical "specialization" in decision-making /P. 135/.

By treating the "vertical" division of duties as merely one more kind of "specialization," with its attendant "functions" for the organization, this formulation de-emphasizes its "dysfunctional" aspects, and tends to trivialize the long history of social conflict and theory centering on the division into managers and managed, "state" and "society," "rulers" and "ruled."

By contrast, a more balanced* view of such matters was taken by Chester I. Barnard, a modern theorist with whom Simon was generally much in sympathy. Barnard (1952) described both "functions" and "pathologies" of "scalar" status systems--those involving "superiority of subordination in a chain of command or fomal authority." He warned that "conservative" tendencies are inherently fosterd by status systems, since "except for those of the lowest status... conservatism is protective of individuals," each of whom has "someone of still lower status" below him. And he said:

> The sentiments supporting conservatism with respect to status are developed and maintained by rationali-

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*Weber (1958) referred to such specialization in "modern capitalistic enterprises" as a "concentration" of control over "the material means of management."

> zations, ceremonies, and symbolism. They have for their broad purpose the inculcation of the doctrine that the primary interest of the individual is dependent upon the maintenance of the whole organization and its effective operation as a whole, and that whatever is necessary to this end, even though it adversely affects the individual, is offset even to him by the larger advantage accruing from it [Pp. 252-253].

Barnard concluded that:

> ...[No] doubt corrective measures can be known. They can be applied, however, only with great difficulty from within an organization, for even the chief executive is the chief of the status system and dependent on it [P. 254].

What Barnard made explicit was the connection between "*functional*" *views* of organizational interests, as subsuming or including individual interests, and the *self-justifying rhetoric* of those who occupy positions in a putatively "functional" status-hierarchy. From this perspective, whether a *specific* separation of "decision-making" and "performance" is desirable must be decided upon particular circumstances, not on the *generally* "functional" character of "specialization" for "the organization" as such. Moreover, Barnard implies, no person holding status-prerogatives in such a "scalar" system should be seen as an unbiased observer or speaker concerning its possible "pathologies."

In such a contrast of theoretical approaches, administrative rhetoric tends to follow Simon's line rather than Barnard's. It is the interest of "the institution" as such that justifies administrators' decision-making power. The division of labor between "decision-making" on broad institutional policies and the "actual performance" of academic tasks is justified by organizational goals, and is supported by a purported identity of interests between the "institution" and its parts. "Dysfunctional" or "pathological" aspects of decision-making hierarchies are said, either implicitly or explicitly, to be negligible.

"Institutional" Interests and Other Values

By using a symbolic entity called "the institution" to justify their decisions, academic executives perpetuate a semantic puzzle that has long plagued political and legal philosophy--what has been called "the personality of associations (Laski, 1960)." The fiction of treating corporations as legal "persons" is a standard intellectual tool of our law, and the philosophic rationale for it has been debated for centuries without having been made quite clear. Modern social theory also places considerable reliance on the notion of an entity called a social "institution," but with many and subtle variations in meaning. Thus it may be understandable that university executives rely on a similar formulation, without quite being able to explain where it begins and ends.

Nevertheless, the notion of "the institution" produces great problems in the discourse of the campus. Student activists charge that campus executives are simply guarding vested individual interests, retarding desirable social change, and violating human values which they themselves espouse, when they say that they are protecting "the institution."* The puzzle is, therefore, not inconsequential.

It is compounded, however, when many administrators agree readily that interests of "the institution" do in fact conflict with those of individual members and sub-groups "within it." Thus President Dodds (1962) refers to the likelihood that some "individuals, interests and personal ambitions" will be hurt by almost any decision of a university president. His duty is to make such decisions nevertheless, in light of the "welfare" of the university "in the large." Other writers have also explicitly noted the existence of prevalent differences in "interests". Millett (1962), a specialist in public administration, has written as follows:

> The president and [academic vice-president] must be careful to represent the best interest of the faculty as a whole if they are to be in fact faculty leaders. At the same time their administrative role... requires them to represent also the best interests of the university as a whole. The interests of the faculty and the interests of the university are not necessarily identical, although they are of course highly interrelated [Pp. 94-95].

Among the survey respondents, less than a quarter (24%) agreed with the general statement: "There are no real conflicts of interests between the university and its individual members." On items concerning the opposition of specific interests and values to that of "the institution," the responses were more mixed. On the question whether each faculty member should be reviewed before tenure "to assure that he is a constructive 'citizen' of the university community, as well as academically qualified," about half (48%) agreed, but an almost equal proportion (41%) disagreed. And less than a third (32%) agreed (as against 61% disagreeing) with the statement: "Faculty members should not make public speeches on political issues when there is a substantial danger that this will involve their university as an institution in controversy." (See Table 2.)

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*One survey respondent, a private-university business manager, commented: "There is really no such thing as the 'best interest of an institution' as a whole." Cf. Time magazine: "Universities are in for trouble until they mobilize a moderate majority that respects institutions as much as individuals [April 18, 1969, P. 56]." One former college executive has volunteered a similar view in private conversation.

These data suggest that university administrators' beliefs are quite varied on the specific values that may override a specific "institutional" interest, in specific circumstances. But they tend to affirm the general propositions that institution-member conflicts do exist, and that in general the interests of "the institution" are primary.

Redefining "Imaginary" Conflicts

The key to this semantic puzzle may lie in two comments from the survey which illustrate a crucial variation in views among university executives themselves. On the general issue of placing the institution's interest highest, one respondent disagreed, commenting: "Justice may require otherwise, and this is always to the best long-run interests of the university." Another respondent,

TABLE 2

"The Institution" as an End

Item		Agree*	Disagree*
20.	A responsible administrator places the best interests of his institution above those of any specific individual or group.	86%	8%
10.	University executives should carefully review the record of each faculty member recommended for tenure, to assure that he is a constructive "citizen" of the university community, as well as academically qualified in the judgment of his colleagues.	48%	41%
38.	The support of certain "publics" is absolutely vital to a university's objectives, so a top administrator who did not give special weight to their views would be derelict in not safeguarding the best interests of his institution.	56%	24%
23.	Faculty members should not make public speeches on political issues when there is a substantial danger that this will involve their university as an institution in controversy.	32%	61%
6.	There are no real conflicts of interest between the university and its individual members.	24%	68%
22.	Universities necessarily reflect the society in which they exist, and there is little to fear from this in a democratic, pluralistic society such as ours.	33%	51%

*N = 526: 60% useable responses from mailing to 869 top administrators in 69 major universities.

who agreed to the universal priority of institutional interests, specified: "Remembering that the protection of a specific individual may be, in the long run, the best protection of the interests of the institution." Both respondents distinguish between "long-run" and other interests of the institution; however, the first accepts the idea that short-run conflicts of interests are genuine conflicts, while the second is able to define the institutional interests in such a way that "long-run" interests encompass all the relevant interests involved.

Such subtle disagreements underscore the importance of the executive's reliance on his "discretion" as the healer of all wounds. When reasonable men sit down and discuss their conflicts, this view implies, the conflicts are never insurmountable. The imagined irreconcilability of some interests is a product of impatience, inadequate conceptualization, or both.*

This view is sometimes put in terms of the currently popular argument against assuming that conflicts are "zero-sum games (Parsons, 1966)." Morris Keeton (1968), a sociologist and academic dean at Antioch College, has recently formulated the issue as follows:

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*In agreeing that "there are no real conflicts of interest" between the university and individual members, one respondent underlined the word "real," appending the comment: "Many imaginary ones!" In contrast, the dean of students at one major private university, interviewed informally near the beginning of this study, indicated he had recently become convinced that tuition increases are one matter on which a university's interests inescapably conflict with those of its students. Any other view, he said, tended to avoid honestly assessing the consequences of the hard decisions that must be made.

> ...One can play games in which if one person wins, someone else loses. This is what some of the mathematicians call a zero-sum game...There are many people who are agitating on campus nowadays for a student voice in campus governance who come at the objective with this zero-sum game perspective...If, however, we approach our trustees with the idea that there is something incompatible between what the college is doing and what its objectives are, I have rarely seen a group of people more prone to admit the point and to get right to the discussion as to what could be done to improve the situation. With this approach, we are no longer engaged in a zero-sum game but one in which working together produces more of what all parties want than would otherwise be the case /P. 15/.

Following the passage quoted, Keeton goes on to note: "If, however, one tries to play this game of mutual understanding and helpfulness, he must be careful not to be so nice that he quits speaking candidly about his own interests and aspirations /P. 15/." In an earlier argument for "student participation in setting goals and interpreting them," he recounts the following events at Antioch:

> ...There were three students on our Administrative Council, which passes on the budget in detail before it goes to the trustees. In the Budget Committee, appointed to prepare the budget, there was also some student participation. Both of these groups recommended that we increase tuition and fees $272 per student per year. We survived that decision with little disharmony, but we could not have done so without vigorous student participation in the debate on the way to the decision. One student abstained in the final vote and made this comment: "We don't like it; but we can't disagree with it / P. 12/."

The conclusion, evidently, is that student participation in debate and decision on conflicting interests and values helps to persuade* students generally that decisions which appear to be against their interests actually are not, and so should not be opposed.

E. G. Williamson, long-time dean of students at the University of Minnesota, made the point explicit in 1965:

> I conclude that we in education must turn to the unsolved problem, i.e.: "Who introduces students to the implied and explicit responsibilities in their status as students, if they have not learned the coupling of rights and responsibilities in the home, in high school, or in college?"...I firmly believe that this is the great unsolved educational problem behind some past and current picketing, trespassing, violence, and rioting [p. 35].

Such formulations suggest that student rights are adequately protected; it is student responsibilities that need attention. They also ignore great differences between the academic settings in which both rights and responsibilities are defined. Thus Keeton's institution (Antioch) is a small, unorthodox college; Williamson's (Minnesota) is a complex and massive urban university. Executive rhetoric has often obscured such differences in the past, suggesting a general identity of interests and values within each academic "institution," regardless of its character. This suggestion has gained much rhetorical help from the notion of "the academic community."

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*See B. R. Clark (1960) on the means that community colleges use to "cool out" students who are judged unqualified for further college work. In a different cultural setting, Gluckmann (1967) has described how one judicial system emphasizes the process of persuading the accused wrongdoer to accept the view that he has acted improperly for a person in his particular status.

THE UNIVERSITY "COMMUNITY:" IDEAL OR REALITY?

"Community" is another of the best-used words in the lexicon of university administration, and of academic life generally. The "community of scholars" is a long-standing ideal, still given nostalgic allegiance by many a highly professionalized faculty member (Clark, 1968). Terms such as "the university community" or "the academic community" dot the speeches and writings of academic executives when they discuss relations within the "institution" they represent.

A few years ago, for example, a chancellor at Berkeley described his institution this way:

> Our university house has many mansions. Though the dwellers therein speak in tongues of their specializations, they belong to a single community of scholarly endeavor... [Strong, 1963, P. 113].

Similar references are found in many official university documents, such as those containing student-conduct regulations:

> 33. Basis for Discipline.
> The University reserves the right to exclude at any time students whose conduct is deemed undesirable or prejudicial to the University community's best interest...(University of Illinois, 1967).

And again:

> The rules which are included in this booklet are not static and immutable. They are constantly being evaluated and revised to remain responsive to the needs of the University community (University of Michigan, 1968).

These examples are typical of many others. They seem to imply that "the university community" is a well-understood entity, with definite meanings that are shared by the substantial majority of "its members." The following use of the term, in a public letter that brought considerable publicity to President Theodore Hesburgh (1969) of the University of Notre Dame, illustrates this implication:

> .../Anyone/ or any group that substitutes force for rational persuasion, be it violent or non-violent, will be given fifteen minutes of meditation to cease and desist. If the person or persons do not within that period cease and desist, they will be asked for their identity cards. Those who produce these will be suspended from this community as not understanding what this community is /P. 34/.

Awareness of University "Fragmentation"

Today, the meanings that are and should be attached to the idea of a university "community" are openly at issue. However, a number of academic executives had seen dissensus and fragmentation within the university, well before the current wave of student protests made these facts broad public knowledge. As Chancellor Litchfield (1959a) wrote:

> It has become commonplace to observe that most of our large university organizations are held together by little more than a name, a lay board of trustees, an academically remote figure called a president, and--in his more despairing moments, one might facetiously add--a common concern for the power plant. On most of our large university campuses our individual faculties tend to live in isolated proximity...
>
> This tendency to fragmentation is aggravated by an additional divisive influence within the institution. There can be little justification for the kind of conflict between faculty and administration which characterizes too much of our institutional behavior...

> After all, we have long postulated the concept of a 'community of scholars [P. 354].'

Litchfield's phrase "a common concern for the heating plant," referred to a well-known statement made by Robert Hutchins, when head of the University of Chicago, that only such a concern holds the modern university together at all. Clark Kerr, recalling Hutchins' statement in his own writing, changed the unifying element for California's purposes to "a common grievance over parking," but he kept the descriptive message the same. In Kerr's (1963) view:

> Academic government has taken the form of the Guild, as in the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge until recent times; of the Manor, as in Columbia under Butler; and of the United Nations, as in the modern multiversity. There are several "nations" of students, of faculty, of alumni, of trustees, of public groups. Each has its territory, its jurisdiction, its form of government. Each can declare war on the others; some have the power of veto. Each can settle its own problems by a majority vote, but altogether they form no single constituency. It is a pluralistic society with multiple cultures. Coexistence is more likely than unity...

This means, Kerr continued, that the "first task" of the university president is "peace--how he may 'the Two and Seventy jarring Sects confute [P. 36].'" President James A. Perkins (1965) of Cornell University, in a 1964 speech, completed the litany of concern by noting sadly that "the university does not follow the laws of other organisms:"

> In the biological world, for example, increased specialization in the various parts...has led to a tighter and tighter integration of the whole structure. Similarly, the specialization of tasks among the Incas led to a highly integrated society. But the specialization within

> the university has not, on the whole, led to internal integration; it has, instead, tended to give impetus to the process of decentralization...to strengthened outside relations rather than inside relations. Specialist has called to like-minded specialist, and together they have found their long run interests better satisfied in larger organizations elsewhere than in the university which is their home base [P. 10].*

"Organization" and "Community"

Despite these and other descriptions of modern** universities' "fragmentation," references to the university as a "community" persist in the rhetoric of academic administration. Such usages suggest again the rhetorical value of terms like "institution" and "community" as tools of leadership. Where "community" is a well-accepted ideal but prevalent dissensus and fragmentation endanger its reasonable approximation, leaders may be expected frequently to use language that treats the ideal as if it were a clearly-existent reality. In this way they may assure each of their followers that a community of values, meanings, and interests unites them--and that most members of the organization recognize this. By affirming his own belief in the reality of community, the executive may hope to produce a self-fulfilling prophecy, helping to retain as much of a "community" sense as possible among his organization's members. He may, in other words, be able to suggest to *each* member that there is "implicit consent" (Stone, 1956) to existing authority from all but a small minority of "troublemakers" and "fundamentally disordered personalities (L. Wilson, 1958)."

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*And see Kerr (1963, P. 20): "In an organim, the parts and the whole are inextricably bound together. Not so the multiversity--many parts can be added and subtracted with little effect on the whole or even little notice taken or any blood spilled. It is more a mechanism ...held together by administrative rules and powred by money."

**As long ago as 1894 Santayana decried theAmerican university's fragmentation, its lack of an intellectual core, and the impossibility of an "overview" of such an institution (Veysey, 1965, P. 311).

Rhetoric that equates functional interdependence and social solidarity has a long history in discussions of social order. A similar "hopeful" view, of organized societies in general, underlay Durkheim's well-known forecast that internally differentiated societies could be held together by "organic solidarity," based on the *recognition* of their members' functional interdependence. In "organized societies," with well-developed divisions of labor, Durkheim (1933) theorized:

> ...the individual is not sufficient unto himself, it is from society that he receives everything necessary to him, it is for society that he works. Thus is formed a very strong sentiment of the state of dependence in which he finds himself. He becomes accustomed to estimating it at its just value, that is to say, in regarding himself as part of a whole, the organ of an organism. Such sentiments naturally inspire not only mundance sacrifices which assure the regular development of social life, but even, on occasion, acts of complete self-renunciation and wholesale abnegation...[P. 288].

Thus, he affirmed, "cooperation...has its intrinsic morality," and the cooperative society can become a *source* of solidary "sentiments."*

Durkheim's work involved a normative ambiguity presaging that of more recent writers in this "functional" vein. On the one hand, he saw the structure of organized society as "naturally" producing "sentiments" of solidarity, and stimulating the greater use of "intelligence." His central argument was that "social functions spontaneously seek to adapt themselves to one another" provided that they "are sufficiently in contact with one another." On the other hand, he affirmed the reality of individual choice. In the functionally regulated society, he said,

> ...there is a large place always left for personal initiative. A great many of the obligations thus sanctioned have their origin in a choice of the will. It is we who choose our professions, and even certain of our domestic functions. Of course...duties are imposed upon us that we have not expressly desired. It is, however, a voluntary act that this has taken place...[Pp. 288-289].

Durkheim, unlike some modern users of this rhetoric, was careful to state that *more* than the morality of functional specialization *per se* was necessary for social solidarity in "higher societies."

> There are common sentiments, common ideas, without which as has been said, one is not a man. The rule which orders us to specialize remains limited by the contrary rule. Our conclusion is not that it is good to press specialization as far as possible, but as far as necessary. As for the part that is to be played by these two opposing necessities, that is to be determined by experience

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*Sociologists recently have pointed out that the widely-noted conflict between "professionals" and "bureaucrats" in modern research-organizations is muted by "accommodation" of their differences (Kornhauser, 1962a). Some have ascribed this to "a relationship of mutual dependence between managers and scientists" that is "implicitly recognized" by members of both groups (La Porte, 1965, P. 29; see also Crozier, 1964, P. 167).

> and cannot be calculated _a priori_.../P. 401/.

Moreover, Durkheim expected that, as "organic" interdependence grows:

> On its side, society learns to regard its members no longer as things over which it has rights, but as cooperators whom it cannot neglect and towards whom it owes duties /P. 228/.

These two notions, raised by Durkheim in the context of societies generally, are at specific issue in the development of modern universities: first, whether the members of large and fragmented universities retain enough "common sentiments" on substantive matters to support official claims of "community," or even the requisites of formal unity; second, whether these "task-committed" organizations are sufficiently cognizant of members' needs and rights to retain their members' loyalties (Foote, Mayer & Associates, 1968). Issues such as these are systematically obscured by administrative rhetoric invoking the _general_ functions of specialization (Deibler, 1942), emphasizing the common interests of members within "organisms," and treating the ideal of university "community" as if it were largely achieved.

Consensus, Consultation, and Decision-Making

Beyond its use in justifying a structural "specialization in decision-making," the rhetoric of "community" allows the academic executive to imply that strongly shared and well-understood assumptions unite all but a few members of "the academic community," providing guides to difficult decisions that must be made. Thus, while a campus executive must often make decisions that not everyone will agree with, the implication is that he does so securely within this shared value-framework, and so can usually be expected to decide "correctly." He "understands" implicitly what is important and what is not, at that level of presumption which escapes conscious attention, but which still shapes thoughts and actions in a fundamental way.*

Such an implicit community of values is always incomplete, however, and administrative rhetoric has long taken account of this. Today's academic executives tend to reject the alternatives of constructing their own "vision" of the university (Kerr, 1963) or of building organized "political" support for their policies. Instead, it is through "the consultative process" that the administrator regains his confidence in the substantive rationality of his decisions.

In some versions of the rhetoric, executive decisions as such almost disappear, and the administrator merely voices collective judgments that are pre-set by objective "facts" and the opinions of the academic "colleagues." For example:

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*The importance of implicit norms for decisional processes has been suggested by a number of scholars. Goss (1963) has shown how shared standards of judgment make possible "advisory" relations and the avoidance of hierarchic authority among hospital physicians, on "medical" matters to which their common training and experience are relevant. Bendix (1947) pointed out some years ago that all large-scale organizations depend on an "irrational foundation" of implicit attitudes, and that a leader's implicit conception of the "policy" he is "administering" can substantially affect the course of decisions. Weber's discussion of "substantive rationality" clearly implied that it depends upon an official's choosing the "right" ethical, political, or economic norms when deciding. See also Polanyi (1967); Llewellyn (1960).

> Persons vested with authority usually have little real choice in their decision. The logic of facts, as well as the pressure by one's colleagues to accept narrowly defined alternatives, usually determines which choice will prevail. Once in a while an official may make a "command decision" and overrule his colleagues, but he can't do this often and survive.
>
> ...Individual faculty members are unaware of the amount of consultation that goes on, and necessity for prompt action may make it impossible to keep everyone informed.
>
> The administration is, in reality, more a process involving a considerable number of persons than a specific group of officers. ...Its essence is responsible leadership acting through consultation [Stone, 1956, Pp. 287-288].*

Other versions of the rhetoric combine an emphasis on consultation with a clear statement of the executive's decision-making prerogative. Harold Dodds (1962) in his widely read book, was explicit on this point:

> The goals of the consultative process are a wiser decision than the president alone is equipped to make, a wider sense of ownership in the decision, and a more direct responsibility for carrying it out. To treat it as a manipulative tool for securing one's way is treason to the principle. It is also foolish, because the fraud is soon found out. The consultative process must be open and free. The knowledgeable president

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*On executive "mediation," see Kerr (1963, Pp. 29-41); Day (1946, Pp. 341-342). Cf. Lindblom (1960) for a theory of "incremental" decision-making that shares much with this view.

> will see that all views are fully explored, particularly those that run counter to his own. This he does, not only as a matter of intellectual integrity and to save time in reaching a decision, but for the vital reason that, as discussion proceeds, his own views may be altered...For once the president feels that all elements have been adequately explored, his duty is to decide and make his decision known [P. 73].*

Here is a "judicial" role for the university executive. After hearing all the arguments, he must judge the outcome. But as official representative of the "institution" he is also an explicit party to the debate upon which he must decide. As Dodds makes explicit, a vital premise of this conception of decision-making is the notion that the consultation significantly *affects* the executive's decision, *changing* for the "wiser" the decision he would otherwise have made. It is this premise that tends to break down when administrators are seen by others as carriers of a systematic "organizational" bias.

In addition, the *style* of "consultative" decision-making, especially when coupled with such terms as "the logic of facts," seems to suggest a neutral and democratic orientation that removes the decision-maker from any real responsibility for his decision. In fact, such a style is quite compatible with both "democratic" and "author-

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*See also Stoke (1949): "...In matters of college administration faculties should have the privileges which Walter Bagehot attributed to the King of England: 'the right to be consulted, the right to encourage and the right to warn.' These rights should be *guaranteed* to the faculty by processes which administrators *must* observe, but when the processes have been observed the subsequent responsibility for decision is the responsibility of the administrator.. [P. 124]." (Emphasis in original.)

itarian" orientations. This was made clear by McMurry in a 1958 article on executive management, entitled "The Case for Benevolent Autocracy:"

> The benevolent autocrat...may encourage participation in the planning of a course of action, but much less frequently does he do so in execution. In effect, he differs from the weak autocrat only in that he encourages participation by his subordinates prior to reaching *his* decision.
>
> ...This is the key to the use of so-called consultative, participative management, even in an autocracy. The employees share in the problem solving, either individually or in a group, but each is encouraged to contribute his opinions and preferences--*but always within the structure*. No one takes any real risks; the superior always has the final say. [Pp. 86, 89] (Emphasis in original.)

What this argument indicates is not that academic administrators are "benevolent autocrats," but that the perspective of administrative judgments informed by extensive "consultation" is compatible with an exceedingly wide range of decision-making styles and outcomes. By itself, "consultation" is no assurance of decisions that are either "rational," by any specific standard, or responsive to the views of those consulted. Current mistrust of campus administrators by student activists is partly a result of official rhetoric that obscures this fact.

Community or Bureaucracy?

Finally, a major obstacle to executive idealizations of the university as a "community" is the letter of the law. Large-university administrators are well aware of the bureaucratic legal framework of American universities, which almost universally are public agencies or charitable corporations. They are formally governed by boards of "trustees" or "regents," from which all powers of internal governance are technically delegated (Chambers, 1959; Blackwell, 1961). By long tradition, academic discourse has declined to dwell on these unwelcome facts, except when major "revolts" have emerged in the faculty or student bodies. (See Cattell, 1913; Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955.) Today, relations between this formal framework of governance and the substance of university life are again very much at issue. The ambivalent character of the dominant view among administrators is indicated by responses to our survey. (See Table 3.)

Of the 526 major-university executives responding to the questionnaire, about two-thirds (66%) agreed that "faculty" and "administration" are "not separate groups in any important sense, since all are members of the academic community." A similar proportion (64%) refused to agree that "The multiversity is an inconsistent institution, without any real coherence or unity of purpose."* Responses were more evenly split, however, on less extreme statements. About half (49%) agreed (but 45% disagreed) that "Universities today are so large, formalized, and impersonal that it is little wonder they

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*Cf. Kerr, 1963, P. 18. One president commented: "I don't think the word 'multiversity' ever should have been coined."

TABLE 3

The University: Community or Bureaucracy?

Item		Agree*	Disagree*
11.	"The faculty" and "the administration" are not separate groups in any important sense, since all are members of the academic community.	66%	29%
28.	Universities rarely utilize a hierarchy of authority; most important decisions are reached by consensus among the parties concerned.	44%	46%
7.	Most administrative "decisions" in large, complex universities actually are largely pre-determined by the "logic of facts", which are uncovered by consulting the parties involved.	56%	33%
15.	The multiversity today is an inconsistent institution, without any real coherence or unity of purpose.	22%	64%
14.	Universities today are so large, formalized, and impersonal that it is little wonder they have trouble eliciting student and faculty loyalties.	49%	45%
9.	Despite romantic objections, the modern university is primarily a business enterprise with the public as shareholders.	21%	74%
1.	A major problem of university governance today is a lack of clear, consistently-followed lines of delegated authority.	64%	31%
35.	A university must be so organized that there can be an accurate, objective assessment of how well it is doing its job.	69%	19%
25.	A university is not a democratic polity; therefore, demands for rules based on "consent of the governed" have no relevance to the university context.	39%	51%
13.	University administration actually is "democratic" in a basic sense, since administrators are appointed by boards of regents (trustees) who represent the public.	26%	63%

*N = 526; 60% usable responses from mailing to 869 top administrators in 69 major universities.

have trouble eliciting student and faculty loyalties." A slightly smaller percentage (44%) affirmed that "most important decisions are reached by consensus" in the university, rather than by "a hierarchy of authority." (Cf. Millett, pp. 244-245.) About the same proportion (46%) disagreed. But a clear majority (56%) agreed, with only a third (33%) disagreeing, that "Most administrative 'decisions' in large, complex universities actually are largely pre-determined by the 'logic of facts,' which are uncovered by consulting the parties involved."

On items tending to portray the university as a bureaucracy, a similar ambivalence was apparent. Almost two-thirds (64%) saw a "major" need for more "clear, consistently-followed lines of delegated authority" in universities, when not asked to specify how much delegation and to whom. About one-half (51%) of the respondents denied that "a demand for rules based on consent of the governed" is in principle "irrelevant" in universities.* Again, about two-thirds (65%) agreed that "A university must be so organized that there can be an accurate, objective assessment of how well it is doing its job."** But only about a fifth (21%) would affirm that "the modern university is primarily a business."***

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*One respondent commented: "Consultation yes, consent no!" Substantially this position, based on the premise that "The University is not a polity...," was taken by a major faculty bloc at Berkeley in 1965, against student demands for consent-based rules of student conduct. (See Faculty Forum, 1965.)

(m8)

What these data suggest is that university administrators are painfully aware of the ambivalent character of the organization they represent, and their views reflect this ambivalence. Bureaucratic in framework, avowing the ideal of "community," the U.S. university has moved inexorably away from the informal cohesion and consensus necessary to make that ideal a reality. Its formal officials see this and do not like it--but they have no sure new vision to substitute for these extremes. As one dean wrote on the questionnaire:

> A university is not a democratic polity. Neither is it a military establishment. It is a complex organization, and we need new ideas about its form and governance.

**Responses to this item indicate it was normatively ambiguous to readers. A number of respondents agreed with the item, but added comments such as "A nice idea!" or "Yes--but is such organization for assessment possible?" (Such responses were coded "Cannot Respond.") Many of the 65% who agreed without comment may similarly have read the item as expressing an impossible but desirable ideal, rather than a workable plan of action. But this does not change their affirmation of the ideal, which by almost any current account would require further bureaucratization.

***One respondent (a dean) wrote: "Infuriating suggestion!" Cf. Machlup (1962), writing of universities collectively as a "knowledge industry." And see Kerr (1964), referring to a Los Angeles Town Hall speech as "exchanges of ideas with the shareholders" of the University of California.

POWER, POLITICS, AND PRESSURE IN ADMINISTRATION

Is power a part of university life?

Do university administrators have power over others on the campus?

Are "politics" and "pressures" involved in university executives' decisions?

Strangely or not, issues such as these have been hotly debated between university administrators and others--especially student protest leaders--in recent years.* The issues are more than semantic ones; they are intimately involved with the claims of legitimacy for administrative authority on the campus. They affect such basic questions as whether institutional change requires tactics of dissent that go beyond the "legitimate channels" of campus administration--whether such tactics are effective, are themselves destructive, are morally acceptable. The civil disobedience of the early civil-rights movement in the 1950s raised these issues with a vigor new for recent decades. However, it was not until student protestors turned similar tactics against the administrative rules and decisions of the campus at Berkeley, in 1964, that the issue of "power" in university life was brought forcefully to public view.

The ambivalence evident in campus administrators' views about a viable university community is mirrored in their views of whether "power" and "politics" are to be openly acknowledged as parts of administrative life and work.

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*See Knorr and Minter (1965), Pp. 41-57.

Scholarly usage. Most scholars have tended to define authority, including administrative authority, as a relationship involving power. Thus Weber (1954) called it "a special case of power." Although a relation to be called authority must involve at least "a minimum of voluntary submission," within the relation subordinates may not consent anew to each "command." Some writers in the Weberian tradition have defined authority without reference to terms implying coercion; e.g., Parsons (1963):

> Authority is the aspect of a status in a system of social organization...by virtue of which the incumbent is put in a position legitimately to make decisions which are binding ...on the collectivity as a whole and hence on its other member-units... /P. 244/.

Some (Nisbet, 1962) have distinguished between power and authority:

> Authority, like power, is a form of constraint, but, unlike power, it is based ultimately upon the consent of those under it; that is, it is conditional. Power arises only when authority breaks down /P. xiii/.

Similarly, MacIver (1947) distinguishes the two because authority's "accent primarily is on right, not power. Power alone has no legitimacy, no mandate, no office /P. 83/." Bierstedt (1964), after reviewing a number of analyses of authority, commented:

> When consent is involved, as it is in voluntary associations, it applies to the fact of membership and not to the acceptance of authority.
>
> We can agree that 'power alone has no legitimacy, no mandate, no office' and that authority is not simple power in this sense. But the institutionalization of power is a process which occurs in the formal organization of groups and it is institutionalized in them as authority. Without the support of the power which resides in the majority of the

> members of associations there would be no such phenomenon as authority [P. 80].*

Thus those scholars who distinguish authority from power point to the "ultimate" consent of subordinates, by which authority is "legitimized." We have seen (Chapter II) that this "consent" is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon, that it is collective and not individual, that it is consent to the relationship rather than to specific commands, and that it can be manipulated intentionally by leaders. It is around issues concerning the *degrees* of *active* and *informed* "consent," as against its manipulation by "social pressures" and "control of information supply,"** that current scholarly disagreements seem to lie. Few scholars would deny that persons in authority actually do have official "powers of sanction" which they use to control members' actions. Moreover, it is well-understood

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*Other definitions are cited by Bierstedt (1964) at P. 78. See, in addition, Cartwright (1959, P. 5), French and Raven (1959, P. 159), Emerson (1962, P. 38), Dahrendorf (1959, Pp. 165-167), Blau (1963, P. 312). Bennis, Berkowitz, Affinito, and Malone (1958) distinguish power and authority in order to make the point that *sometimes* "the formal organizational position" lacks power to control rewards and punishments of members, where the incumbent does not "accurately perceive" or "does not maintain" the "adequate means for the need-satisfaction of his subordinates [P. 145]."

**De Kadt (1965) has usefully stated a growing criticism of Parsons' "concentration" on "consensual" integration of social orders around shared goals and values. According to de Kadt (1965), Parsons is "aware (as he has written) that 'the conception of a completely integrated social system is a limiting case'...*but this does not prevent the whole argument being carried on as if it were not a limiting case* [P. 456]. (Emphasis added.) This criticism is similar to the one being made here of idealized and normatively ambiguous rhetorical conceptions used to describe empirical reality within the university. See also Bendix and Berger (1959) on the error of treating ideal types as empirical descriptions.

that powers of sanction are parts of formal authority in every formal organization--including universities--in which leaders hire and fire employees, set and enforce standards of work performance, grant and withold the benefits of organizational membership.

Power and "Ideas"

In contrast to these scholarly views the rhetoric of university administration frequently has denied the relevance of terms such as "power" to the enterprise of administration.

Here is the recent formulation of President Lloyd Elliott (1969) of George Washington University:

> Any power except the power of truth is self-serving power and has no place in the university; the power of ideas and the conditions that best serve their pursuit remain the only proper weapons for use in the intellectual arena that is the university. Power without truth is a falsehood and incompatible with the campus, and since the power of a university is truth, it follows that the work of the university is the continuing struggle for truth /P. 304/.

President Edward Levi (1969) of the University of Chicago has put it less simply:

> .../T/he interrelationship between the world of ideas and the facts of life is intricate. The university is or should be the home of ideas. Ideas are properly subversive, frequently wrong. They give power to see correctly and also, of course to see incorrectly....
>
> The /current popular/ preoccupation with power and coercion undoubtedly reflects, as I have suggested, justified criticism of what appears to many as the central position given to power in our national vision....

> /Today/ universities are viewed as a part of the political society. Whether the university is public or private... like all institutions and persons it is subject to coercion, and uses power--it is said. Any argument that there are different kinds of institutions, and that the student voluntarily chose this one, is thought to forget the coercion he is said to be under and, in any event, is like telling a citizen of a country he can go to some other place. The institution's denial of certain kinds of power is then regarded as either hypocritical or an impossible attempt to abdicate responsibility, like the unconcerned citizen....
>
> It is not certain there is an answer....One would hope it can be most appropriately made through a patient reassertion of the universities' own conception of themselves as places for disciplined thought, as academies of the mind, as custodians of our culture, the restorers of eloquence, the centers of that intellectual concern and unrest which can change the world /Pp. 24, 26-27/.

In these two presidential statements we may see again one key to the semantic and conceptual puzzle of power in university life. This key is in the normative ambiguity that runs through both formulations. It is not said that in fact power is absent within and about universities. Instead, universities' ideals of unalloyed truth-seeking, their "conceptions of themselves," are reasserted. The discussion of "power and coercion" as "facts of life" in the university is tacitly avoided. This aspect of administrative rhetoric has become an increasingly important part of the political process involving campus executives and student protestors in recent years.

Executive "Power" on Campus?

Closely allied to the general relevance of power in universities is the issue of whether executive positions themselves carry "power" over others. A remarkable range of formulations has been offered by academic executives on this point. When interviewed, one state university director of "university relations" was blunt:

> The administrators here have *tremendous* power. Decision-making *is* power.

By contrast, Clark Kerr (1963) when President of the University of California, wrote as follows:

> Power is not necessary to the task, though there must be a consciousness of power. The president must police its use by the constituent groups, so that none will have too much or too little or use it too unwisely...[P. 39].

Still another puzzle is posed by such a formulation: What kind of capacity is it that can "police" the use of power by others, but is not "power" itself? A little later, Kerr (1963) goes on to tell us: it is reasoned persuasion.

> The usual axiom is that power should be commensurate with responsibility, but, for the president, the *opportunity to persuade* should be commensurate with the responsibility. He must have ready access to each center of power, a fair chance in each forum of opinion, a chance to paint reality in place of illusion and to argue the cause of reason as he sees it [Pp. 39-40]. (Emphasis in original.)

Kerr thus comes down with those who see consensus as the only power that high university executives *should* have and use. His language, again, suggests both description and prescription, in uncertain mixture. No clear idea is given of the degree to which reasoned persuasion--as distinguished from the use of executive directives, the influence of official position, and the implicit threat of sanctions--*do in fact* characterize university executives' behavior.

One possible meaning of such arguments is that campus executives are so powerless relative to tenured faculty members, and so vulnerable to faculty non-support, that "reason" is the only power they can use with safety. Thus Millett (1962) tells us:

> ...In other words, administration power to be acceptable to the academic community and to realize its actual purpose must be considered a limited power /P. 181/.

And Joseph F. Kauffman (1968), a nationally prominent dean of students (later a college president) told an interviewer:

> .../One/ of the things that administrators had better face is that they really do not have very much muscle or power themselves. They are laboring under false illusion if they think they have. I say this because I think they derive their moral credit--educational power--from the constituency they serve, rather than the other way around.
>
> .. The ultimate power in the university, if you want to challenge it, is with the faculty and not with the administration.
>
> The special privileges, the prerogatives, the last bastion of the entrepreneurship and of the self-interest of the guild, lie within the faculty and the academic department.../P. 5/.

One state university president interviewed in the present study appeared to combine these views. Asked whether university executives have power, he said:

> You have to be cloaked in power and authority to match your responsibility. But you never use it if there is any way to avoid it.... The image of a president that the faculty have is of someone who's always waiting for a chance to use it.

A related explanation involves more the rhetoric than the concept of power. Academic usage often tends to associate the term "power" with power-seeking by individuals, and this epithet has been used against those who turn from the faculty scholar's life of "reason" and inquiry to involve themselves in institutional management. Thus administrators may understandably shy away from the suggestion that executive office carries any capacity to "impose" one's "will" on others. The denial may accord with their subjective impressions--that academic administration is a "calling" with high purposes and unique challenges (Nygreen, 1966).

Moreover, academic executives must assume that their stated views will have consequences. As President Levi (1969) wrote: "It is not at all true that the way things are stated makes no difference [p. 267]." The university president or vice-president is a highly visible speaker. He learns to expect that his pronouncements on the dynamics of university life will tend to influence others' views. Thus statements emphasizing the role of power in administration may return to haunt him by encouraging a belief that decisions are and can be affected by bringing "pressures" to bear. He learns, in other words, to fear that he will produce a self-fulfilling prophecy about the role of power in administration, helping to bring greater pressures on himself from groups that ordinarily rely mainly on respectful requests.

A striking example of this occurred in the use made of Clark Kerr's insightful book, The Uses of the University, by student protest leaders during the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley. While Kerr, as University president, was arguing his own good will and resonableness (Lipset and Wolin, 1965, p. 344), student leaders enhanced their arguments with his famous passages on the president as "mostly a mediator" among "power centers." Kerr may be the first prominent university president to state so bluntly and compellingly the degree of dissensus and power-orientation found in the modern university--*while still in office*, where he could be held to share heavily in the responsibility for it.

"Politics" and "Pressures"

Terms like "politics," and suggestions that university decisions are importantly affected by social and political "pressures," are similarly avoided by many campus executives, at least in public. One interviewee, when asked whether administration involved "politics," volunteered the assurance that "Administrators are *not* just political creatures, currying favor with different groups." A pejorative meaning for the term also is revealed by this interview response from a state university president:

> Is administration a kind of politics? You know, I never thought of it that way. No, in my experience it has very little to do with that boot-licking sort of business, or whatever you would call politics. As I've said many times, administration is the art of compromise.

Still a third and related concern may lead academic executives to avoid discussing power and political "pressures": Such terms are strongly associated in their minds with the "outside" world, especially the world of state legislatures, alumni and citizens' groups, local newspapers, and university governing boards. Against this world, high-ranking university administrators tend to see themselves as protecting the academic freedom of faculty and students--and therefore as themselves "on the academic side" against undesirable "political pressures" from without. Ongoing relationships with "outside" groups, especially governing boards, make public statements on these matters hazardous for practicing executives.*

In a book like Harold Dodds' (1962) work on the academic presidency, for example, the word "political" will appear only on three or four pages, in discussions about the need for heads of state universities to have "political _savoire faire_"--" a comprehension of how things get done in government, as well as a capacity, if not a fondness, for living in a glass house"--because they must deal with "a tendency of public officials to view the administration of public education as the same as any other function of government /P. 19-20, 270-271/." Except for such problems, issues of "how things get done in government" are taken as _implicitly_ irrelevant to the administration of universities.

In interviews during this study, however, the relevance of this dimension was repeatedly volunteered. Here are examples:

> ...The main "pressures" come from the legislature, the alumni, and the newspapers. The /major local newspaper/ is always looking for a chance to make us look bad. How you handle these pressures is a very personal thing. Mostly the President handles them. He's a lot more liberal than he shows; he's under a lot of constant pressure from /the state capitol/. Our trustees are mostly big business executives. _They_ have power--and they _use_ it.... Yes, it's true that you have to weight the views of certain "publics" more

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*_Ex_-presidents are not always so reluctant to publish condemnations of governing boards' practices. (See Rainey, 1960.)

heavily than others. But you also have to come to terms with your own principles. It's a very personal thing. The faculty seem to think we operate in a vacuum, that we should speak forth. They miss the fact if we're not judicious it would hurt the faculty's programs... (Executive assistant to the president of a state university.)

...What you asked about pressures affecting decisions is true, to a certain extent. We had an antiquated rule on /campus speakers7. We talked to the Trustees about it, but failed to get them to change it, so we locked out a speaker....Civil disobedience is okay, philosophically. But not practically, or generally The sit-in delayed our changing of that rule by two months /because of Trustee reactions7. The sit-in wasn't necessary; pressure is. (State university vice-president for student affairs.)

The pressures come from the outside....We do have a number of activists on this campus, unfortunately....The deans and chairmen and faculty /are shielded7 from pressures and from lobbying with the politicians--except in agriculture and medicine, where the deans do have to deal with the politicians. The medical dean is a born politician.... Mostly the President deals with the legislature, but the students and faculty see that they can't thumb their noses at the legislators.... The President does the mediating so the others can speak their piece. He protects them from the Trustees if necessary....(State university vice president for research.)

.../On pressures:7 Are you talking about the ideal or the reality? I'm not privy to all of /the top group's decision processes7....The squeaking wheel does get the grease; there's a lot of truth in that....I'd hope that very few decisions are made on the basis of pressures, without time for full discussion....It gets tough; there's always the time factor, and groups bring pressure....You have to ask what you can do for the institution in the long run /depending on7 how you handle this one....(Assistant director of public relations, state university.)

...Most pressures /in a crisis period7 come from the Board members. /The former president7 found them in his living room when he went home at night. (Special assistant to president, state university.)

Responses to the survey instrument also indicate that most academic executives accept power and "pressures" as routine administrative realities. (See Table 4.) For example, almost two-thirds disagreed with the statement that "Administrators actually have very little power" because they depend on others' cooperation. Only a tenth (11%) would say that university administrators "seldom, if ever" allow "pressures" to affect their policy decisions. A surprising 63% even agreed that "a show of 'student power' sometines is necessary" for a hearing on student grievances. By contrast, on the normative issue of whether "university administrators usually will do what is best for faculty and students witout 'pressures' from organized groups," nearly two-thirds (63%) agreed that usually they will.

The Fear of "Divisive" Controversy

Among academic executives, then, "pressures" and "politics" are all too well-known, but they are associated spontaneously with "outside," non-academic forces--forces from which academic executives must safeguard the freedom of the university, with its "commitment to reason" and to "rational persuasion." This honest conviction allows the administrator to ignore or de-emphasize his own positional power, and the existence of organized power-relations within the university generally, to focus on his integrative and "protective" functions. One survey respondent wrote as follows in his general comments:

TABLE 4

Power and "Pressures" in University Life

Item		Agree*	Disagree*
3.	Administrators actually have very little power in a university, since everything they do is dependent on the cooperation of many other persons.	32%	65%
26.	University administrators seldom, if ever, allow social or political "pressures" to affect their decisions about university policies.	11%	82%
4.	University administrators will usually do what is best for faculty and students without "pressure" from organized groups.	63%	27%
16.	Recent campus protests have demonstrated that a show of "student power" sometimes is necessary to persuade university officials that they should take student grievances seriously.	63%	33%
19.	Mass, public disobedience of university authorities can sometimes rejuvenate a campus community, by awakening new moral awareness in its members.	27%	61%
12.	Faculty or student "unions," and other "collective bargaining" groups have mainly a divisive and destructive impact on university life.	43%	42%
36.	It is naive to describe policy discussion between administrators and faculty or students as a rational, disinterested dialogue, since these groups do have conflicting interests, as well as interests in common.	50%	40%

*N = 526: 60% useable responses from mailing to 869 top administrators in 69 major universities.

> A university has strong traditions, values, and potentials for divisiveness. A public university is broadly involved in the political process of the state whether it likes it or not. Administrators should be aware of this. Their main role is to protect the institution from external political interference, to maintain conditions, including order, in which academic work can flourish, and to upgrade the competitive position of the institution in the academic market place.

Countering the danger of "external political interference" requires the executive to give explicit attention to solidarity within the ivied walls. One approach to this problem is to attack directly the idea that there are serious divisions or social bases of conflict in university life. Roger Heyns (1966), Chancellor at Berkeley, has done this by suggesting that such an idea must not be "given a dominant role":

> There are in American higher education today many different competing conceptions of what a University should be. Let me list just three of these:
>
> (1) The University consists of three power blocs. These are--the administration (including the Board of Regents), the faculty and the students. The essential processes that go on in the University are those of power confrontations, of bargaining, and temporary coalitions.
>
> (2) The University is an instrument of direct, social action....
>
> (3) The University is a public utility, existing to serve the needs of taxpayers....
>
> None of these conceptions of the University is adequate. If any one were to be given a dominant role, serious harm could be done to our free academic institutions.
>
> ...I would like to urge upon you the advantages of considering the University as a Center of Learning... /Pp. 6,7/.

A variant of this approach goes directly to the need for solidarity, emphasizing the relative closeness of university administration and faculty, as contrasted with the wide gulfs between the university and those outside. James Perkins (1965) has stated this argument colorfully:

> ...[T]he administration and faculty must learn that they have at least one overlapping mission, which is the internal integrity of the university--and the president and faculty that forget this mission will see their university become a gigantic intellectual mobile--put in motion only by the chance currents of air generated by the opening and closing of distant doors [P. 11].

But "the outside" is not the only enemy that the campus executive fears when he refuses to discuss "politics" and "power." The true enemy lurks within the university, in its "potentials for divisiveness" and its "wasteful" mistrust of administrators (Heyns, 1968). Administrators are keenly aware of the tenuous bases of "community" in the fragmented modern university, and their job requires them to guard against its breakdown. It is perhaps understandable, therefore, if campus executives are constantly on the watch against what one president has called "eristic" controversy:

> ...Eristic controversy uses data not as material to be examined but as selected weapons of disputation. To the eristic, persons cease to be individuals clothed in dignity, they become objects of personal attack and character assassination, because, failing to win an argument, the eristic arguer makes the opponent his target.
>
> Heuristic controversy, on the other hand,...aims at truth. Whereas the eristic is dogmatic, the heuristic is tentative. Heuristic argument rests on mutual respect of the contending parties, never substitutes personal ricidule

> and vulgarities for frank statement of examined truth, is indifferent to the winning or losing of the argument if only truth is served. Arrogance characterizes the eristic, while humility marks the heuristic...
>
> Eristic controversy ultimately converts the groves of Academe into a frightening and frightful jungle, where every branch sprouts thorns, every trunk hides a lurking character assassin, and only those feel free who are members of a guerilla force, or are private roving marauders. But heuristic controversy transforms the darkening forest forest back into the friendly grove where honest and decent men may without fear, in Robert Morse Lovett's words, 'tread the pleasant walks of Academe [Gallagher, 1965a, Pp. 1-2].'

It is not unusual to read public statements that rest on such simplified, dichotomous analyses. Like "reason" and "power," "freedom" and "order," "rationality" and "irrationality," or "law and order" versus "anarchy," the eristic/heuristic distinction may be a useful descriptor for great polar tendencies in human actions and intentions. Such distinctions help us to identify limiting possibilities in courses of action, and thus hopefully to embrace the desirable tendencies, avoiding the undesirable. They have several limitations, however. One is their abstractness, which makes their application to specific situations difficult and ambiguous. Another is their high value-loading, so that one side of the dichotomy is all "good" and the other all "bad," This characteristic can obscure intelligent judgment, by equating a slight tendency with its feared or desired polar extreme.

Dichotomous thinking may thus help to produce its own "self-fulfilling prophecy" of conflict and confrontation, by treating every "disorder" as the incipient breakdown of all order per se. Finally, as implied, dichotomies tell us nothing of degrees in tendencies, so that we must go beyond them to judge how imminent is the danger feared or the ideal sought.

These complexities in the use of two-valued analyses are often lost in public statements by persons in authority--perhaps necessarily in some cases, since they must simplify in order to communicate. Nonetheless, the effects are important, and two are especially important in the present context. First, the fear of destructive or "eristic" conflict can be used to demand increasingly unfettered power for those in authoritative positions, so that they may restore "order," stave off "anarchy," impose the conditions necessary for "heuristic" discussion, and create a "rational" social organization once again--without clear justifications of their specific actions in the process. This demand is coherent with the tendency noted here in the rhetoric of academic administrators, to rely on the unfettered "discretion" of executives in resolving university conflicts.

The second effect to be noted is hard to gauge in degrees. In some cases, the "outside" seems so power-oriented and "irrational," the university so tenuously united and so vulnerable to "pressures," that the administrator's task of protecting its integrity becomes the central imperative of his working life. In public statements, he may feel, he cannot even talk "political." One state university business manager was sure of it. When interviewed, he said:

> If our administrative team discussed political questions openly, the university would become a more political place.

Moreover, the risks of openly discussing their official power apparently leads some campus executives to avoid even thinking about it. In another interview, a state university vice-president for student affairs said:

> I don't know how much power I have. I don't want to know. I'm very wary of using it, anyway...
>
> I really don't think of myself as dealing in power. My work is largely human relations...

EXECUTIVES' COMPETENCE AND TRUSTWORTHINESS

A major tool of power for the modern bureaucratic official is thought to be his claim to superior competence at his job (Weber, 1947). As we have seen, however, the university executive is handicapped in claiming a special competence attached to his position. No certified specialties of "higher education" or "administration" have gained general acceptance among academic men to date, and even the division of "jurisdictions" between administration and instruction is ill-defined. Some attempts are now being made to justify separate administrative specialties on their own specific grounds, and this effort may have some success in the more technical specialties such as fiscal management.* In less technically oriented specialties, however, such as the broad area currently referred to as "student personnel administration," there is little agreement on the personal qualities and job-skills necessary for competence (Bursch, 1969). Moreover, in the higher executive positions, ambiquity of tasks and boundaries may be inherent. Simon (1965) has argued that this is so, since "the higher administrator" must concern himself increasingly with "budget decisions--that is, decisions as to the directions in which the organization's efforts should be applied," and with "formulating organizational objectives--that is, the values that will guide decisions at all lower levels of the organization/P. 245/*."

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*See Burns (1962, P. 225): "One myth holds that serious scholarship is necessarily confined to the academic disciplines. Such is not the case. The same degree of scientific method, professional application, and personal dedication can be exerted on a study of Chaucerian literature, solid state physics, metabolic imbalance, or university finance."

The Competence to Hold Power

In this situation, some academic executives disavow any claim that special competences set them apart and justify their holding official power. They deny in a variety of ways that administrators are a separate "group" at all. Thus one president, in responding to the survey, commented: "The 'administration' is not a 'group.' There are only administrative officers." In such a view, each administrator can be seen as merely a member of the academic profession, who accepts the lonely burdens of leadership. He is perhaps no less competent than his fellows, but no assertion is made of any greater competence, either. He is merely one of the "community," who is doing a difficult job for the sake of all.**

This viewpoint was forcefully stated by former Chancellor Edward Strong (1963) of Berkeley in a speech to the American Association of University Professors. Here is a part of what he said:

> I have no doubt that in speaking to you as members of an association of university professors I am regarded as an administrator, although I have taught for over thirty

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*See also Sullivan (1956, P. 315); Dalton (1956, Pp. 252-255); Barnard, (1938, Pp. 272-275).

**"In the academic community, traditionally the president is only the first among equals... /Horn, 1962, P. 72/."

> years, and would (if I could find the time) still be teaching. I am one of many men of my own university who differentiates himself from other persons also engaged in university administration by characterizing himself as an academic-administrator...
>
> ...The salient feature that characterizes an academic-administrator is this: His appointment as a member of the faculty remains in effect so that he can return full-time to his professorial pursuits when he completes a term of service as an administrator...
>
> ...There are not two logics...one by which a faculty member reasons and another by which an academic-administrator reasons...Neither should presume that the other has a closed mind or an opposed purpose [P. 109].

A year later, after the Berkeley Free Speech Movement had begun, Strong (1964) addressed a similar view to the Berkeley faculty as follows:

> ...Unfortunately, these troubles tend to polarize us, and to bring out the suspicions that the faculty always has of the administration. I understand these feelings: I have shared them, and I know they betoken the vigilance that makes free men. But, as you know, we administrators are faculty members under the skin; we are amateur administrators--if we were not perhaps we would make fewer mistakes...I seek to work together with you in overcoming divisive and destructive forces, so that we may solve our mutual problems in the most constructive way [P. 2].

Superior "Information"

One claim that fits well with this denial of separateness is the claim that university executives have "more relevant information" about their "institution," and hence can make better policy decisions than others. As Table 5 indicates, about two-thirds (65%) of the survey respondents agreed that for this reason university executives "are likely to judge best" on "most matters of broad institutional policy." Only a quarter (25%) disagreed.

"Information," like "communication" and "consultation," is implicitly a neutral term, without political or moral overtones. In practice, the "information" that a campus executive needs--and gets--typically is not so neutral in character. Reputations of persons, demands of political officials, complaints of parents, conflicting needs of departments--these and more are routinely parts of the high university executive's "communications" process, whether he likes it or not. During one administrative council meeting that was observed, for example, the president sharply criticized a faculty committee statement about an "academic freedom" case, on the ground that it implicitly asked him to ignore information about faculty members' political affiliations that came to his desk through the mails. Another executive, when interviewed, stated that he had indeed received more information about institutional matters since becoming an administrator. But much of it was "things I wish I didn't know," including "political reactions" to individuals and programs, and "institutional commitments" that could not be overriden even if he thought it was best.

On the other hand, most practicing executives find it hard to get all of the information they need--a fact that is familiar to students of complex organizations.* One aspect of the problem has been discussed delicately but with insight by Stoke (1959):

> The range of information with which a college president must concern himself is enormous.... It is no good to him unless he gets it.... [but] it is not always easy to get.
>
> There are several obstacles which the president faces in getting information. The first is the colleague, administrator, or faculty member who is a practitioner of what I shall call the art of incomplete disclosure. This practice consists in disclosing only information which the informant, for reasons of his own, decides the president should have.... The master of the art of incomplete disclosure is one of the most difficult of all administrative handicaps. He is always in a position to defend himself as to the truth of what he says and can always claim innocence for what he did not say [Pp. 45, 46].**

There seems little reason to doubt that the university executive commands more "information" than his fellows--information of certain kinds, which concern "the institution" as he defines it. But his information is systematically attenuated in other areas--especially those involving the informal views and concerns of faculty members, students, and other university members. Because of the diffuseness of executive responsibilities, it may often be difficult for him to know what information he needs at a particular time. Thus the executive's superior "information" is not so simple and useable as it first sounds. Here an alternative term is often used to signify the executive's advantage in "rational" decision-making: He is said to have an "overview" that others lack.

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*Blau and Scott (1962) have called this the "dilemma" of "coordination" vs. "communication," declaring generally: "Hierarchical differentiation is dysfunctional for decision-making because it interferes with the free flow of communication [P. 243]." Boulding has pointed out that one of the purposes of a hierarchy is precisely to "filter" information--and the selection made may not always suit either the top executives or the organization's "needs." See also Wilensky (1967, Pp. 43, 44); Bendix (1963, P. 247).

**See also Dodds, 1962, P. 92.

"Overview" and "Responsibility"

It is a common claim that high-ranking executives can better make institutional policy decisions because of their "overview" of institutional needs and opportunities (Eliot, 1911; Dodds, 1962; Day, 1946). President Kingman Brewster (1968) of Yale University has repeated this claim in a recent Annual Report:

> Administration, however, does have two significant levers.... The first is the simple fact that a dean's office is likely to offer an overview which comprehends the hopes and fears of a faculty as a collegiate entity; and the president and other officers of the University are expected to have a perspective and acquaintance which encompasses the University as a whole....
>
> ...No one below the Provost and Treasurer at Yale can fairly make the ultimate comparative judgments upon which the rationing of Yale's resources depend [Pp. 8-9].

The conception of an "overview" attaching to high executive position seems to be a bridge between "information" and the purposive notion of its use in making decisions. Again, however, pejorative and invidious connotations are avoided. An "overview" is by implication a good thing, carrying no "organizational bias," because it "views" the entire relevant universe--the "institution."* The high executive "sees" the institutional "necessities" that tell him how to use the information he has--and he "sees" them because of his position in the organizational structure. This position thus has systematic effects upon his "view" of the organization--but they are all "good" effects.

Reponses to survey items on those points are difficult to interpret. (See Table 5.) Only about a fifth (26%) of the respondents agreed that a university president's "overview of all its needs and problems" makes him "the most nearly impartial" of campus decision-makers.** However, over three-fourths (77%) agreed that "When a faculty member becomes an administrator his job changes, and he usually acquires a more responsible viewpoint as he assumes more obligations for institutional governance."*** And almost two-thirds (64%) affirmed the more invidious statement that "academic administrators tend to be more loyal to their institution's welfare than

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*Cf. Simon (1965, Pp. 199-218.)

**Larger proportions of the presidents themselves (42%) and of their executive assistants (35%) agreed. But comments on some other respondents' questionnaires suggest the question was badly worded: Many might agree about the "impartiality" of an "overview," but believe that the president is not the only executive who has it.

***One president commented matter-of-factly: "It usually takes two or three years."

TABLE 5

Administrators' Competence

Item		Agree*	Disagree*
8.	When a faculty member becomes an administrator his job changes, and he usually acquires a more responsible viewpoint as he assumes more obligations for institutional governance.	77%	11%
34.	Academic administrators tend to be more loyal to their institution's welfare than are most faculty members or students.	64%	24%
29.	On most matters of broad institutional policy, a university's top administrators are likely to judge best, because they have so much more relevant information than anyone else.	65%	25%
33.	Realistically, the men who attain executive positions in a large university are likely to have more natural talent for institutional decision-making than those who stay in purely academic work.	60%	25%
30.	The president of a university is the only person with an overview of all its needs and problems, and so is the most nearly impartial decision-maker on the campus.	26%	61%

*N = 526: 60% usable responses from mailing to 869 top administrators in 69 major universities.

are most faculty or students." Even here the preference for neutral terminology was evident; one respondent commented: "Would prefer the words 'cognizant of' to 'loyal to'."

While ambiguous, these responses would seem to suggest that the conception of an "overview" inherent in high executive positions is shared by a large majority of the survey respondents. Such a conception, combining a recognition of positional effects with a presumption that they are all "good," has obvious uses as a general justification of executive decisions.

"Natural Talent" for Decision-Making

Of the survey items, only one posed a comparison with clearly invidious connotations. It stated: "Realistically, the men who attain executive positions in a large university are likely to have more natural talent for institutional decision-making than those who stay in purely academic work." A clear majority (60%) of the survey respondents agreed with this item, and less than a third (29%) disagreed.

Such statements are rare in the literature of academic administration. One finds many references to the great demands placed upon university presidents and to the need for "leadership qualities." But such statements rarely claim that high university executives generally have these qualities, and most discussions of innate talents are carefully hedged by an emphasis on the importance of "experience." Excerpts from a treatise on academic administration provide an example:

> ...A second fable is that administrative proficiency cannot be learned and developed. This patently false.... A third bit of folklore is that leadership qualities, administrative experience, and managerial aptitude are less important in the college presidency than academic prominence.... Since our higher institutions--especially the great universities with annual budgets in nine figures--are now vast and complicated "corporate" enterprises, it seems only logical that the president should be, as Harold Stoke says, a man of management as well as a man of learning. The two are not mutually exclusive, can be found in the same person, and it is time that trustees became aware of this.
>
> ...Experience is the greater teacher.../Burns, 1962, P. 225/. (Emphasis in original.)

Invidious statements about administrators' superior "talents" would run contrary to much academic mythology, which treats most administrators as academics who could not "make it" in the scholarly world. It seems unlikely that most academics would even concede the existence of a "natural talent" for "institutional decision-making." Nonetheless, the idea has an intuitive plausibility, and it accords with our national heritage emphasizing individual qualities of "merit" as the keys to social success. And it again avoids the political and moral dimensions of the "institutional decisions" that are made.

The Sense of Innocent Motives

Claims of neutral competence support the sense of innocent indignation apparently felt by many university executives when it is suggested that their discretionary authority should be limited by clear "due process" requirements, or by removing certain questions from their jurisdictions (Lipset and Wolin, 1965; Foote, Mayer & Associates, 1969). From the university executive's point of view, he is the last person on the campus who needs "restraining," since the recalcitrant forces of human inertia, the halo of academic privilege, and the irrational forces of passionate controversy already block the way to "getting things done" in his areas of responsibility. He is in executive office, he believes, not for his own satisfaction, but to help his "institution."*

Comparison with the lot of the faculty professional helps to build the executive's sense of selfless social dedication. Subject to "accountability" that is "spread more widely" than that of his faculty colleagues (L. Wilson, 1958), the academic executive must "work through others, and for others," while the faculty member has the luxury of being "primarily responsible for his own individual efforts and duties (Sullivan, 1956)." For the administrator, according to Dodds (1962), "self-realization is attained in, and through, an organization:"

For previous reliance on himself as his chief source

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*A 1967 interview study of top campus executives, conducted by several "academic administration interns" on California campuses, reported that many see themselves as having drifted into administration half-unwillingly, often because a higher official had called them to take on institutional "responsibility." "The overriding impression...is that a move into the administrative landscape for our subjects was primarily unplanned, almost accidental, but once taken difficult to reverse Rosenblum, Glenn, Laggini, Mitchell, Smith, 1967,[Pp. 12, 19]."

> of ideas and center of action, he substitutes faith in the principle of organization as a 'conscious planned order of relations between men [P. 71].'

Here, again, the administrator sees himself as simply doing his best in a difficult job. Publicly, administrative rhetoric tends to insist that this job is the "rational" solving of the university's "long-term...problems (Heyns, 1968)." It is an apolitical, altruistic effort, and is either value-neutral or is based securely in values shared generally throughout the "community." Privately, many a campus executive sees that his own personal vision of what the university is and can be has much to do with what it becomes. But he also comes to believe quite sincerely that his administration is "better" for "the institution" than what is likely to follow if he resigns. In this spirit, Herman Wells(1964), long-time president of Indiana University, once advised his beleagured fellow-executives:

> Professional longevity is essential. No institutional battles are won out of office [P. 243].

Managing the Academic News

The present importance of this sense of innocence is that it helps to legitimate highly manipulative activities--including secrecy, public untruth, and techniques of "salesmanship"--that run sharply counter to the usual avowals of "free and open" communication. Richard M. Sullivan (1956), when president of Reed College, frankly described this aspect of administration:

> ..[T]he avenues of communication are not, and in some respects cannot be, completely open. For one reason, much of the stuff of which administrative detail consists is of a privileged and confidential nature. Airing everything could be as disastrous as airing nothing. For another reason administrative activity is partially political in nature. The wisest educational program devised is of little import unless and until it be accepted and in use. The gaining of such acceptance often requires the most astute maneuvers, to cancel prejudices and to prevent misunderstandings if for no other causes. For a third reason the timing of announcements, disclosure of vital information, or decision to seek a faculty vote or a board approval may be crucial in creating success or failure. Lastly the matter of presentation of the same substantive matter can honestly vary, depending upon the audience. The element of salesmanship in most administration cannot be disregarded [Pp. 316].

Dean Williamson (1965) has made the case for manipulating information even more explicit in regard to student concerns:

> Even a president fully committed to students' freedom of discussion and advocacy cannot often make his decisions with full public discussion of competing options because some of the vector forces may be identified only at a high price, even though freedom is worth a high price. This is a fact of life. But it is a wise president, and his dean of students, who finds ways of communicating selectively "off the record," and thus sharing with students and faculty alike some references to the complex situation in which he finds himself.... [This] is an art in itself. The technique has one important and sobering effect--it dignifies the importance of dissident students and often wins their assent, as well as sometimes attaining consensus, of a sort, without destroying students' status as leaders rather than as administrative stooges [P. 36].

These aspects of administration do not conduce to the sense of implicit "trust" for which campus executives increasingly call today.* Nevertheless, a substantial proportion of our survey respondents agreed that both secrecy and public untruth are sometimes necessary to institutional leadership. (See Table 6.) Over half (53%) of our respondents agreed that some matters, even if "vitally affecting university policy," should not be raised publicly, "lest they stir up fruitless controversy." Only 35%, or a little over one-third, disagreed. Almost half (47%) of the respondents agreed that "A university executive sometimes finds it necessary to believe one thing but say another publicly, for the good of his institution." In this case an almost-equal proportion (40%) disagreed. And a clear majority (54%) agreed (only 22% disagreeing) with the statement that "University presidents should take firmer stands against public pressures than they usually do." But 84% *disagreed* with the statement that "Working in university administration requires a person to compromise his ethics or morals to some degree."*

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*See Petry (1958), citing among the long-standing sources of faculty-administration tension: "Lack of frankness on the part of administrative officers: The most usual form of this is the suppression of information about matters of faculty concern under administrative consideration until it is too late for the opinion of the faculty to be brought to bear on them [P. 17]."

*Cf. Schein, 1967, P. 609. Barnard (1938) has discussed the inevitability that executives will face conflicting moral codes.

Intricacies of "Trust" and "Incomplete Disclosure"

For the academic executive, just as "trust" in his discretion is felt as a central need, so the management of secrecy and "disclosure" is a source of central difficulties. Interview responses

TABLE 6

Administrators' Trustworthiness

Item		Agree*	Disagree*
37.	There are some matters vitally affecting university policy that university administrators should not raise publicly, lest they stir up fruitless controversy.	53%	35%
17.	A university executive sometimes finds it necessary to believe one thing but say another publicly, for the good of his institution.	47%	40%
18.	University presidents should take firmer stands against public pressures than they usually do.	54%	22%
32.	Working in university administration requires a person to compromise his ethics or morals to some degree.	13%	84%

*N = 526: 60% usable responses from mailing to 869 top administrators in 69 major universities.

and comments on survey items suggest some of the intricacies involved.

Some respondents saw a moral issue. For example, here are some comments in response to items on disclosure and public untruth:

"If you believe it, say it or nothing!"

"To thine ownself be true..."

"The truth shall make you free."

And one respondent agreed that public untruth is sometimes necessary but: "Not in questions of personal ethics or morals, however."

A number of comments indicate that campus executives rely heavily on distinctions between a tactful silence, a posture of "confidence," and outright public untruth. On the latter issue (Item 17, Table 6) one dean wrote:

> A university is not built to meet crises, like a destroyer is. So, it may become necessary for a university administrator to steer around some problems rather through the middle of the battle. Also, there are times when an administrator must express confidence about future developments when, in fact, he is uncertain about them but believes that by maintaining the institution's "cool," things will turn out all right.

The same dean commented on the complexities of claiming that executives judge best because of superior "information:"

> This is a rationalization used when the administration is not willing to say the same things to all parties involved in a problem. I agree with the statement that the administration is usually in command of more relevant information, but the statement is usually used in context where it is a lame excuse.

Many respondents see confidentiality on major issues as simply a pragmatic necessity if executives are to discuss frankly the policies of the institution, or are to "be tactful and considerate of the feelings of others." One "business affairs" officer wrote:

> I have said many things within the administrative circle that I would not wish to say in a non-university setting --criticisms of policies that need reshaping should remain within the "family," not [be] aired in public constantly.

A "financial affairs" officer agreed that some matters "vital to policy" should be kept confidential, but then wrote:

> Rarely, however, and only in instances where lack of privacy either greatly damages the University, or one of its members. Examples: suspension of a mentally ill faculty member or administrator; land acquisitions.*

Several interviewees indicated that a university must frankly "put its best foot forward," and that this inevitably involves what one called "the PR problem" of distorting in one's own favor. Several interviewees indicated they see the public--especially state legislators and newspapers--as overly conscious of uncomplimentary things about the campus: Counteracting this seemed to some a justification of judicious "omissions" and "emphases" in public statements.*

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*The coupling of two such examples represents a significant source of current conflicts over university decisions. Student protestors today frequently argue that campus officials pretend to safeguard individuals' privacy when institutional "politics" is the primary reason for non-disclosure--e.g., of the facts concerning a student disciplinary ruling. Since either motive or both may frequently be present in such a case, a basic source of disagreement is clearly posed. In addition, the casual inclusion of "land acquisitions" in matters to be kept confidential--while highly relevant to market prices--clearly is a matter of major controversy, in light of the gymnasium issue at Columbia in 1968 and the "People's Park" protests at Berkeley in 1969.

Several interviewees agreed that fidelity to the decisions of *the administrative "team"* shaped their habits of disclosure. One official in charge of "student affairs" said:

> Being part of the team means that I get my voice heard, but when it's decided, it's my decision for public purposes.

Another executive stated:

> In my present role, if I can't agree with the decision, I still support it publicly. But not privately. And if I can't agree with the decisions over a period of time, or I disagree with the general point of view, I should leave.

A number of interviewees made it clear that their willingness to work in administration depends heavily on *their own implicit trust* in their fellow-workers. One campus "public affairs" officer, when asked about public "untruths" by his administrative colleagues, replied thoughtfully but with feeling:

> I can't think of a single case. Heavens no! ...Most of our [administrative] people are kind of high-level types. They are inclined to think that nothing is to be gained by creating false impressions.

Other interviewees avowed similar assumptions of good faith, in administrative co-workers and others as well. One "dean" of admissions records said:

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*See Stoke (1959): "Colleges and universities are the Caesar's wives of our society; any lapses from dull respectability are always exciting but are to be deplored. [P. 90]."

"...Experienced college presidents do not suppress news, but one of their most important tasks is to redirect attention and to counter as quickly as possible any unfavorable impressions [P. 91]."

> ...I assume the other fellow is sincere, with no hidden motives. Sometimes this is hard, with some things that are happening.... There is a certain suspicion about administrators. I became a dean after sixteen years in a department. I've taught. [The faculty] need to get to understand that administrators have a different responsibility. I've taught; I try to understand their point of view, and hope they do the same.
>
> No, there is no ethical compromise [necessary in administration.] I take into account all I can, and often the information I have is more than others have. I am sure the President is a man of integrity. I assume that if I had all the information he has, I'd do the same....

Here the "assumption" of others' good faith is buttressed by a second assumption--that apparently unwise decisions by leaders actually are made on the basis of *superior* *"information."*

A president's executive assistant elaborated a similar theme:

> ...As an administrator, I probably deal differently with things than I did as a professor of [humanities], because the President has laid it out on the table. Students tend to see issues [such as military recruiting on campus] as simple. An administrator sees it from a variety of viewpoints--for example, within the faculty, the legislature, the board, the governor, the ROTC, and so on. He has a lot of facts at his disposal that he can't even communicate. Students can't see these complexities. The administrator sees what will move the trustees, and has moved them in the past. And he can't tell the students that. He has to say: "We're working on it, trying to do our best for the institution".... It's almost so subtle that you can't verbalize it. It's intuitive.

The high proportion of our survey respondents (84%) who rejected the notion of necessary ethical compromises involved in

University administration comprised the second largest consensus on any item in the survey. The intensity of conviction on this point is emphasized by a comment from one of the few who responded the other way. Agreeing that university administration "requires a person to compromise his ethics or morals to some degree," he wrote: "Of course! What kind of administrationdoesn't?" Another, who disagreed with the item, wrote poignantly:

> As provost of [a southern campus during a racial crisis], I did compromise my "ethics or morals" to keep the institution accredited. I'm not certain that I would do it again, but it seemed the only course at the time. I think that such compromises come only at times of great crisis, and a university is not structured to meet crisis.

A third respondent may have spoken for the majority when he wrote:

> It is just more difficult to maintain them ["ethics or morals"] and sanity at the same time.

THE NEED FOR "LEADERSHIP": IMPLICIT BASIS OF DISCRETION

Our review of the administrative perspective has focused on its sources of justification for administrative authority, centering on the importance of freely exercised, competent and trustworthy discretion by organizational executives. Another element in this justification is rarely explicit in these executives' public statements, but may be found in some writings and in comments and interview statements. This is the view that a position of high formal authority requires more than its stated duties ever specify: It requires "leadership."

An extensive and complex literature exists on the meaning of "leadership," its relation to "management," and similar conceptions (Bennis, 1959; Bavelas, 1959; Gouldner, 1954; Selznick, 1957). This is not the place for a summary or analysis of that literature. However, it is important to understand some of the things that "leadership: means to university executives, for the notion appears to be important in helping them to believe in the propriety of their own free "discretion" on matters of organizational policy.

Executive "Leadership" in Academe

In one of its meanings for academic executives, leadership appears in opposition to the simple acceptance of faculty demands and opinions. One president put it as follows during an interview:

> The faculty would like a person they can run, who doesn't challenge them. But a leader must preside at a level above consensus.

A dean, in his general comments on the survey questionnaire, elaborated a similar meaning without mentioning "leadership" specifically:

> In a rapidly growing large institution a large part of administrative time (at a dean's level) has gone into attracting and holding faculty members and department chairman. It's

> been like running a hotel--a hotel that seeks to have full occupancy and distinguished guests. The prejudices and preferences of the faculty (particularly of the mobile and articulate part of the faculty) have set the mood and tone. As someone else has said, the administration has been kept very busy keeping the faculty happy. The effort hasn't been too successful. This "public" is the chief public a dean has to play to--unless organized student pressure groups are successful in mounting an effective campaign.

Executives as "Educational" Leaders

Such concerns are based in part on the conviction of many campus executives that they must be "educational" leaders as well as organizational managers. Dodds (1962), in his book entitled *The Academic President--Educator or Caretaker?*, stressed this theme:

> A president whose heart is centered in education will not content himself with reconciling diverse opinions, important as this function is; he will go further. He will be a parent as well as a midwife of ideas, not omitting those he knows will be contested...[P. 48].

Other executives also see themselves as "educators," as indicated by the statements of the governing-board secretary (above, this chapter) who distinguished this identity with its "scientific" decision-making from the less worthy function of the "regulator." A vice-president for research, also quoted above, saw the proper use of rules as that which produces "learning experiences for the kids."

For campus administrators in a variety of positions, then, "educational" intentions and self-conceptions help to maintain convictions about the legitimacy of executive "leadership."*

The Need for "Innovation"

A third meaning given to executive "leadership" in the university is focussed on the initiative necessary for producing planned institutional change (Heyns, 1968), or "innovation" (Dodds, 1962). For some campus executives, this role is seen as central because of the apparently honest conviction that "A university, if it is worth its 'salt,' is dynamic and change is the order of the day." For others, innovation is important precisely because of the inherently conservative nature of the university (Kerr, 1963).

Administrative leadership is seen as necessary because of "a strong impression that the conservative nature of an institution is ordinarily reinforced as the faculty takes on more powers in policy determination and execution /Sullivan, 1956, p. 331/." Some executives see this as a result of faculty irresponsibility. As one dean wrote:

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*Others have felt less sure that university executives can any longer hope to perform "educational" functions. For Heyns (1968), the problem is related to the leaders' lack of authority: "Educational leaders must be more than consensus seekers and mediators. Our problem about goals arises in part from the fact that our educational leaders have not had the authority to go with their ideas, and many of them stopped having any /P. 172/." Cf. Mooney (1963), arguing for a more complex relation of "intellectual command," organizational complexity, and the possibility of university "leadership." Stoke (1959) and Park (1967) conclude that a president must ask questions of an "educational" character, but should not hope to answer them "alone."

> Faculty government is a fact today in most institutions... Faculty curbs on arbitrary administrative actions are quite effective but how do you change the focus of the faculty from simply negating to concentration on how you meet responsibilities?

Other see faculty members merely as understandably, if regrettably, oriented to extra-"institutional" concerns. A president replying to the survey suggested that a typical academic does become "more responsible" upon taking up administrative duties--"that is, more responsible to the well-being of the institution, whereas earlier his responsibility was channelled more to his students as persons and to his field." On either account, however, it is the president and his executive colleagues who must provide the initiatives for institutional change and dynamism.

Leadership as "the Integrative Factor"

Still another set of meanings for academic "leadership" has focussed upon the executive--especially the president--as providing the ingredient essential to "integrate" his institution. For example:

> In the absence of leadership from presidents, trustees, or some other source, departments and schools tend to engage in power struggles.../Wert, 1963, P. 95/.

In this view, it is the leader who holds the enterprise together, against spontaneous centrifugal forces that would otherwise take over. More than one presidential writer has talked in this context of "mediation among warring groups (Day, 1946; Kerr, 1963)," or of the need for the executive to be "something of a politician," concerned with the "delicate qualities of negotiating, compromising, mediating, pacifying, /and/ soothing" competing interests (Heyns, 1968). But "leadership" has been held to mean more than the neutrality of such terms implies.

An indication of this is found in the degree to which some writers view "leadership: as the integrative factor. Here is Millett's (1962) formulation:

> In a system of shared power, conflict may surely be expected ...Conflict can result in nihilism. Conflict may also give way to consensus by which those who share power unite to realize shared purpose....
>
> I know of no way to guarantee that...I can only observe that consensus has in fact been realized by most colleges and universities...When consensus is not possible, then new leadership is usually needed /Pp. 242-245/.

Logan Wilson (1958), when President of the University of Texas, wrote in a similar vein:

> ...I think it can be fairly said that whenever a serious conflict rends a college or university, the administration is necessarily more at fault than any person or group of persons on the faculty...My point is, not that the administration should yield to the faculty in a dispute over principles or other matters, but merely that it is the duty of administration to keep impasses from developing /P. 8/.

Equally important in the view of some writers is the executive's responsibility to "identify and express the general philosophy for which the institution stands:"

> In these days of universal confusion, it is of paramount importance that the institutions of higher learning make more clearly evident the fundamental purposes to which they propose to devote the resources of which they are possessed. It is not enough for them to stand simply for the spread of knowledge. They must stand for a definite moral and spiritual commitment... There is no responsibility of administration quite so important /Day, 1946, Pp. 342-343/.

Such a responsibility has received considerable discussion among some organizational theorists (Selznick, 1957; Simon, 1965). In the form expressed here, it seems to call for more intellectual and moral cohesion than modern executives believe is possible for the university, and for that reason it may comprise a minority view. However, it accords with the high importance placed on "leadership" as a source of "integration" in university life.

The Importance of "Personal" Qualities

Precisely because the task of integrating the diverse university "community" is so difficult, some writers who expect "leadership" to accomplish it have also emphasized the personal qualities necessary in university executives. Dodds (1962) specified that presidential "success" depends on "personal values and influence," which must be placed courageously in support of "free-ranging imagination of teachers and scholars," as against "nice, orderly organization processes." Other writers have specified the "rugged character" required of an institutional leader (Benezet, 1962). "Intuition" and "decisiveness" were emphasized by Brown (1966). Kerr (1963) implied the need for a personal capacity to play many roles: "leader, educator, creator, initiator, wielder of power, pump; ...officeholder, caretaker, inheritor, consensus-seeker, persuader, bottleneck...mediator [P. 36]." "Giants" among university presidents of the past are used today primarily as examples of autocratic egoism, with which the reasonable, flexible style and the intentions of today's leaders are contrasted (Dodds, 1962; Kerr, 1963). Nonetheless, as noted above, 60% of our survey respondents believe that a "natural talent" for decision-making is characteristic of high-ranking university executives. (See Table 5.) And more than one respondent noted other personal qualities--such as "tolerance of ambiguity"--as important requirements for administrators.

One respondent, a director of university "planning," gave a moral tone to the personal dimension in a view that may be more widely shared:

> ...I believe that problems can be worked out across the table and I believe that the resort to demonstrations, etc. is an admission of personal deficiencies.

Such translation of social controversies into results of personal deficiencies is by no means uncommon tdoay. (See Feuer, 1969.) As a rhetorical device, it has obvious uses in supporting the authority of those who exhibit the style of reasoned self-restraint, whatever the political motives or outcomes of their acts.

The Blending of Person and Institution

Beyond such clear ideological uses, however, the rhetorical ambiguity of personal and social responsibilities is part of a complex dilemma in which the executive--especially the president--is inescapably involved. The president, as Stoke (1959) has said, is necessarily the major public "spokesman" for his university or college:

> The public cares less as to whether colleges are classified as public or private than it does about who attends them, who teaches in them, what is taught, and the endless flow of news about the activities. This means public relations, and since every responsibility for the success of the college eventually comes to rest upon the president, he finds himself inextricably a public relations office /Pp. 89-90/.

In practice, this means that the "administration," and especially the president, is held generally responsible by most members of the public for whatever happens on the campus. Thus, in the 1966 Congressional campaign, a California candidate appearing on television said:

> Well, I think that when you have an organization, like a university, you usually have a president. And if things go wrong, you hold him responsible. If he can't manage the place properly, you get someone else.

Benezet (1962) has noted from his own experiences that "the public inevitibly personalizes" institutions, so that the person of its chief spokesman actually is confused in their perceptions with the organization itself. His actions become "its" actions, and as the official "representatives" of the organization, other members of "the Administration" may also be taken as speaking "for," and even embodying, the abstraction called "The University." As Stoke indicated, this public blurring of analytic categories has its consequences for the campus executives, and he must learn to deal with them.

One way of dealing with ambiguities is to use them for one's own advantage.* To become a high-ranking executive virtually requires that one have considerable social and verbal skills, so it is not surprising that many campus executives do use them in this way. The prevalent executive perspective on rules, jurisdictions, and "the institution" assists in such use. At some points, an executive will personally suspend existing rules, or will exercise his "judgment" by declining the public recommendations of all groups. At other points, he will invoke rules or laws in the judgment that they are binding on him as on all members of the university, and will use them as justifications for his action or inaction (Lunsford, 1965). Or he will anticipate other social and political "inevitabilities"--such as what will change his Board members' minds, what will not--and his assessment of these imponderables will usually carry the day.

This, of course, is one important meaning of decisional "discretion," which is present to some degree in all organized social action. In the large modern university, the range of executive discretion is formally very broad, its limits fuzzy, its "guidelines" vague, its constituencies many. Hence the alternative justifications that an executive can give for his actions are many and subtly interwoven. Few persons are able successfully to second-guess his "judgments," or to assess from another perspective whether their bases are substantively reasonable. There is great temptation in this situation for hard-pressed executives to temporize with rules and abstractions and inferred states of opinion--all with good motives, and in the worthy cause of "the institution's" interests.

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*Stoke (1959) has noted that such a "semantic device" as the term "the administration" may upset "younger" presidents; it "has its usefulness, however, for presidents as well as faculties /P. 106/." Weiss (1965) has suggested that a major requisite of success as an administrator is an ability to fuzz some issues while sharpening others, at the right times.

This combination of judgmental freedom and pressing demands for his organization's "success" can sometimes lead university executives themselves to confuse person and organization in comprehending their own actions. (See Hughes, 1940). The high-ranking executive, especially a president or chancellor, becomes to some extent a symbol, an "institution" himself, in public eyes. It may be hard not to accept the public's image of his total responsibility for the university. As it comes increasingly to fill his whole working life, his self-awareness to some degree becomes merged with it. Moreover, faced with great public demands on a fragmented and fast-growing organization, campus executives may tend to see many decisions as critical ones, viewing their institution as overtaxed and precariously supported from within and without.* Thus, because "fundamental" institutional interests are thought to be at stake, more and more decisions may come to be made "at the top." Fluid and informal decisional processes then tend to replace more orderly bureaucratic delegations (Dodds, 1962). The burdens on the high executive "team" are further multiplied, and their lives further consumed by institutional problems.

In the eyes of the executive's subordinates and co-workers, a subtle merger of his personal and social dimensions also tends to occur. Stoke (1959) has written tellingly of the "little discoveries" that face the academic president as he finds himself "clothed in garments of dignity and authority." He is "scrutinized" at every social gathering; he loses his "freedom of speech" with "members of his faculty and staff;" he finds that others "extinguish" their conversations at his approach; he "quickly learns to be a man of calculated speech," in "casual conversation" as well as in "official communications /Pp. 21-23/."

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*One dean wrote on his questionnaire: "The costs of operating a university in 1968 have so far outrun sources of income that practically all universities are on the brink of financial disaster. Over-indulgence in the academic 'star system' in the alleged scramble for 'excellence' has seriously deflected the university from its main business, which is education. Everyone (students, faculty, administration, public) has come to believe that universities can do far more than they actually can. This means that universities now live in a constant atmosphere of failure. Unrealistic goals inevitably lead to disappointment and ultimately to disaster." (Second emphasis added.)

> Even more dismaying is the president's discovery that he is a man of many acquaintances but few friends. The reason is simple: friendship is possible only between equals, and a college or university has only one president... If a president is chosen from within his institution, his old and close friendships will wither, and if he comes from outside, his new position will not allow him to form them...a grim price but it must be paid. The first responsibility of good administration is justice, and the requirements of justice and of friendship are incompatible /P. 23/.

Dodds (1962) has described this interpenetration of the informal and the formal: In the president's administrative council, "it is incumbent upon him to see that an informal atmosphere dominates but that business gets done /P. 87/." Again, "a president recognizes certain individuals to be power centers of influence in the faculty and realizes the importance of maintaining contacts with them. But too repeated access to the president's ear is quickly noted and apt to be resented by others... /P. 123/." Further:

> He will take advantage of the multiplicity of small occasions and minor matters that somehow escape delegation to convey an educational accent or to increase his fund of knowledge. Informal campus contacts may consist of nothing more than chitchat, but they may also supplement the information that he gets through usual administrative channels. The moments of a walk with a young teacher from one building to another can be vaporized in observations about starlings and pigeons, or they may be exploited by a kindly inquiry about his courses and his plans for the future, capped by a word of encouragement... The possibilities of such informal methods are endless. The way in which they are utilized is one of the imponderables of leadership /P. 49/.

What this means is that for the president, and in some degree for the other high-ranking officials of the university, all contacts with their fellows and subordinates become politicized in a most fundamental sense. Every contact, every interaction, is thought to have organizational meaning, and potential to affect the lives and fortunes of its participants. As Stoke and Dodds make clear, this is not merely a misunderstanding on the part of fearful subordinates: The informal knowledge that an executive gains in such informal interactions becomes inescapably a part of the judgments that he makes of persons' intentions, competences, commitments, and probable future actions. All are, or may unexpectedly become, relevant to the fate of "the institution," and to his responsibility for its success.

The Thrust Toward Executive "Freedom"

Some administrator-writers have discussed the impact of executive office by making passing reference to the occasional "unwarranted swelling of the ego" of a few puffed-up young presidents (Dodds, 1962). That formulation may accurately catch the resentful response of some faculty members to aggressive campus executives. But it misses the more important social processes that occur when individuals must see themselves as "representing" a complex social organization to its diverse classes of members and its many publics. These processes have so far been very little explored in a sociological context, although they have been hinted at insightfully in accounts such as those by Stoke and Dodds.

These accounts suffer as well as benefit from their origins in the experience of practicing university administrators. Immersed in that experience, presidents can write with detail and subtlety of its dimensions from their point of view. But, captured by the social and intellectual boundaries of their roles, they tend--like all actors--to believe implicitly that the task and the social setting are summed up in the perspectives of its immediate participants. The reflexive consequences of those perspectives on tasks and setting may remain obscured.

Perhaps partly for this reason, the dominant response among academic executives to the problem of "integrating" their complex universities through "leadership" has been to prescribe more of the same. Administrative writers are not at all apologetic about the "maneuvers" discussed by Sullivan (1956). Instead, these are seen as simply necessary uses of whatever positional advantages the executive has, in the service of "the institution" as he sees it. Reliance is placed ever more insistently on the *self-restraint* of administrative executives, on the necessity for freeing them further from either legal or political *institutional* constraints. The "leaders" of the university--as long as they exhibit the public *style* of the reasoned and reasonable man, avowing their faith in others and their desires for harmonious "progress" of the "academic community"--are to be trusted implicitly. Such is the central plea of the administrative rhetoric today. This posture is implicit in the many calls for greater confidence in administrative good faith, for "responsible" acceptance of procedural "order," for a halt to "divisive" talk and action, for a recognition of the danger of outside political interference if executive authority is challenged.

However, some writers have seen a systematic thrust toward executive "freedom" based on the awareness of weakness in the leadership base.

Mooney (1963) has argued that the crisis of university leadership has institutional bases far beyond the personal qualities or lack of them possessed by individual leaders. Instead, he suggests, the failure of shared norms, the ubiquity of "veto groups," and the emergence of a separate administrative "class" have helped to produce a structural crisis of leadership. There is "the latest feeling that even if a man were somehow to acquire full leadership power, he would not really know what to do with it." One result, Mooney suggests, is the ascendancy of what he calls "a psychology of management":

> A would-be leader, conscientious, able, and devoted, can find himself fully occupied in adjusting himself to the constant flow of realignments as various forces inside the university recompose the vectors and valences affecting choice. Keeping in position for effective choice becomes a goal. [P. 53] (Emphasis supplied.)

Instead of heralding a crisis in university leadership, such a "goal" has been seen by some analysts as a normal tool of the skilled tactician in a bureaucracy. Thus Conant (1967) has written that a dean, to be effective, must be a "subversive bureaucrat," who accomplishes organizational ends by committing others to actions while always refusing to becoming committed himself. Wrapp (1967) writing on effective management generally, has similarly prescribed the "ability....to satisfy the organization that it has a sense of direction, but without ever getting himself committed to a specific set of objectives /P. 147." Crozier (1964) has observed that "bureaucratic" power in general is a function of one's ability to predict others' work-behavior (e.g., by means of binding rules) while keeping them uncertain about the conditions in one's own work-area. Thus the urge to remain uncommitted may always be explained in at least two ways: as a means to make rational work-decisions, and as a means to retain power for whatever the future produces.

Where managerial "freedom" is implicitly accepted as involving only the means to better decisions for "the institution," a curious twist is added tothe merger of the person and the office of the executive. The "leader" becomes at once the embodiment of organization, protected by its complexities from effective restraint by others, and a free, separate force "outside" the organization, manipulating the incentives of its members, the operative meanings of its goals, and its loose organizational rules--all for "its" own good.

Chancellor Roger Heyns (1968) of Berkeley has recently made a forthright plea that administrators be given increased "freedom" to determine university affairs in this way, informed by better-prepared and "more specifically representative" devices for "faculty consultation and advice," and periodically checked by "more sensitive and more serious postaudit procedures." In Heyns' view:

> ...[It] is necessary to give more power and effective responsibility to college and university administrators at all levels. I emphasize at all levels, lest anyone think I mean centralization of power in a top executive. We must identify the major decision-making points and center responsibility and accountability and authority in specific persons... [P. 171].

Heyns calls his proposal for changing university governance a "posture of greater individual authority" and opposes it to "corporative" and "group" decisions. The "individuals" in question should in greater numbers be "full-time, skilled administrators: rather than "academics who see their commitment to the position as temporary [P. 169]." As Heyns summed it up:

> Universities are essentially voluntary organizations; authority by and large is attributed by the members. What I am suggesting is that we voluntarily extend, by convention and understanding, the scope of administrative leadership. It is as if each part of the community were to say to a particular administration: "O.K., you run it for a while in these areas, discuss things with us for advice, share decision making in this third domain, and we'll be back to see you in three years [P. 171]!"

CHAPTER V

VARIETIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE PERSPECTIVES IN ACADEME

Among the dimensions of "official perspectives" with which theorists have concerned themselves are (1) an emphasis on formalistic rules and/or on executive initiative (Merton, 1957; Bendix, 1952; Crozier, 1964); (2) an insistence on the identity of organizational and individual interests (Barnard, 1938; Cahn, 1963; Mannheim, 1936; Michels, 1915); (3) a tendency to equate the status quo with democratic, consensual governance (Selznick, 1965; Bendix, 1963); (4) denial of the existence or legitimacy of group conflict, bargaining, and "politics" within the organization (March and Simon, 1958); and (5) emphasis on the advantages of centralized decision-making for the whole organization (Bendix, 1963; Michels, 1915; Selznick, 1943). Our survey items were designed to explore issues similar to these in the context of large-university administration.

In Chapter IV, we described "the" official perspective of academic executives, as it emerged from our study of interviews with administrators, from observation of administrative councils in operation, and from responses to a questionnaire survey. While we focussed on major themes corresponding roughly to the dimensions just mentioned, we suggested that there is a certain defensive unity about "the" perspective favored by most of our respondents: Views on most particular issues tended to protect executives' free discretion within the institutional status quo, and to deny the relevance for academic "administration" of power, political controversy, or rules that bind executives as well as others. However, most persons with administrative experience probably would insist that university executives share no monolithic consensus about problems of authority, and a lack of unanimity is clearly evident from the survey data already presented. Now we turn to look systematically at variations within "the" official perspective, among the members of four major executive job-groups,* and in relation to patterns of academic background, career experiences, current involvements, and age.

VARIATIONS AMONG EXECUTIVE JOB-GROUPS

First, let us examine the responses of the four job-groups to the set of attitude items. (See Tables 7-13, Appendix A.)

Perspectives on University Rules

When the six items dealing with university rules are considered (Table 7), several sub-group differences in response-patterns may be discerned. Business and Finance officials seem to be "rule-formalists" compared to the other groups. Their proportions of agreement tended to be high on the items denouncing "flouting" of campus rules (Item #2) and calling for an official stand against all lawbreaking (Item #31), but low on Item #24, which calls for ignoring rules in the interest of individuals. The rule-formalism is, however, subordinate to their institutional orientation, as shown by their high percentage of agreement that selective enforcement is justified to quell student disturbances (Item #5) for the institution's sake. Similarly, only the BF officials in any substantial minority scorned campus requirements of "due process" (Item #27), which tend to serve individual interests against those of the organization. The group's position was intermediate on Item #21, which asserts that existing grievance procedures are reasonable.

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*The four job-groups were designated Presidents, Academics, Business and Finance officials, and Student Affairs executives. Specific titles included in each group are described in Appendix B.

By contrast, the Academics tended to be low on the two rule-formalistic items (#2, #31), relatively high on the necessity to ignore rules for the individual's sake (#24), low on the selective use of rules against protesting students (#5), low on the item deprecating campus "due process" (#27), and low on confidence in existing grievance procedures (#21). Thus the Academics show themselves at the opposite extreme from the BF officials on these items; they are relatively "rule-skeptical," and least oriented of any group to the interests of the institution against those of individuals.

The Presidents present a more complex pattern. They are high on the rule-formalistic items (#2, #31), and on selective enforcement for the institution's sake (#5). But they are also high on ignoring rules for individuals' sake (#24), and low on the deprecation of campus "due process" (#27). Their confidence in existing grievance procedures (#21) is highest of the four groups.

Thus the Presidents best exemplify the "double standard" on rules: strict obligation for members generally, but broad latitude for interpretation and suspension of rules by campus executives--in the interest *both* of individual justice *and* of institutional order, as *the executives* interpret these values.

The Student Affairs executives responded in patterns less easy to describe. Like the Academics, they tended to be low on the denunciation of "flouting" (#2), on the deprecation of campus "due process" (#27), and on confidence in existing grievance procedures (#21). Their response-proportions were intermediate on Items #24 and #31, however, and relatively high on Item #5, supporting the selective enforcement of rules against student demonstrators. This last may be explained in part, perhaps, by the relative immediacy of this issue to the experience of these "student personnel administrators."

Perspectives on the Institution as an End

In the second set of items (Table 8), involving institutional and other interests more explicitly, somewhat similar patterns appear. The BF officials seem most institutionally oriented. Their agreement was more than double that of the other groups on the most significant item, which stated that faculty members should avoid political speeches rather than risk involving their institution in controversy (#23); it was highest of the four groups on acceptance of the need to weight the views of various "publics" according to institutional needs (#38). They also tended more than others to accept the university's "reflecting" society (#22), and tended more than the Academics or SA executives to identify institutional and individual interests categorically (#6).

The Academics' responses were significantly different from those of the BF officials on all four of these items, and lower (though not significantly so) on Item #10, calling for a review of faculty members' qualifications as university "citizens."

The Presidents' responses differed significantly from those of the Academics on giving special weight to influential "publics" (#38), on the review of faculty as "citizens" (#10), and on the identification of institutional and individual interests (#6); in each case the Presidents were more institutionally oriented. Presidents differed from the BF officials on only one itme, albeit an important one: Item #23, concerning faculty political speeches and controversy.

Student Affairs executives responded much like the Academics on most of these items, and differed significantly on none. Only on the issue of special weight to influential publics (#38) does inspection reveal a sizeable, though non-significant, difference between the two groups, with the Academics more reluctant to agree.

Perspectives on the University as Community

Table 9 indicates that of the four groups, the Presidents are most committed to viewing the university as a consensual, consultative, and coherent "community." They gave high proportions of agreement to items describing most important university decision as consensual (#28), and as "predetermined" by the "logic of facts" (#7). But they gave least agreement to descriptions of the university as lacking "any real coherence" (#51), and as so large and impersonal that it understandably loses faculty and student loyalties (#41).

Of the other three groups, the Business and Finance officials tended most to agree that decisions are pre-determined by the "logic of facts" (#7) and to disagree that the multiversity lacks any real coherence (#15). Their response-proportions to the other items in the set are intermediate; however, on none of the items were the Presidents' and BF officials' responses significantly different.

The Academics show intermediate response-patterns on these items. But these differed significantly from the Presidents' responses on the issue of impersonality (#41), and from both Presidents' and BF officials' responses on the "logic of facts" (#7).

It is the Student Affairs officials who most sharply diverged from the Presidents' optimistic perceptions of the university as a "community." The SA responses differed significantly from the Presidents and/or the BF officials on all four of the items just mentioned. (There were no significant differences on Item #11.) On two items (#15, #28) the SA executives differed significantly from the Academics as well, in the direction of skepticism toward university "community."

Perspectives on the University As Bureaucracy

On items tending to describe or justify the university as a bureaucratic authority structure (Table 10), the largest proportions of agreement came from the BF officials. Their agreement was relatively high on descriptions of the university as "primarily a business enterprise" (#9)*, and of university administration as "actually democratic" because it represents "the public" (#13). They also tended slightly more than the Academics and SA executives to call for organizing the university so as to make an "objective" test of its effectiveness (#35). Their response-patterns on clearly delegated authority as a university problem (#1) and on the irrelevance in universities of "rules based on consent of the governed" (#25) were intermediate.

The Academics were lowest on perceptions of the university as "primarily a business" (#9), on university administration as "actually. . . 'democratic'" (#31), and on the irrelevance of "consent of the governed" (#25). The Student Affairs executives, perhaps because of their experience working "*in loco parentis*" with students, differed sharply with the Academics on the relevance of "consent of the governed" (#25). And they tended slightly more than the Academics to see clear authority as a problem in the university (#1).* On the other three items in the set (#9, #13, #35), however, the SA executives shared with the Academics a relatively low proportion of agreement.

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*Duster (1966) found that one in three members (33%) of governing boards for institutions in the Association of American Universities agreed "a university is best conducted along the same principles of organization and output as a business enterprise." Agreement to this view was associated, he found, with a belief that "there is too much academic freedom" in universities today.

The Presidents gave similarly mixed responses to this set of items. Like the Academics and SA executives, they refused almost unanimously to describe the university as "primarily a business" (#9), and they responded in intermediate proportions to the items on clear authority (#1) and "consent of the governed" (#25). However, they closely parallelled or exceeded the proportion of the BF officials affirming that the university must be organized for a test of its effectiveness (#35), and that university administration "actually is 'democratic'" (#31).**

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*Again, this may be primarily a product of differences in faculty and student traditions of governance. Several academic deans wrote comments indicating they see university authority relations as vague and indefinite--but they prefer the attendant problems to those of "over"-formalization. By contrast, Student Affairs executives have recently been faced with many controversial issues of student protest which--because they are thought to threaten the institution as such--have frequently been removed from delegation and decided "at the top (Foote, Mayer, & Associates, 1969)."

**In the pre-test phase of this study, one interviewee suggested that this item constituted a near-"insult" to administrators, since its meaning turned upon an implausible "word-trick." Nonetheless, when the item was included in the final questionnaire, over a quarter (26%) of all 526 respondents agreed with it (Table 3), including higher proportions of Presidents and BF officials (Table 10). These facts suggest that such conceptual gymnastics may have more meaning for hard-pressed university executives than many observers would guess.

Perspectives on Power and "Pressures" in Administration

From the responses reported in Table 11, it can be seen that the Presidents tended most among these four groups to deny both the reality and the appropriateness of power and "pressures" in university life. They differed significantly in that direction from the Academics on five of the seven items involved (#3, #4, #12, #16, and #19), and responded at the same extreme on the other two items (#26, #36) although the differences were not significant at the .05 level of confidence. The Academics' responses clearly tended toward the other extreme, showing high awareness of power-relations in campus life (Items #3, #26) and also relatively high tolerance of civil disobedience (#19), "student power" (#16), collective bargaining (#12), and other organized "pressures" (#4) by campus groups. Only on Item #36, concerning the naivete of considering campus policy discussions as "rational, disinterested dialogue," did the Academics approach the Presidents' pattern of response.

The BF officials differed significantly from the Presidents on several items in this set. They were less inclined than the Presidents to agree that administrators "have very little power" in a university (#3), and more inclined to view as "naive" a description of campus policy discussions as "rational" and "disinterested" (#36). Surprisingly, they also tended less than the Presidents to say that "collective bargaining" by faculty and students is mainly "divisive" and "destructive" (#21). The reasons are unclear, but may involve BF officials' having greater familiarity with collective bargaining in "non-academic" spheres. But the BF officials stood close to the Presidents' views on the lack of any necessity for "student power" (#16), the denial of any positive effects from mass civil disobedience on campus (#19), and the conviction that administrators will "usually do what is best' without organized faculty or student pressures (#4).

The Student Affairs executives tended toward intermediate response-patterns on most items in this group. However, they responded in high proportions that "student power" is sometimes necessary (#16), and that civil disobedience can awaken new moral awareness in a campus (#19). Like the Academics and BF officials, they were far less sure than the Presidents that "collective bargaining" by faculty or students is a destructive force (#12).

Perspectives on Executive Competence

Table 12 shows that the Presidents were most likely mong our four groups of respondents to affirm the types of executive competence explored in this study. Their agreement was proportonately highest that administrators are distinctively more responsible (#8), that they have more "natural talent for institutional decision-making" (#33), and that presidents tend to be more "impartial" becuse of their "overview" (#30). As to executives being "more loya to their institution's welfare" (#34) and more likely to "jude best" on policy decisions because of better "information" (#29), the

Presidents equalled the high response proportions of the BF officials. The latter group was also closest to the Presidents on the issues of "natural talent" (#33) and presidential impartiality (#30), but equalled the slightly lesser agreement of the Academics on Item #8 concerning the development of "responsibility."

By contrast, the Academics were significantly less sure than the Presidents of executives' information (#29) and talent (#33), and of the presidents' own impartiality (#30). Their agreement was substantially, though non-significantly, less than the Presidents' on the idea of distinctive executive loyalty and responsibility (#34, #8). Student Affairs executives agreed in relatively moderate proportions to executives' special loyalty (#34) and responsibility (#8), and on the issue of "natural talent" (#33) they tended to agree more with the Presidents and BF officials than with the Academics. But they were least ready of the four groups to concede that administrators "judge best" because of "information" (#29), or that the president tends to "impartial" decision-making (#30).

Perspectives on Executives' Trustworthiness

Finally, in the set of items directly concerned with campus executives' trustworthiness (Table 13), statistically significant differences among the job-groups appeared only on the issue of official secrecy about "matters vitally affecting university policy" (#37). On that item, BF officials were most convinced that secrecy is necessary, and SA executives least convinced, while the Presidents and Academics who responded were almost evenly split on the issue. All four groups were similarly split on the necessity for executives to tell public untruths ("believe one thing but say another publicly") for the sake of their institutions (#17). As to the need for presidents to stand firmer against public pressures generally (#18), and the inevitability of ethical compromises by university executives (#32), the SA executives were in strongest agreement, but the inter-group differences were non-significant.

A FIRST INTERPRETATION OF THE VARIATIONS

Apparent differences between "academic" and "non-academic" administrators, while they are not often discussed in published print (cf. Petry, 1958, pp. 14-17), are well-known to the common lore and conversation of university life. It is therefore not surprising that, on inspection, the clearest patterns of differential response between groups of campus executives appear between those most closely associated with "academic" affairs (academic vice-presidents and deans of "arts and science" colleges) and those concerned primarily with the finance, facilities, technical planning, and other "business" affairs of the large university.

Academics and BF Officials

As we have seen, by comparison with the other three groups discussed, the Business and Finance officials responding to our survey tended rather consistently to emphasize reliance on formal rules and protection of the interests of the institution over other interests; to describe executive decisions as the "predetermined" results of "facts;" and to see the university as a business corporation responsible primarily to the outside "public." They tended to see power and pressures as facts of campus administrative life, but to disapprove the use of "pressures" by faculty and student groups. They tended to see campus executives as more loyal, more informed, and more talented decision-makers than others in academic life--although *not* necessarily impartial or appropriately resistant to pressures from the outside. They were relatively certain of the need for executive secrecy on some policy matters, but they shared other groups' ambivalence about outright public untruths. Thus they tend to *recognize* power, hierarchy, and "pressures" as facts of life. But they still *advocate* implicit trust in administrative discretion for the sake of "the institution." In short, they tend strongly to support the major tenets of the "official perspective" discussed above.

By comparison, the "Academics" tended to give significantly different responses on most of these issues. This suggests a major structural source of continuing cleavage among the members of the executive "team" that runs the university. The extent of this cleavage is suggested by the fact that Academics and BF officials gave statistically significant differences of response to 21 items (55%) out of the 38 opinion items in the survey.

The Presidents

Perhaps more important for the course of discussions and decisions in university executive councils, the Presidents as a group tend more frequently to approximate the responses of the BF officials than those of the Academics. Thus, the Presidents' responses differed significantly from the Academics' on 17 items (45%) of the 38, but from those of the BF officials on less than half that number--eight items, or 21% of the total. On two of the eight items (#3, #12) the Presidents disagreed about equally with the BF officials and with the Academics. These comparisons loom even larger if it is noted that only on 26 of the 38 items did statistically significant differences emerge between any of the four executive sub-groups. Response patterns of the Presidents and the Academics differed significantly on almost two-thirds (65%) of these 26 items. As measured by these responses, therefore, where Presidents tend to disagree about issues of authority with one or more of their major lieutenants, the chances are more than two to one that they will side with those involved in business, finance, and related matters--whose attitudes are relatively protective of "the institution" as it exists.

When the content of the few disagreements between Presidents and BF officials is considered, they may be seen to include several of the most extreme statements in the survey--for example, assertions that the university is "primarily a business" (#9, Table 10), and that "due process" restrictions "serve mainly as legalistic obstacles" on the campus (#27, Table 7). On two other items, suggesting that administrators have little power (#3, Table 11) and the "collective bargaining" is "destructive" in academe (#12, Table 11), both Academics and BF officials tended about equally to disagree with the Presidents. However, as noted above, the Presidents appear even more "rule-skeptical" than the Academics, agreeing in the highest proportions that executives should "ignore" rules in individuals' interests as well as those of the institution. And, on the classic "academic freedom" issue of faculty members' right to speak out politically, even if it risks involving their institutions in controversy (#23, Table 8), the Presidents appear to share with both the Academics and the Student Affairs executives a substantial disagreement with the BF officials.

By contrast, the Presidents tend to "side with" the BF officials, and to differ significantly from the Academics, on an impressive number and variety of issues. These include the following: whether "flouting" of rules is ever justified (#2); whether universities should categorically denounce all lawbreaking (#31); whether executives may properly give "special weight" to the views of those who can provide or withold institutional support (#38); whether there are genuine conflicts of interest between the university and individual members (#6); whether most executive decisions are "largely predetermined" by "facts" and "consultation" (#7);

whether it is sensible to call administration "democratic" because it responds to the outside "public" (#13); whether executives have much or little power (#3); whether they usually will "do what is best" without pressures from faculty or students (#4); whether "student power" is sometimes necessary (#16); whether civil disobedience can increase moral awareness on a campus (#19); whether campus executives are likely to "judge best" because they have more policy-relevant information (#29); whether administrators tend to have more "natural talent for decision-making" than faculty members (#33); and whether presidential office produces an "impartial...overview" (#30).

As followers of recent events know, most of these issue have been important in one or more of the major campus confrontations since 1964.* Thus, while the present study does not involve a comparison-group of faculty members who are not involved in administration, the present evidence clearly indicates that, on a number of major matters affecting authority in the university, campus presidents and business-finance officers are likely to differ from those executives most closely identified with the institution's "academic" side. It seems highly probable that the chief executives would differ even more sharply with a representative sample of faculty members.*

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*See Report of Fact-Finding Commission on Columbia Disturbances, 1968; Lipset and Wolin, 1965; Lunsford, 1965.

Student Affairs Officials

The Student Affairs executives differed significantly with the Presidents on ten of the 38 opinion items, with BF officials on 13, and with the Academics on only five. However, some of their responses differentiate them from the Academics as well as from the other two groups. Like the Academics and Presidents, they are relatively sure that officials must know when to ignore rules for an individual's sake (Item #24), and relatively acceptive of campus due process (#27). However, they tend significantly more than the Academics to affirm the legitimacy of selectively enforcing rules against student demonstrators, for the sake of "the institution"

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*Caffrey (1968) reported, from a national survey of campus administrators, officials of college and university associations, AAUP chapter heads, NSA leaders, and trustees, that he found "surprisingly great" agreement among administrators and association officials on "desirability" ratings of 35 possible future trends in higher education. "Faculty and students are in greater agreement with each other than either is with trustees" or with administrators, although the differences in rank-order correlations are smaller. The "only striking disagreement (on the part of faculty and students)" concerned the following item: "The authority of top administrators in making broad policy decisions will be significantly eroded or diffused." Over half of both administrators (57%) and faculty respondents (55%) considered this event "Almost Certain or Very Likely." However, 83% of the administrators considered such a development "undesirable or detrimental," while 77% of the faculty considered it "desirable or essential." Faculty respondents generally assigned the highest desirability rank to increased faculty participation in academic governance (administrators ranked it eighth in desirability), "while students do not assign desirability rank 1 to any of the events rated as the top ten by administrators /Pp. 135, 138, 139, 133/." By contrast, Gross and Grambsch (1967) found only "very slight" faculty-administration differences in ranking university "goals."

(#5). On issues of power and "pressure," the SA executives share with the Academics a relative tolerance for "student power" (#16), civil disobedience (#19), collective bargaining by students or faculty (#12), and other "organized pressure" on administrators by campus participants (#4).

Most striking of the SA executives' responses are their rejection of the idea that university decisions are reached by consensus (#28), their agreement that faculty and student loyalties are understandably lost to large, impersonal universities (#41), and their relative willingness to affirm that the modern "multiversity" lacks any realy coherence or unity (#15). Like the Academics, very few SA executives (less than one in five) were willing to call campus administration "democratic" (#13). And, while almost three-fourths (74%) of the SA executives saw superior "natural talent" in administrators (#33), only a bare majority (#54) expected them to judge best because of better "information" (#29). Their relative skepticism of administration showed again in the fact that less than a third (32%) approved of executive secrecy (#37), while almost four-fifths (79%) agreed presidents generally should stand firmer against public pressures (#18). The reasons for these views are, of course, unclear; however, Student Affairs executives as a group would seem to be much closer to the views of many student protestors than are the chief executives under whom they work.

VARIATIONS OF PERSPECTIVE BY BACKGROUND AND INVOLVEMENT

Let us now examine some of the variations in "official perspective" among academic executives on the basis of differences in their education, career experiences, age, and present involvements in teaching, administration, politics, and religion. Selected indicators of these dimensions were cross-tabulated, for convenience, with 24 of the 38 opinion items, chosen to represent the major issues of authority discussed above.*

Educational Background

A popular view of academic executives sees them as men steeped in the academic life of the university, who take on administrative chores for the benefit of their fellows and of their institutions (L. Wilson, 1955; Strong, 1964). This image of campus executives as securely "academic" in background appears to be only partly accurate. But background differences also seem to involve fewer differences in perspectives than might have been expected.

Of the 526 total respondents in our survey, a majority (58%) had earned doctorates, including seven per cent who had received honorary doctorates as well. Three per cent held honorary doctorates but not "earned" ones. (See Table 24.)* Holders of earned doctorates differed significantly from non-holders on seven (or 29%) of the

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*See Tables 14-23, Appendix A, for the cross-tabulations of opinion items and background/involvement variables. Backgrounds and involvements for all respondents and for the four major job-groups are presented in Tables 24-33, Appendix A.

24 items chosen for cross-tabulation. (See Table 14.) Holders showed less tendency to see rule-"flouting" as always wrong (#2), and campus "due process" as legalism (#27); they also tended to agree by a substantial margin that officials must ignore rules where necessary for justice to individuals (#24). They tended somewhat less than non-holders to agree that faculty members should avoid political controversy if it threatens to involve their institution (#23). They also showed less tendency to see executive decisions as predetermined by "facts" (#7), to dismiss "consent of the governed" as irrelevant to university life (#25), and to approve administrators' judgments generally as based on superior "information" (#29). Other, non-significant differences, where they appear, generally support an image of academic executives who hold earned doctoral degrees as less rule-formalistic and less institutionally conservative than executives without earned doctorates. However, on some items (e.g., #2, #7, #29) large majorities of both groups affirmed substantially conservative views of formal authority.

Examining the respondents' academic specialities in graduate school (Table 25), we see that the largest proportions come from the "arts and sciences" fields traditionally considered the heart of the university. A fifth of the respondents (20%) received their graduate education in the social sciences, a similar proportion (18%) in the humanities, and only slightly fewer (14%)

in the physical and biological sciences. The total proportion in arts-and-sciences fields thus is 52%, a majority. The proportions in these fields were affected, of course, by the inclusion in the survey sample of arts-and-science deans on the one hand, and business-school deans on the other.

Comparison of the executives trained in arts-and-science (A&S) fields with those from other specialties (or none) produced significant differences on eight (33 1/3%) of the 24 opinion items (Table 15). The A&S group was significantly less sure that rule-flouting is always wrong (#2), and significantly more ready to agree that officials must ignore rules for the sake of individuals (#24). They agreed in smaller proportions with the items that affirmed institutional responsibility over faculty freedoms (#10, #23). They were less sure than the non-A&S group that administrators will usually do what is best without faculty or student "pressure" (#4)--although both groups affirmed this view by large majorities. The A&S group also was less sure that "the logic of facts" pre-determines executive decisions (#7), and was more inclined to see large universities' loss of faculty and student loyalties as understandable (#41). They were strikingly less willing to call academic administration "democratic" (#13).

Differences on the items concerning executive competence (#29, #33, #34), suggest that executives from A&S fields are more skeptical of administration than their colleagues from professional-school backgrounds. An apparent exception is the small and non-significant difference on item #28, affirming that university decisions actually are made by "consensus" rather than "hierarchy." Responses to the items concerning trustworthiness reveal no clear patterns of variation.

In general, then, different academic backgrounds among these campus administrators are associated with some differences of opinion about campus authority-relationships. Those who hold academic doctorates and/or were educated in the "arts-and-science" departments tend to be less rule-formalistic; less willing to honor institutional values over individual interests, faculty competence, or the freedom to speak; more tolerant of faculty and student "pressures" on administrators; more skeptical of administrators' neutral rationality; and more aware of the problems of university impersonality and size. But on most of the 24 opinion items tabulated here, no substantial differences appear.

Career Backgrounds

As a group, the executives who responded to our survey reported substantial experience in full-time teaching and research. (See Table 25.) Two-thirds (66%) reported seven years or more, and almost a fifth (19%) reported having 20 years or more. Differences between those with some full-time academic experience and those with none proved significant on six (25%) of the 24 selected opinion items. (See Table 16.) Those with some full-time academic experience were less critical of rule-flouting (#2) and of campus "due process" restrictions (#27). They were strongly less inclined to advise against faculty speech on controversial matters (#23), and were less convinced that "consent of the governed" is irrelevant in universities (#25). They were less sure (though still agreeing by a strong majority) of executives' superior "information" for decision-making (#29). And they were even more reluctant than their colleagues to say that campus administration requires ethical or moral compromises (#32).

If experience as a full-time academic is taken to indicate knowledge of and immersion in academic culture, these data suggest that such immersion is associated with less rule-formalism, more concern for individual rights and academic freedom, awareness of consent as a part of university authority, and doubt about the superior "information" possessed by campus executives. It also is associated with the conviction that no ethical compromises are necessary in academic administration.

Our respondents reported even more years of experience in academic administration (full- or part-time) than in full-time teaching and research. Almost two-thirds (60%) had been in administrative work for more than ten years (Table 27) and the amount of administrative experience was associated with views on nine (38%) of the 24 issues (Table 17). On each significant difference and most of the non-significant ones, respondents with over ten years in academic administration tended in the opposite direction from respondents having experience in full-time teaching and research. Thus those with long administrative experience were significantly more likely to condemn both rule-flouting and law-breaking in general (#2, #31); to see "due process" and legalism (#27); to doubt that "student power" is ever appropriate (#16); to deny that "faculty and administration" are separate in any important senses (#11); to see executive decisions as pre-determined by "facts" (#7); to deny that the multiversity lacks coherence (#15); and to see campus executives as possessing unusual "natural talent" for decision-making (#33). On items where differences were non-significant, they were nevertheless mostly in the same direction. Exceptions were the three items (#17, #37, #32) on executive trustworthiness, where small and non-significant differences were similar to those revealed by differences in teaching-research experience.

Present University Involvements

Two variables were selected as indicators of the respondets' current involvement in "academic" and "administrative" concerns.

Less than three in ten of our respondents (27%) indicated they are presently teaching in addition to their administrative duites. (See Table 28.) This difference turned out to be significant in relation to views on eight (one-third) of the 24 opinion items. (See Table 18.) Those who are presently teaching consistently took a more "academic" and less "administrative" viewpoint than their non-teaching counterparts. They less frequently condemned rule-flouting (#2) and more frequently urged ignoring rules where necessary for justice (#24); were less likely to reject "pressure" on administrators (#4) and more likely to support "student power" (#16); more prone to see universities' problems of impersonality and internal incoherence (#15); and less willing to call administration "democratic" (#13); and less certain of executives' superior "information" about university policy matters (#29). Other differences, while non-significant, followed a similar pattern.

Here, again, is evidence that involvement in "academic" tasks with their attendant associations is conducive to more "academic" views of authority than is purely administrative work.

As a rough measure of the campus executive's association with other administrators, and his consequent immersion in "administrative" subculture, we asked each respondent to indicate his attendance at "regional or national conferences of university or college administrators" during the past year. Such conferences clearly are a part of professional life for the overwhelming majority of academic executives (86% of our respondents), and an important part for a strong minority: More than two in five (41%) indicated they had attended three or more such conferences in a single year (Table 28). When the views of those who had taken part in at least one such conference were compared with the views of the non-participants, significant differences appeared on four (17%) of the 24 opinion items (Table

18).* On all four items, participation was associated with insistence on the reality of "community" within the university (items #11, #7, #14, #15). Non-significant differences on other items involving university rules, institutional interests, the uses of pressure, and the competence of campus executives are consistent with the more clearly "administrative" posture of the "participators."

Examining these six indicators thus suggests rather strongly that differences of viewpoint about university authority relations are affected by the academic executive's exposure and ties to "academic" or "administrative" contexts. These findings are consistent with our prior expectations concerning the origins of the "official perspective" and the influences that shape its major tenets.

To investigate other influences on the perspective, the 24 selected opinion items were cross-tabulated with several other indicators of general interest. These indicators were the respondents' political preference, religious preference, and age.

Political Preference

As we have noted repeatedly, academic administrators insist strongly on the non-political character and relevance of their positions as the university's formal authorities. We have suggested on analytic grounds that this insistence is more a norm or ideal than an empirical fact. Thus it is relevant to ask whether the political affiliations of our respondents affected their views of authority relations as formulated in our survey.

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*Comparison of high participants (those who attended three or more conferences) with others produced significant differences on only two opinion items: High participants were less inclined to agree with items #41 and #26.

Of all respondents, about half (49%) reported they usually consider themselves Democrats; about a third (34%) consider themselves Republican; an eighth (12%) are Independents; and only six per cent reported some other political preference or none (Table 30). When the two major groups, Democrats and Republicans, are compared on the 24 opinion items, significant differences appear on exactly half (12) of the issues raised--more than on any of the educational and experiential indicators discussed above. As can be seen from Table 20, Republicans tended to respond in more rule-formalistic and institutionally conservative ways than Democrats. The significant differences appear on items concerning rules (#2, #31), institutional interests (#10, #23), power and "pressures" (#26, #4, #16), university "community" (#11, #7) and bureaucracy (#25, #13), and executives' competence to decide for others (#29). By small margins, Republicans also tended more than Democrats to reject the administrative necessity for public falsehoods (#17) and moral compromises (#32), but to affirm the necessity for executive secrecy on official matters (#37).

Thus the nation's commonest difference of political preferences, involving 83% of our respondents, appears to be associated with strong differences of viewpoint among campus executives about basic issues concerning authority in university life. At the very least, this finding casts further doubt on the typical administrative posture of "non-political" rationality.

Religious Preference

Preference on religious matters appears to be at least as important as political preference for issues of university authority. Almost two-thirds (62%) of our respondents indicated their religious preference is Protestant: only about a tenth (11%) are Catholics. (See Table 31.) We compared the views of those who reported their "religious preference now" as either Catholic or Protestant with the views of the other respondents.* Statistically significant differences appeared on 15 (63%) of the 24 opinion items--the largest number for any of the variables considered (Table 21). As might be expected by now, those reporting involvement in one of the two major religious groups tended consistently to be more institutionally conservative than respondents who reported a preference for some other group or for no organized religion at all.** This tendency showed itself on issues in each major group of opinion items, including those concerning rules (#2, #31, #5), institutional interests (#10, #23), power and "pressures" (#4, #16), university "community" (#11 #14) and bureaucracy (#25, #13), executive competence (#29, #34), and even executive trustworthiness (#17, #37). On the questions concerning trustworthiness, the conventional religionists tended to deny the necessity of public falsehoods and to affirm the necessity for executive secrecy.

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*Proportions of the sample indicating the various preferences (Table 31) were affected by the presence of three Roman Catholic institutions among the 69 "large" and "prestigious" institutions to which the questionnaires were sent. But these proportions do not influence the comparisons of viewpoints within preference groups.

**Interpretation of this item as an indicator of involvement in a conventional, organized religion is supported by the fact that very similar differences of response on 12 of the 15 items were revealed by comparing respondents who consider themselves "deeply religious" or "moderately religious" with those who consider themselves "largely indifferent" or "basically opposed" to religion. (See Table 22.) By contrast, comparison of Catholics with Protestants produced no significant differences among the 24 opinion items.

Age

Finally, we evaluated the effect of respondents' age on their viewpoints concerning campus authority. As Table 33 indicates, student protestors do not simply deal with some campus executives who are "over 30." Of our respondets, all but one were over 30 years of age, only a small fraction (10%) were under 40, and a strong majority (59%) were 50 or over. Comparing those under age 50 with those 50 or over, we found significant differences on half (12) of the 24 opinion items. (See Table 23.) Older respondents were consistent in their tendencies toward institutional conservatism, and were among those most certain that administrative work requires no ethical or moral compromises (#32). At least one opinion item in every group showed a significant difference associated with age. Thus it would appear that conventional wisdom again is supported: Sheer age, for whatever social and psychological reasons, is related to major differences of views about how a university should be governed.

Summary

The data to this point, then, would seem to support several major theses: An "institutionally conservative" official perspective is characteristic of most campus executives today, and the more conservative variants of this perspective are associated with lack of traditional academic background, with length of administrative experience in the university, with current involvement in administrative concerns to the exclusion of teaching, with a Republican political preference, with an involvement in conventional religious institutions, and simply with age. The data are not conclusive, but they are remarkably consistent as far as they go. Now let us take them one step further by examining the way these indicators of background and involvement are related to our respondents' administrative positions.

BACKGROUNDS AND INVOLVEMENTS OF THE JOB-GROUPS

When we examine the variations among our four major job-groups in backgrounds and current involvements, we discover overlapping and crosscutting similarities.

Educational Backgrounds

Large majorities of the Academics (92%), the Presidents (81%), and the Student Affairs executives (66%) hold *earned doctorates*, while only a small minority (13%) of the BF officials do so. (See Table 24.) The results are similar when *academic specialties* are considered: Large proportions of the Academics (86%) and the Presidents (61%) received their graduate education in the arts and sciences, and about half (94%) of the SA executives did so. However, less than a quarter (23%) of the BF officials studied in A&S fields. Not surprisingly, the largest single proportion of BF officials studied in engineering, business, or agriculture.

Among the SA officials, a substantial minority did their graduate work in education, but none studied in the natural sciences. (See Table 25.)

Career Experience

Moving to experience in full-time teaching and research (Table 26), we see again very high proportions of former full-time teachers and scholars among the Academics (100%) and Presidents (88%), while the proportion is a modest majority (55%) among SA executives and only about a fourth (27%) of the BF officials. However, when experience in academic administration is considered (Table 27), it is the Presidents (75% with more than ten years' experience) and the BF officials (70%) whose average tenure appears longest. The Academics' proportion with ten years' experience (44%) is significantly lower than either of these, while the SA executives report an intermediate 66%.

University Involvements

On whether respondents are presently teaching (Table 28), the responses of the Presidents and the BF officials are the same, with 10 per cent presently teaching in each group. By contrast, a majority (51%) of the Academics and a large minority (40%) of the SA executives reported they are still teaching. As to participation in inter-university conferences of administrators (Table 29), it is the Presidents (66% high participation) and the SA executives (62% high) whose responses are similar, and significantly different from those of the Academics (39% high) and the BF officials (33% high).

Political Preference

In political preference (Table 30), the Presidents (54% Democrats) and SA executives (60% Democrats) appear to fall somewhere between the Academics (70% Democrats) and the BF officials (33% Democrats). The Presidents' responses on this item are significantly different from those of the Academics, while the responses of the BF officials differed significantly from each of the other three groups. The BF officials were the only one of the four groups reporting a majority (51%) of Republicans.

Religious Preference and Involvement

The BF officials also reported themselves Protestant in the largest proportion (71%), while the proportion of Protestants among the Academics (54%) was significantly smaller. (See Table 31.) Preferences reported by the Presidents (66% Protestant) and SA executives (62% Protestant) were intermediate between these extremes. If we consider the per cent Catholic or Protestant as against all others and more (Table 31), the BF officials' proportion of religionists is again the highest (86% Catholic or Protestant), and those of the Academics (65%) and the SA executives (70%) are significantly lower, while that of the Presidents (78%) is intermediate. Considering the proportions who say they are "deeply" or "moderately" religious (Table 32), we find similar results, with the BF officials highest (77% deeply or moderately religious), the Presidents close to them (73% religious), the Academics significantly lower (56% religious), and the SA executives (70% religious) in the intermediate position.

Age

Almost three-fourths (73%) of the Presidents reported they are 50 years of age or older. (See Table 32.) This proportion was significantly greater than those of the Academics (58%), the BF officials (56%), and the SA executives (51%). It is worth noting that a majority is 50 years of age or older in each job-group--including even the Student Affairs executives, who are charged most directly with handling student concerns and interpreting them to other officials. The Presidents' ages are especially relevant to problems of student protest, because of the tendency to see such problems as threatening the interests of "the institution," and thus to decide them "at the top." (Foote, Mayer, & Associates, 1968) Among the Presidents responding, none was under age 40, and almost a fourth (22%) were of age 60 or older. As we have seen, age is associated with institutional conservatism on a number of issues of authority.

Summary

We see, then, that the Presidents and the Academics as groups are similar (but unlike the BF officials) in reporting high proportions with doctorates, specialties in A&S fields, and experience in full-time teaching and research. The Presidents and BF officials are alike (and unlike the Academics) in their relatively long years of campus administrative experience and in the small percentages who are presently teaching. On matters of political and religious preference, the Presidents fall between the widely separated Academics and BF officials. But the latter two groups are alike, and unlike the Presidents, in their relative youth and their lesser involvements in off-campus meetings of administrators.

The characteristics of the SA executives were intermediate between the other groups on most of the background/involvement variables, including the percentages having earned doctorates, A&S specialties, full-time academic experience, a decade or more in academic administration, current teaching duties, Democratic political preference, deep or moderate religious commitment, and Protestant religious preference. Only on attendance at administrative conferences do they, with the Presidents, stand out as high among the four groups. Like the Academics, the SA executives are significantly low in the proportion who are either Catholics or Protestants. And the SA executives tend slightly to be the youngest group of the four.

A SECOND VENTURE AT INTERPRETATION

These data reveal no simple pattern of associations that might explain the differences and similarities of official perspectives among the four major groups of academic executives. Not surprisingly, each group's responses appear to be shaped by conbinations of factors, some of which operate in opposition to each other. However, some plausible patterns that do emerge are relevant to our major theoretical concerns.

We have seen that the Business and Finance officials tend most strongly toward a classic bureaucratic viewpoint on university authority, emphasizing rule-formalism, the overriding importance of institutional interests, and the "business"-like character of the enterprise. They tend to see power and pressures as realities of administrative life. But they refuse generally to condone the use of pressures by any but "duly constituted" officials, whom they see as competent to make institutional decisions, using official secrecy where they deem it necessary.

By contrast, the Academics among our respondents are quite different on most of the tendencies mentioned. They are relatively rule-skeptical, except where rules (such as due-process requirements) serve individuals' rights against institutions. And they are least comfortable with selective enforcement of rules (which might fit a simple rule-skeptical viewpoint) where this serves institutional purposes against those of protesting students. They side strongly with faculty freedom of political speech against institutional interests, and are least comfortable of the four groups with an executive review of faculty members' university "citizenship." They are unwilling to view the university as a bureaucracy, but (like the BF officials) are uncertain also about its status as a "community." They are ready to see power and pressures in campus administration, but in contrast to the BF officials they also tend to approve of organized pressures by faculty members and students. They also are less sure of campus executives' competence to make policy decisions for their institutions. In short, executives who hold the most "academic" jobs fit broadly within the widespread view of "academics" as more individualistic and skeptical of institutional forms than their fellows in the "businesslike" occupations.

The background and involvement data tend to support this view. The more conservative perspectives tend to be associated with lack of an earned doctorate, with non-A&S academic specialties, with lack of full-time teaching-research experience, with long experience in campus administration, with lack of present teaching involvement, with Republican political preference, with religiosity, and with involvement in a conventional Christian denomination. All of these attributes are more characteristic of the BF officials as a group than of the Academics. Only in age and recent attendance at administrators' conferences were the Academics and BF officials very close in their proportions of responses. Thus it is reasonable to explain the striking differences between the Academics and BF officials as due, at least in part, to these differences of background and current involvements.

We have also seen that the Presidents tend to be more institutionally conservative than the Academics, though somewhat less tha the BF officials, who appear both conservative and rule-formalistic. The Presidents, while they strongly defend institutional integrity, tend to affirm both rule-formalist and rule-skeptical views in doing so. Their idea of "the institution," therefore, seems more complex than that of the BF officials. The Presidents are foremost among the four groups in affirming the reality of university "community," and of executive decisions "predetermined" by "facts." They tend to reject bureaucratic views of the campus, but to approve a view of academic administration as "democratic." They tend also to deny the relevance of power in administration, and to reject strongly any use of pressures by faculty or students. Their confidence in executives' competence is relatively high. In general, their responses appear to minimize the reality of conflicts on the campus, and to be most acceptive of normative ambiguity--the substitution of ideals for realities in describing campus life.

The Presidents' agreements with the BF officials become more striking, however, when backgrounds are considered. The Presidents are more like Academics than BF officials in their proportions have earned doctorates, A&S academic specialties, experience as full-time teacher-researchers, and Democratic political preferences. By contrast, the Presidents are more like the BF officials than the Academics in their long years of academic administration, their abandonment of teaching for administrative work, and their involvement in conventional, organized religion. The Presidents proved to be a more elderly group, and far more involved in inter-university administrative meetings, than either the Academics or the BF officials.

These data are consistent with a view suggested by our earlier analysis: That Presidents tend to be "academics" who, through long and intensive experience as campus administrators, come to think about issues of authority much as business managers do.

The mixed responses of the SA executives suggest no simple interpretation of their specific perspective. It may be that their intermediate position on most of the background and involvement variables dictates similarly mixed positions on many of the opinion items. However, the SA executives are the group least content with a description of the university as a consensual "community;" most aware of the "multiversity's" size, impersonality and incoherence; least tolerant of official secrecy; and most critical of presidents' lack of firmness against public pressures. It is plausible to connect these views with the SA executives' relative youth, lack of conventional religious involvement, and modest current involvement in teaching--characteristics on which they differ clearly from the Presidents and BF officials. There are other explanations, however, which are closer to the character of the Student Affairs executive's special task and self-image as a member of a "helping and caring" profession (Williamson, 1965; Nygreen, 1966). This notion is lent importance by the finding that both Presidents and SA executives are highly involved in inter-campus administrators' groups--but presumably in different groups. Informal observation suggests that many "student personnel administrators" view themselves as far more committed than other administrators or faculty members to the welfare of individual students, against impersonal and over-rationalized requirements in modern academic life. Such matters, like most relationships in campus governance, deserve much further attention from researchers.

CHAPTER VI

THE DYNAMICS OF BREAKDOWN

We turn now to consider more directly some of the processes leading to the present crisis of formal authority in large U.S. universities.

BASIC DILEMMA OF THE CAMPUS EXECUTIVE

In Chapter II, we suggested some of the reasons why formal authority has long been precarious in universities: The salience of authority based on certified expertise, traditions of "academic freedom" from managerial supervision, ideals of consensual governance among scholars, the lack of a secure "specialty" in academic "administration". These factors have been augumented in recent years, we suggested, by universities' growth; by their greatly increased public importance and visibility; by insistent demands for more "accountability" to public officials. The results have included growing numbers of campus administrators, increased separateness and unity of tasks and associations amoung university executives, and a symbolic isolation of "the Administration" from the substance and authenticity of academic life. We described some of the responses of university executives to these problems, including attempts to rebuild patterns of contact and "communication" with others on the campus, and the development of a complex and subtle ideology to justify administrative "discretion" as the pivotal arbiter of major policies and policy decisions.

Let us now look more closely at two opposing strains in the university executive's situation, which shape his responses to it. These are strains toward pragmatism and toward rationalization. These strains, like Weber's (1954) "formal" and substantive" rationalities, may be present to some degree in every system of social order. However, they affect the university executive with special force because his authority is so precarious: He cannot expect implicit acceptance of his decisions based on his organizational position. For reasons discussed in Chapter II, he cannot routinely expect that "suspension of judgment" by subordinates which analysts such as Simon (1965) have considered the hallmark of authority. Instead, he must expect frequently to *bargain* pargmatically for that "minimum of voluntary submission" of which Weber (1947) wrote and to *justify* his decisions to a variety of critical publics.

The Strain to Pragmatism

Because of his special problems, the university executive is under strong inducements to accommodate "realistically" to the short-run pressures he finds around him. Since he cannot expect implicit obedience, he is forced to be "personal" and "political", rather than authoritative, in seeking to gain acceptance of his decisions, or even to remain in office. He must avoid giving "orders" to proudly independent professionals, or relying too heavily on technically correct formal rules, or taking hard stands on issues if important constituents feel that these strongly affect their values and interests. In a variety of subtle ways, he must bargain both with his organization's members (Blau, 1963), and with influential outsiders (Thompson and McEwen, 1958). While formally he makes and announces "decisions," these must be adapted to the views and needs expressed by those who have the capacities to help him "get things done", or to withhold support from his policies and his incumbency. He must avoid visible errors of judgment and untenable commitments, which might raise the issue of his competence and legitimacy to public view. And where controversy does break into the open, he must seek ways to bargain quietly and gracefully for the values and interests to which he feels most committed, without prematurely placing his entire authority on the line where it may be lost in a "minor" cause.

The Strain to Rationalization

But the university executive does not act and adapt for himself or his values alone. As the visible, official representative of an increasingly "public" organization, he makes decisions "for" others as well as himself, and his actions often affect others' values and interests profoundly. Hence he is not free to bargain openly with the powers that be, or to accommodate any and all pressures as he deems it necessary or legitimate. He must find ways, periodically at least, to explain and justify his decisions to many and diverse constituencies.

More broadly, because they "represent" their organization to its many publics, university executives find themselves regularly called on to explain that organization publicly--in ceremonial speeches, in policy statements, in *ad hoc* press conferences, in reasoned explanations for policies and decisions. In doing so, they are inescapably involved in operationally defining the bounds of a social order.

Weber wrote (1957) that the legitimacy of modern "legal-rational" orders depends on belief that a "consistent system of abstract rules" which has been "intentionally established" comprises the order and defines its boundaries. As we have seen, however, universities' formal rules tend to be broad and ambiguous guidelines, rather than specific and binding norms. Unassisted by any separate judicial branch within the organization itself, university executives are themselves the interpreters of these rules as they "apply" to specific cases. Even the formal jurisdictions of administrators, while clear enough in broad outline, have often proved too vague for authoritative settlement of issues during a controversy. And the formally avowed goals of universities tend to be of little help in setting institutional priorities. For example: Which department (among those seeking to educate young people and advance scientific knowledge) shall be given the two new professorships it asks this year? What qualifications fit a professor to provide "high-quality" education to students? Which student "political" activities, if any, are incompatible with university "purposes"?

The framework of explicit meanings within which university executives must rationalize their official decisions, then, is fraught with ambiguities, which they must either resolve or evade as much as possible. For this reason, university officials have special need of "socially integrating myths" to help hold their loosely coordinated organization together and give its members a "sense of mission" (Selznick, 1957). By focussing attention on such unifying myths of shared ideals and purposes, the executive can help his organization to pursue "its" ideals more effectively. He may also shore up his own authority, emerging as a leader who expresses a sense of the enterprise genuinely shared by his followers. Thus broad objectives such as "the search for truth," "liberal education," and "the higher learning," which enjoy prominent places in traditional university rhetoric, have a strong attraction for university executives as means to justify the legitimacy of their organization and "its" policies.

Obstacles to Executive Success

But the task of simultaneously adapting and justifying is by no means easy for the academic executive.

In the first place, the two activities are always potentially in conflict. Definition and explanation inherently limit action, if they are taken as guides to it at all. Hence the executive limits the scope of his own potential adaptations by stating principles upon which he acts: These principles may prove incompatible with the decisions that will seem pragmatically necessary in unforeseen future circumstances. Accordingly, as we have seen, university executives typically do not want to be bound by specific rules, even though these might provide certainty and legitimacy to their decisions.

Second, the varied commitments of the modern university produce needs that often seem irreconcilable: more time and money for faculty research, but more for teaching also; more freedom from bureaucratic supervision, but also more accountability to the public; faculty members who are competent in their academic specialties, but able and willing to do interdisciplinary teaching as well; and so on. Because they deal with quite fundamental matters of human knowledge and values, faculties and student bodies often include sincere but strongly differing convictions about the most important values to be served, the priorities that a university should set, the academic policies that are desirable or "necessary." Thus only the most skillful rhetoric can reconcile the diversity of orientations among scientists and humanists, "applied" and "basic" researchers, those oriented to teaching and to research, political activists and political quietists--and the many other quite genuine divisions common to the large campus.

Third, the task of reconciling such differences often places a premium on what may be called "political" information: the executive's informal knowledge of his constituents' implicit attitudes; of the problems that concern them; of the shifting patterns of interpersonal influence within the faculty, the student body, the governing board, and the "outside" public. In stable and peaceful times, it may be sufficient for executives to give statesmanlike consideration to the respectful recommendations of subordinates and the polite suggestions made by representatives of "the outside community". In more stressful times, executives must make quick and expedential readings of what the traffic will bear--what each influential group and individual will accept if and when "reasoned discussion" breaks down and "political" stances become salient. Such knowledge can be vital to both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the university executive, who must be able to predict with some success what policies will be acceptable--before he announces them.

But the university executive is under special handicaps in trying to stay informed of his constituents' needs and views. His personal experience of academic subcultures, as a former student and faculty member, often is a major source of insight. But these subcultures may have changed substantially since his last intimate acquaintance with them--especially the subcultures of students, from which he is farthest removed. And his interpretation of those subcultures will be highly colored to the degree that he is involved in administrative tasks and immersed in an administrative subculture.

Like other high hierarchic officials, the university executive suffers defects and distortions of information because of his position itself (Wilensky, 1967; Boulding, 1953). Moreover, the social and symbolic separateness of "the Administration" in the large university creates additional obstacles to free "communication." The restricted associations of administrators tend to bring them only very selective information about university life and to shape the principles by which they assign importance to what they learn. During a time of campus crisis, when "political" attitudes are being sharply affected by events, the executive's isolation may be increased, and its effects overwhelming.

By contrast, as noted in Chapter IV, the university executive finds he has special access to some "information" by virtue of his position: The very diversity of demands upon him draws his attention sharply to the university's complex structure and commitments. The scope of his official duties demands an "overview" of competing interests and values, revealing an "institutional" relevance in many acts and policies that others may see only as isolated events. And, as members of the university's official administrative "team," high-ranking executives will also receive specific information denied to others, including both complaints and expressions of support. But this information, precisely because it involves "institutional" interests and carries "political" meanings, also is limited in its use because the executive can rarely discuss it openly. Instead of helping him to meet competing demands with rational justifications, it may actually hamper him by accentuating the very real but covert "political" strains in his position.

Finally, as titular leaders of an institution that traditionally has purported to change men's minds by the power of truth, academic executives must depend more on the "normative power" of symbols and meanings than do the leaders of other organizations, such as business firms or prisons (Etzioni, 1964). But they also must meet higher standards in trying effectively to rationalize the institution they represent. Faculty members, and many of their students, are severe and capable critics of rational justifications. Thus skill at distinguishing the false from the true in intellectual matters is a major competence and concern of the academic executive's two most immediate audiences. Just as his isolation from them reduces his knowledge of their felt needs, it also attenuates his awareness of the criticisms they level at his pronouncements.

The increasing separateness and salience of "the Administration" in university life also encourages a subtle intolerance of admininstrative "mistakes." As distant, impersonal figureheads, issuing regulations and handing down decisions, university administrators lose much of their human quality for the mass of students, of "non-academic" employees, and even of faculty members. As the broad division of labor between "administration" and "instruction" has progressed, giving "the Administration" increasing responsibility and control over institutional policy decisions, the feeling has also grown that the executives "in charge" have an obligation to "make things come out right" for their organization. (See Harrison, 1960.) Many students and faculty therefore listen unsympathetically to administrators' disclaimers that they can rarely make "command decisions" and "survive," or that the task of "pacifying" all viewpoints consumes most of their professional attention. Administrators come to be seen as a class rather than as individuals. Having asked for and accepted the power of decision over others, they are expected to "get results" with that power--or step down.

DOMINANT RESPONSE OF THE UNIVERSITY EXECUTIVES

Faced with this basic dilemma, university executives have responded in a variety of ways. Among them, and of central attention here, is the development of a complex and subtle perspective, composed of partially integrated and mutually reinforcing parts, which supports their continued exercise of executive discretion as formal representatives of their organization. In Chapter IV, we detailed a number of common, interlocking elements in such a perspective, and suggested that each can be associated with recurrent problems that academic executives feel bound to solve.

The Perspective in Summary

The perspective on which these executives place major reliance is delicately balanced between unprincipled adaptation to political influence and adherence to explicit, concrete, policy commitments. In the perspective, as we have seen, rules are said to be necessary and important; university members should obey them strictly. However, rules should retain sufficient vagueness to be interpreted and "applied" selectively by academic executives, as they deem appropriate.

A rough division of labor between "administration" and "instruction" is seen as both appropriate and desired, allowing faculty members to concentrate on intellectual matters while executives "facilitate" this by running "the organization" as such. Official jurisdictions along these lines, it is thought, should be sharpened and more rigorously followed. Within them, however, executive discretion should be relatively free and unfettered over long periods.

Guiding all executive discretion is an ideal construct called "the institution," which combines organizational framework, official goals, and informal processes in a global abstraction, the "interests" of which serve as an all-purpose criterion of "rational" executive decisions. Persons participating in this institution are said to be "members" of a "community." Members are thought to have substantially the same interests, and to share both meanings and values so thoroughly that these can be routinely used by executives to resolve ambiguities of decision. Within this framework, extensive "consultation" is said to go on between executives and community members, often unspecified. Such "communication" is said to supply the decision-makers with all necessary "information" about the needs, problems, and viewpoints of those whose affairs they govern.

By contrast, terms such as "power" and "politics" are typically excluded from executive discussions of internal university relations, and are associated with potential "outside interference" from governing boards or elected officials. Internal relations are described, instead, as an intellectual discourse among equals, or as a benevolent process of "human relations". When the competence of academic executives to "judge best" is discussed, the dominant preference is for value-neutral terms such as "information" and "experience," even though most executives tend to see their colleagues also as having unusual "natural talent" and institutional loyalty. The moral integrity and trustworthiness of executives are emphasized. This allows executives to ask that others overlook their uses of secrecy and public untruth, since these are "necessary" for protection of institutional interests.

Finally, the need for "leadership" supplies the holder of bureaucratic office on the campus with a generalized rationale for going beyond formally specified bounds in his "executive" role. As autonomous individuals, without taint of any administrative subculture, executive leaders are seen to stand above "corporative" decisions. They must lead their institutions to "progress" through "innovations" and through "rational" solving of that institution's "long-range problems."

The Uses of Structured Ambiguity

A common theme uniting these formulations is the insistence that a framework of formal rules, goals, and jurisdictions guides and legitimates the decisions of university executives—but leaves them "free" to make "substantively" rational departures from legalistic formalities as they deem it necessary.

A high level of abstractness, characterizing most of the public formulations cited here, helps to convey this theme. Abstract terms do convey meaning, and help to impart a sense of certainty and completeness in explanation without sacrificing the ambiguity necessary for shifts of interpretation when they are "applied" to concrete circumstances. This quality is no mean asset to the harried university executive, who rapidly learns that his institution's widespread commitments and diverse constituencies will produce many pressures to alter any set of specific priorities that he might publicly avow.

The Achilles' heel of such an approach is the assumption that academic executives share with the many other classes of university participants an informal but fundamental consensus about certain central meanings and values--allowing executives to make substantively rational judgments within broad rules, and to expect that these will seem fair and reasonable to others. As the large university has grown in the diversity of its commitments, in the isolation of its members from each other, and in the separation of its formal officials from the concerns of member groups, this assumption has become increasingly shaky.

This difficulty is dealt with in the official perspective by a widespread and subtle use of what we have called normative ambiguity. Students, faculty members, and others have been told repeatedly that they are members of an academic "community"--a sincere desideratum of many persons on the campus, but of increasingly doubtful accuracy. "Power" and "politics" are said to be irrelevant to the internal affairs of universities, which recognize only "the power of truth." "Consultations" as a general habit of administrators is invoked as if it routinely produced "full and free" discussion and agreement among the "parties concerned" in policy decisions. Thus noble goals and good intentions are frequently substituted for a frank description of official actions and their exigencies; ideals are routinely substituted for reality.

It may be argued reasonably that such a perspective has served with remarkable utility to retain some semblance of loose and collegial coordination within modern universities, burdened as they are by overwhelming pressures to become solidly bureaucratic public agencies. Recent events and the present analysis suggest strongly, however, that the perspective may have reached the limits of its utility, and that naive or calculated insistence on perpetuating it tends to worsen the existing crisis. The point can be emphasized by a brief look at the first great student protest of the current decade, which did so much to precipitate that crisis.

THE 1964 "TEST CASE" AT BERKELEY

By 1964, most of the conditions that we have described as affecting university administrative authority already obtained, and conflicts in "administrative-faculty relationships" had long been of widespread concern among university officials. (See Abbott, 1958; Sullivan, 1956.) Heavy reliance on the benevolent discretion of university executives was firmly established as the dominant perspective of campus officials. However, explicit challenges to executive authority on campus were sporadic, isolated and little publicized. Beginning in September of 1964, that situation was changed by the dramatic and internationally publicized series of student protests at Berkeley known as the Free Speech Movement, or FSM. For many persons, inside and outside the university, these events comprised a "test case" of university administrative authority.

Its outcomes catalyzed the crisis of legitimacy that today shows little sign of abating.

A variety of elements helped to produce the Free Speech Movement and increased its impact on opinion; only a few of these can be mentioned here.*

Sources of Impact

In September, 1964, the University of California at Berkeley was a world-renowned center of academic research and instruction, widely considered the "best" public university in the United States (Cartter, 1966) and the prestigious pinnacle in the nation's best-known state "system" of higher education. The University had made political news during the 1950s with a celebrated "loyalty oath" controversy, which resulted in dismissals of a number of distinguished faculty members, followed later by reinstatement offers at the order of the U.S. Supreme Court. (See Stewart, 1950; Gardner, 1967.) Beginning in 1959, much publicity had resulted from student hunger fasts, vigils, and sit-ins to protest compulsory ROTC, the execution of author Caryl Chessman, activities of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee, and other official deeds. (See Horowitz, 1962.)

The University's president was Clark Kerr, a nationally known labor mediator and writer on labor economics, who had risen to campus prominence as a champion of the liberal cause during the "loyalty oath" conflict. In 1963, he had attracted wide attention for his Godkin Lectures at Harvard on the modern university and its governance (Kerr, 1963). In early 1964 he had received an Alexander Meiklejohn Award from the American Association of University Professors for his contributions to academic freedom at the University.

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*For a few among the many fuller accounts of the FSM, see Lipset and Wolin (1965), Draper (1965), Miller and Gilmore (1965), and Lunsford (1965). The present discussion is based on the last-named work, which is heavily documented; therefore, references will largely be ommitted in what follows.

By mid-1964, a national political campaign was well under way, and the Republican National Convention was held that summer in San Francisco. It nominated, in U.S. Senator Barry Goldwater, the most conservative presidential candidate in several decades. The summer of 1964 also saw many "freedom rides" and other "direct actions" on behalf of Negro civil rights in Southern states.

In this atmosphere, leaders of Berkeley's student political organizations returned to the campus during September to find letters awaiting them, giving notification that political advocacy, organization, and fund-raising would henceforth be strictly prohibited in the narrow 26x90-foot "strip" which for years had been the center of such activities, at the campus entrance near Telegraph Avenue and Bancroft Way. The immediate response of student political leaders, from eighteen organizations comprising a broad range of political opinion, was formation of a "United Front" for vigorous protest to University officials. Within a few days of the ruling, some students threatened picketing, vigils, and civil disobedience in violation of the ban if preliminary petitions for reconsiderations failed.

By the next January 2, when classes resumed after the Christmas vacation, two major sit-ins and a number of minor ones occurred. Hundreds of Bay Area policemen and highway patrolmen had been called to the Berkeley campus on two occasions by the Governor of California. More than eight hundred persons had been jailed for civil disobedience on the campus. The Berkeley faculty had overwhelmingly accepted the student activists' position on "free speech," voting 800-114 for removal of all University restrictions on "the content of speech or advocacy" on campus. The Regents had begun a "comprehensive review" of University policies on political activity. Berkeley Chancellor Edward Strong had been secretly ordered by the Regents to take a "recuperative" leave or resign. And forces had been set in motion that would later result in the Regents' dismissal of President Kerr. In the process, major portions of these events had been carried on world-wide television, a half-dozen highly articulate student spokesmen had become international public figures, and a new spirit of militant political activism had begun to spread dramatically among U.S. students.

The Centrality of "Administration"

For present purposes, the important fact about these events is that they constituted a prolonged and highly visible test of University administrative "discretion" before the bar of public opinion. Administrative policies and rule-interpretations were specifically at issue again and again in the several months of controversy.

University policies, initiated and defended by President Robert Gordon Sproul as early as 1933, had long prohibited student political speech and expression on campus. Sproul's rulings, while modified and loosened by President Kerr in 1963, had continued the ban on political advocacy, recruitment, and fund-raising for "off-campus" causes. But these policies had never been enforced in the Bancroft-Telegraph "strip," which many officials believed had been sold to the City of Berkeley. The decision that the policies should be "strictly enforced" was made administratively, and was given no publicity prior to its abrupt announcement in the letters sent to student leaders on September 14, 1964.

During the conflicts of the ensuing months, moreover, University executives repeatedly made their own policies and interpretations a central issue. They insistently avowed their good will, reasonableness, and concern for free expression, warning student protestors that the only real threat to freedom of speech was "political interference" from "outside" officials, which they said would be caused by student actions.

Administrative "Mistakes"

During these same months, a number of University administrative actions helped to discredit the impartial benevolence and accuracy of their "discretion." After making the unequivocal announcement that long-standing prohibitions would now be "strictly enforced," campus officials quickly modified those prohibitions by "re-interpretations," when faced with the vigorous and immediate protest of the United Front. Reasons given for the new enforcement--such as obstruction of traffic by student leafleters and their tables—were shortly discarded, after students proposed self-regulations to alleviate the traffic problem.. At the time of the October 1-2 sit-in surrounding a campus police car, University officials first refused even to discuss students' demands while the car was held, but later did so, and negotiated the car's release.

For a time, a "state law" was invoked by the University President as requiring prohibition of campus political activity and the matter was debated by the student Senate--only to have it appear subsequently that no such law had ever applied to the University. Reliance was also placed by executives on a State Constitution provision, stating that the University must be "entirely independent of all political or sectarian influence and kept free therefrom in the appointment of its Regents and in the administration of its affairs." However, legal opinion both inside and outside the University administration soon concluded that no restrictions on the content of student speech were required by this provision; neither could they Constitutionally be based on it. The argument was entirely abandoned by November 20, 1964, when the Regents modified their policies to allow student political activity directed to any "lawful off-campus action."

IMPACT OF THE BERKELEY EVENTS

These and other events during the FSM crises have been widely recorded and discussed. They did much to discredit the claim of University executives that their informed and benevolent discretion constitutes a trustworthy safeguard against any conflict of "institutional" interests with broader societal values. Couched in the terms that we have described here as the official perspective of academic administration, these claims themselves became broadly suspect. The bases were thereby laid for a widespread crisis of executive legitimacy on U.S. university campuses.

The conflict between University of California executives and the Free Speech Movement accomplished, therefore, precisely what U.S. university executives had carefully avoided for so long: a heated, public confrontation between the discretion of campus administrators and a major value of the broader society. The value in question, "free speech," was a potent one --central to Western university traditions, a time-honored symbol in American political myth, enshrined in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The conflict itself was protracted, hotly polemical, and sensationally publicized. It focussed repeatedly on the deliberate decisions and explanations of liberal university executives at one of the nation's most prestigious campuses.

Thus thousands of persons, by actual or vicarious participation in these events, received what some student activists have called a "political education"--about the dilemmas of university administration, its relation to "politics," its sincere but fallible claims to "judge best" on broad institutional policies. Many saw clearly, perhaps for the first time, how attempts to protect the institution called a university could work contrary to some of the very values that its traditions have long avowed.

The New Awareness of Ideology

For many students, the 1964 events at Berkeley quickly became a legend, with a host of interwined meanings and fascinations. Outstanding among these was a new and often cynical skepticism about the large university as an entire enterprise, topped by an automatic mistrust of the good will and trustworthiness routinely professed by university officials. Small but influential minorities on many major campuses learned to look upon administrative statements as self-serving, ideological formulations, designed to retain executive power and perpetuate an anachronistic status quo.

Faced by this new awareness of the ideological potential in their official viewpoint, most university executives have continued earnestly to profess it nonetheless. For some, this may be because they simply and completely believe it. Interviews and survey responses contained some explicit professions and many hints of such simple sincerity among respondents. Others apparently take a more complex view of their task than the simple "rationality" avowed by the perspective, but believe that it represents the most desirable *norm* of administrative action, so it should be used descriptively even if it is not literally accurate. This view is enhanced by beliefs that most campus executives *intend* to be "rational" in this sense, and try very hard to attain their ideal. Some executives, believing that their own leadership is important to their university, evidently use the perspective--willingly or regretfully--as a means to retain their power of position.

More complex combinations of such reasons are suggested by some interviews: One executive indicated he had earlier accepted the notion of a university "community" of interests as solid fact; now he sees it as very doubtful fact, but as still a valid norm. Another, saying he had become convinced universities must change to share more administrative prerogatives with students, still saw little *he* should do about it: "I like the university as it is," he said, expressing a sad passivity toward changes he has come to see as historically inevitable. Still another campus executive effectively denied the separation of fact and norm in practical action, declaring his personal willingness to argue vigorously that what he thinks *should be* true *is* true. Some executives--from the fervor of their own moral indignation--appear to feel that the compelling consideration is their relative sincerity, goodwill, and concern for others. They feel that they are more "right" and truthful and "responsible" than the students who challenge their authority. Hence their stand against the challenge, even if it requires expedential compromise of principles, is clearly justified in their minds.

Exacerbation by "Hypocrisy"

Whatever their conscious motives, however, university executives' insistence on reaffirming their benevolent, apolitical rationality has frequently served merely to fuel the flames of student activism.

Events during the FSM crises strained the plausibility of administrative "explanations"--such as the claim that University policies were not being changed as a result of protests, but only "reinterpreted"; the invocation of "a state law" and its subsequent abandonment; the insistence that only "outsiders" and student protesters had "political" motives for their actions. Such temporizing helped student-protest leaders to charge a series of "contradictions" in university executives' statements, and to raise the charge of "hypocrisy" against campus administrators as representatives of a "corrupt" society. While University executives pleaded that they be "trusted," as "reasonable" and politically neutral "men of goodwill," protest leaders argued that *mis*trust was amply warranted by their actions and statements. For many students and others, these protest leaders succeeded in raising serious questions about the credibility of any and all official statements by campus executives. They thereby entered a powerful wedge between these executives and their implicit authority.

In late 1964 and the succeeding months, leaders of the new nationwide student "movement" began to offer explicit analyses of the position and rhetoric of university administrators. During the FSM, charges of "bad faith" and "unresponsive bureaucracy" were prominent (Lipset & Wolin, 1965). Some student leaders later concluded that administrators are, indeed, powerless to make changes in university structure and policies. But they offered little consolation to hard-pressed campus executives, since they now depicted administrators as mere pawns of a larger power-structure including outside politicians, business leaders, and self-interested faculty entrepreneurs (Potter, 1965). Others began detailed documentation of the corporate interests and connections to be found among University Regents (Garson, 1965). Still others pointed insistently to the "subjunctive" quality of most executive descriptions of university life, substituting ideals for realities and asking that students ignore the differences (Schwartz, 1968).

What these and other examples illustrate is that student protests over specific policies at the University of California were rapidly supplemented after 1964 by direct analytic and empirical attacks on the truthfulness, neutral benevolence, and competence claimed by university administrators generally. In other words, the attack shifted to include the beliefs on which administrative legitimacy had been based. As Weber (1954) had forecast for such periods of new awareness, "that very myth" of "deserved" authority soon became "one of the most passionately hated objects of attack /P. 336/." In these circumstances, attempts by executives to refurbish and reaffirm the myth on which they had so long depended was an invitation to exacerbated conflict, not a means of averting it.

Most important to these particular conflicts, executives could not safely deny many of the things charged to them by students. They could not say, for example, that "politics" is literally irrelevant to campus policies. They could only argue that their unexamined judgment of the best way to handle the political forces should be trusted beyond any formal rule or any "corporative" judgment. Second, university executives could not argue that the modern campus is felt by most of its participants to be a community; the very lack of a spontaneous "community" feeling has long been a concern of campus executives themselves. Instead, they can only affirm the ideal of "community," decrying "divisive" viewpoints and criti=cizing "over"-emphasis on the campus as composed primarily of amoral interests and powers. At times, they have been led to concede their own complicity in explicit public falsehoods--as when Berkeley Chancellor Edward Strong revealed that his own "recuperative" leave had been a pretext ordered by the Regents (Lunsford, 1965). And the official secrecy surrounding key "executive sessions" of administrators and governing boards has continued to encourage cynicism about political decisions on major campuses.

Thus the dilemma of the university executive remains unresolved today. It is, in fact, exacerbated repeatedly by his sincere denials that such a dilemma need exist. If our analysis is correct, he will not resolve the dilemma in this way--or in any other, since it would seem to be inherent in the character of leadership for a formal organization avowing goals of rationality. The dilemma must instead be surmounted, by grasping and uniting its two horns of political pragmatism and ideological rationality. To regain the trust they seek, we shall argue, university executives must learn to become intellectual statesmen.

CHAPTER VII

THE FUTURE OF UNIVERSITY "ADMINISTRATION"

The crisis of legitimacy facing large-university administrators in the United States today does not stand as an isolated phenomenon, unconnected with other social and political crises of our time. Student protests have stemmed initially from major social issues, such as the "civil rights" drive of American blacks and other ethnic minorities, the movement opposing American intervention in the Vietnamese war, and ties of universities with the "military-industrial complex." The crisis in university authority is a product of these and many other developments. But it is also a product of structural relations which have grown up around "academic administration" as an internal phenomenon of university life.

We have concentrated our analysis on the administrator's position within his institution, in part because of the typical insistence that this internal situation is the only one relevant to his legitimacy as a leader of the disinterested academic community. We have argued that the campus crisis of formal authority stems in good part from dramatic increases of formal responsibility assigned academic executives, in their highly visible and symbolically powerful positions as organizational spokesmen and decision-makers. These increases in formal power, we argued, have been accomplished by decreasing informal support for "the Administration" among students and faculties.

The "rational" division of labor in the university systematically has widened the executives' isolation from the substance of teaching and research, as it is experienced by faculty and students. Thus campus executives have become less, rather than more, capable of making decisions that take into account the specific problems and opportunities that most of the university's members face. The functional basis of their authority has become thinner and less meaningful for their internal constituents, more and more dependent on its operation as a formal link between those "members" and the "outside" world of governing boards, sources of funds, and pressures for public "service." They have become increasingly the reconcilers in rhetoric of a diverse and impersonal organization with few immediate, experiential bonds among its members--an organization increasingly dependent for its cohesiveness on abstract arguments about the "functional interdependence" of its members as "parts." To perform their function of "integration," high executives of this legal edifice have been assigned increasing positional discretion and control. But their formal authority suffers from that "poverty" of power which is unsustained by the ongoing respect and confidence of its constituents (Merriam, 1934).

It is fair to ask what such an analysis of the current situation suggests about the probable future development of "administration" as a part of large-university governance. In attempting an answer to this question, it would be arrogance or folly to pretend any capacity for prediction; the exploratory character of this study, and the exigencies of impending great changes in the society as a whole, belie any such pretension. The best that can be done is to suggest several semi-coherent directions in which academic "administration" may develop if it is sensitive to the concerns emphasized in this report. These may be called trends toward legalization, politics, and policy.

LEGALIZATION OF UNIVERSITY LIFE

The large university may undergo a trend toward legalization through a change in the character and the uses made of rules in campus life. The present era of student challenge to executive legitimacy began over the interpretation and "re-interpretation" of long-standing rules about student political expression on the university campus at Berkeley. Since 1964, some national student leaders have publicly warned that students will increasingly use the courts for redress of grievances (Powell, 1968). Some university executives, seeking to use court process in preventing campus confrontations, have obtained judicial injunctions against disruptive demonstrations, and these also may increase the courts' reviews of campus affairs. A growing number of cases concerning campus discipline have travelled through the courts in recent years, but so far there is little clear direction to the resulting legal trends. For example, court requirements of stricter "due process" in some disciplinary situations* are balanced by other courts' reliance on newly broadened concepts of administrative rule-making discretion for "educational institutions" as a class.* Thus the impact of judicial review on students' university rights and obligations is uncertain, and likely to remain so for some time.

Evolution of new rule-oriented relationships within universities may result, however, from sources somewhat independent of court compulsion. One possibility, coherent with the growth of massive bureaucracy in campus life, is an increase in the number of specific, binding, formal rules by which large campuses are run. Some such developments seem likely by the simple occurrence of "new" administrative problems for which an official feels he must have a formal rule, so that he need not decide every case anew. This process, by which bureaucracies proliferate formal categories and assign them official consequences, may be seen as a normal and "spontaneous" part of routinization in large-organization life. It results in some irritation with "red tape" and endless regulations, but it is not likely to change very much the use of rules on campus. One reason, as we have seen, is the typical rule-skepticism of academic executives. This means that even quite explicit formal rules are varied, and "exceptions" are freely made for "special circumstances," in routine academic administration--although it may not always be easy for the non-executive to discern what circumstances are considered a proper basis for a variance. It seems likely that the growth of bureaucratic rules will be resisted in many areas of university life by the same rule-skeptical executives--on the ground that such rules impede the "flexibility" necessary for achieving both institutional purposes and justice to individuals. As we have seen, the exercise of independent judgment, rather than the mechanical application of explicit rules, is seen by some academic executives as the crucial distinction between administrative duties and those of a "secretary" or a "clerk."

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*Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F. 2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Knight v. State Board of Education, 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).

*Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968).

Thus, precisely where complex individual and institutional prerogatives are involved, the growth of rules specifying clear rights and obligations for university members seems likely to be a slow one.

A development made more likely by recent events is the establishment of new legal *processes* for the settlement of disputes within the campus. The increased use of faculty "hearing officers," *ad hoc* hearing committees, campus ombudsmen, and legal advisers for academic executives seems likely to continue for the foreseeable future. The major impact of these developments centers, however, on an issue about which there is much doubt at present: Will major campuses evolve an *official* separation of powers between the executive and judicial functions? Such a suggestion developed early in the present period of student dissent, when the Berkeley faculty suggested "That future disciplinary measures in the area of political activity shall be determined by a committee appointed by and responsible to the Academic Senate."* This and similar proposals, designed to take the monkey of politically controversial disciplinary decisions off the back of the campus chief executive, have found little open acceptance in U.S. universities so far. Some campus executives are convinced that, so long as the formal responsibility for disciplinary actions is lodged with them by the institution's governing board, they cannot without legally abrogating their duties make any irreversible delegation of judicial powers to other agencies or officials. More informally, some feel, they cannot give up their power to review a committee's disciplinary recommendation while the punishments meted out to student protest leaders are foci of public interest and controversy. Nonetheless, on at least one major private-university campus, disciplinary measures following a disruptive student protest were publicly reported to have been handled entirely by committees of the faculty. And, on a major public campus, the chief Student Affairs executive asserted in an interview that his superior followed a standing policy of refusing to alter disciplinary recommendations from faculty committees and hearing officers--but without committing himself publicly to such a position, lest his governing board object. Such practices may be isolated in the present, heated political atmosphere concerning student discipline. However, through informal practice and experience with separate tribunals, university executives may gradually evolve "legal" mechanisms of considerable consequence for individual rights.

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*Lipset and Wolin, 1965, P. 101; see also Foote, Mayer and Associates, 1968, Pp. 145-203.

UNIVERSITY LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Aspirations to university "leadership" are a recurring theme in the writings of academic executives (Eliot, 1911; Hutchins, 1956; Dodds, 1962). The aspirations have usually been those of presidents, but as university administration has become a "team" function, other executives have come to share them. Robert Hutchins laid down the basic challenge long ago, when he called for university leaders who would create and sustain a "Great Conversation" among the members of the "community of scholars." Other writers have retained terms like "communication" in their discussions of leadership, but they have tended rather to despair of Hutchins' elevated and intellectual vision. Thus books such as Dodds' (1962) and Kerr's (1963) seemed hopeful mainly that an executive can manipulate his relations with others so cleverly that he leads (e.g., gets his own "new ideas" accepted)* *without seeming to do so*.

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*See Dodds, 1962, P. 49.

Today, both of these alternatives seem to be ruled out, and a much less tidy, more inescapably "political," role must be considered for university executives. It is a role that requires a much richer awareness of the university's collective life. It also requires a much closer interaction of abstract thought and concrete choices, of normative ideal and everyday reality, of executive talk and action.

Political Development in Campus Life

Along with the growth of "legal" rules and processes, academic executives will have to face more directly the need to develop "political" bases for their official power. University executives and many of their critics are agreed that campus leaders must have more confidence and support among their campus constituencies if they are to "lead" rather than "manage" university affairs. The unanswered question is: What could present-day executives do to build such support? One answer is simply to call for more implicit trust in executive discretion over longer periods, followed by regularized "post-audits" after a lapse of several years. But this solution seems to assume its desired conclusion: that confidence and trust in executives' discretion is a readily available commodity to be supplied upon call, without relation to the executives' specific uses of that discretion. The current crisis suggests that confidence in leadership has deeper social and intellectual roots.

The problem of leadership, as against mere office-holding, is how to win and keep *affirmative* support from followers, so that more than mere institution-guarding is possible, and ventures into organizational change, experiment, and risk-taking become compatible with executive "survival." For many years, most university executives have been denied the support necessary for any but the most circumspect and devious sallies into leadership in this sense.

Paradoxically, the turbulence produced by student activists has allowed more educational changes with administrative backing than any other occurrence in decades. As protest against universities' impersonal size has gained momentum, "cluster colleges" have sprouted like mushrooms on campuses all across the country, far outstripping the growth that could have been expected from the mere example of California's Claremont Colleges, University of the Pacific, and UC-Santa Cruz. Interdisciplinary courses, and other innovations favored by some campus executives but by very few faculty members, have received renewed impetus from student demands for educational "relevance" and a balance against departmental specialization.

Student protests also have served to create support for some university executives as hard-nosed champions of campus "law and order," taking no "nonsense" from those who violate "legitimate channels" of dissent. But this kind of support, vigorous for the moment, is viable only so long as protests provide a fearful image of "anarchy," against which "law and order" advocates can staunchly defend "the institution." The exercise of more affirmative leadership, such as the creation of new and unorthodox educational programs, requires a less negative and fear-induced basis of legitimacy.

The Problem of Constituencies

Academic executives are commonly said today to be suffering from a problem of too many "constituencies," whose diverse opinions and demands they find it impossible to reconcile. The present analysis suggests, rather, that their real problem is that they have no affirmative constituency at all. For reasons suggested in Chapter III, academic executives as a group hold office on sufferance. They may enjoy grateful good wishes of those who find their stewardship convenient and governance bothersome; they may have the strong support of a few senior professors who man the principal Academic Senate committees. But for a great many faculty members, "administrators" is a bad word, and few to whom the word applies are held in high regard by many of their academic "colleagues."

In part, this can be ascribed to the importance that academics assign expertise, and the lack of a "scientific" basis for administration. In part, it can be ascribed to the academic's association of administration with "power" and power-seeking. In part, it may be ascribed to the inevitable chafing of bureaucratic rules, or the tedious and apparently arbitrary ritual of securing several official approvals for any new activity. Beyond these things, however, lies the cumulative effect of an organization that rests less on consensus than on dissensus--less on discourse and a meeting of minds than on implicit agreements to disagree.

The Tradition of Non-governance

When David Starr Jordan in 1900 enjoined the university to adopt a "division of labor" giving control over the "general policy of the institution" to its "president and...trustees," he noted that "a wise faculty will be glad to have these burdens taken from their shoulders...." By such a division, he thought, every faculty member could himself "unreservedly to research, to investigation, and to instruction....[P. 491]" and not be bothered by matters of university governance. Jordan prophetically saw the trend toward professionalism, the distaste for imprecise "political" matters, that would characterize the most prestigious university faculties of this country. Excesses in the use of powers by presidents and trustees during the early decades after his speech led to creation of the Association of American University Professors in 1915, and to successful "faculty revolts" at major universities during the 1920's (Joughin, 1967; Metzger, 1955; Cattell, 1913). Faculty "governments" were established on a number of campuses in this period, and pure executive power in academic affairs was somewhat modified. But in the years that followed, and especially after World War II, trends of longer range asserted themselves. Faculty members in the "better" universities have generally been content to leave increasing numbers of institutional policies to administrators, with only the most cursory of faculty committee reviews. In return, control over the structure of curricula, the content and methods of instruction, and the appointment and promotion of faculty members has been left largely to the de facto control of "faculty" representatives in departments and on academic senate committees.

The result is that these matters have been almost completely withdrawn from general university consideration. Few issues of "educational policy" are discussed widely among faculty members in major institutions; still less are academic qualifications or methods of instruction considered fit matters for general discussion. Such matters are assumed to be accessible only to the judgments of colleagues within each specialized discipline. "Public" discussions of them--even by interdisciplinary faculty committees--are seen as likely to produce only a compromise among prejudices, not a reasoned and "rational" result. The importance of specialized expertise in a discipline is thus substituted for virtually all other criteria of adequacy in academic matters, and the foundation is laid for an implicit belief that all attempts at public "discourse" among members of different intellectual traditions is useless. This conviction is deepened and strengthened by experiences in faculty meetings and committees, which at some campuses are the favorite butts of cocktail-party sarcasm, for their token participation, petty wrangling, and lack of coherent focus. When faculty "senates" have been rallied into unaccustomed activity and high attendance during the campus crises of the 1960's, their members have usually found them far less effective forums than the occasions required. Long accustomed to passive dependence on executives and senior committeemen, "faculties" as forums of consensual governance have atrophied from disuse.

Out of such orientations and experiences, many university faculty members have acquired a deep-seated cynicism about their own *capacities* for participation in campus governance, and a rich scorn for colleagues who are willing to spend much of their time on such unworthy matters. Effort spent on specialized research and scholarship in one's own discipline is far less frustrating and more rewarding, both intellectually and professionally. Thus a pattern of "non-governance" is established, which is self-reinforcing: Problems requiring genuine discourse and the forging of consensus are postponed, avoided, or left to "the administrators"--whose efforts are then ripe subjects of criticism as uninformed, unimaginative products of "the bureaucratic mind." The administrators' decisions may be accepted, for want of something better. Or they may be protested--effectively or ineffectively, depending on the protestors' fervor and influence. But the negative, pessimistic assumptions about governance are retained in either case, "proved" by the inadequacy of broad, formalized "solutions" handed down by distant, faceless officials.

This deep-running spirit of privatism* among prestigious faculty professionals is connected directly with the inability of academic executives to muster affirmative legitimacy. Where faculty differences of viewpoint and experience are seen as unbridgeable gulfs, and there is general despair that members can sustain a discourse about matters of concern to all of them, there also is little basis for the sense of shared meanings and values that might unite academic groups behind leaders and their policies. At present, executive legitimacy among faculty members is based primarily on their abilities to "provide" adequate salaries and research facilities, to protect faculty time from student "personal" problems and fiscal technicalities, to avoid adding harassments by their own "bureaucratic" rules. Administration is thus a *service* for most faculty members; its only legitimate "policy" concern is to retain those policies assuring each faculty member the maximum of freedom and support while he "stews in his own mental juices."**

Large-university executives today are *effectively* responsible for university "policy" in many broad and controversial areas, from allocating money and dealing with outside politicians to handling student admissions, counseling, and "discipline." But they have no affirmative mandate, and no dependable support, for specific policies that might guide their decisions.

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*On such problems generally, see Kornhauser (1959). For one discussion of "privatism" in American life, see Lunsford (1968).

**See Clark, 1961, P. 301.

It is not surprising, then, if they try to avoid open controversy: Each dispute may shake their already precarious perch atop the university's formal scaffolding, making it even harder for them to work in the best interests of their institution. It is little wonder that they call earnestly for trust that they are reasonable men of goodwill, without stating any specific policies on which they stand as leaders. It is little wonder that their books are concerned with nuances of interpersonal manipulation, and with high abstractions of very doubtful concrete meanings. It is understandable that they should shy away from even discussing "politics" openly, lest they create new and "unnecessary" sources of division among university members. To a substantial degree, they do these things because they have despaired of doing otherwise and still surviving in office. Moreover, they believe that forthright policies setting directions of university development would shortly result in unmanageable disputes among their academic colleagues, and a paralysis of the institutional effort.

Developing Constituencies

What this means for executive leadership is that its basis must be developed through the building of affirmative constituencies among university members, around interests and values worked out in close relation to the central problems of university life. Because of the tradition of non-governance on the campus, and the prevailing custom of talking as if all university members were undifferentiated participants in an academic community, this task will not be an easy one. There are powerful incentives and rationalizations that encourage university faculty and students to *avoid* taking active parts in campus governance. And constituency-development will not be accomplished by executives alone, any more than executives can make viable decisions for whole institutional structures in the first place.

If meaningful publics are to be developed within university faculties and student bodies, it is true that university members will have to spend more of their effort and attention on matters of governance. More explicit, partisan organization of campus groups probably will be necessary, and a general sense of increased factionalism may well result. Time and thought will be required for groups even to work out a range of coherent positions on the major issues as they arise. Open controversy, accessible to press and outside public, will doubtless increase, making *visible* the conflicts over what formerly were seen as routine administrative decisions.

But many of the conflicts that will become visible exist already, in covert forms. Many of the faculty factions that will emerge already are known to experienced campus observers, if not to outside publics. And some pressures now exerted by powerful individuals and cliques in private can with benefit be exposed to general scrutiny.

Thus demagoguery, narrow partisanship, and superficial appeals to vested interest are possibilities, of course; all political discourse and action involves those risks. But it is not inevitable that they overwhelm university life, as many campus leaders now appear to believe. There is also the possibility of genuine statesmanship by faculty and administration leaders, when they look beyond the surface "efficiency" of a formal division of labor to the deeper efficiency of critical decisions based on serious and open debate. There is good hope that, over time, greater involvement in the governance of their affairs will bring a new maturity and responsibility to university members, whereas foreclosure from participation (for students) or the encouraged abdication of it (by faculty members) has helped to produce present incapacities for governance when it is needed. And there is reason to believe that legitimacy *earned* by building support for stated policies will allow campus executives to lead and stand responsible for their leadership, rather than merely to administer the implicit dictates of a dissensual *status quo*.

Governance by Euphemism

So far as the academic executive's fear of "politics" reflects a concern to avoid entangling every issue in all issues, it seems reasonable enough. And, in view of the long-developing trained incapacity for governance that is characteristic of university faculty and students, campus executives may be understandably leery of depending on others for far-seeing, statesmanlike governance. But recent events suggest that campus administrators may have reached a limit in their attempts to deal with these campus "political" problems by avoiding them.

One great disadvantage of the resignation to non-governance is the unrealism that it encourages in collective life. For long periods, the skillful use of high normative abstractions may smooth over potential conflicts and retain an outward appearance of unity, within which many pragmatic accomodations can be made. But in a diverse and vigorous organization, the demands and perspectives arising out of particular tasks and associations are always in danger of breaking through this skein of neat formalities and overwhelming it. At worst, the posture of the non-"political" executive becomes government by euphemism, in which all real and significant conflicts are papered over by polite, universalistic propositions.*

The danger of this eventuality, which the university would seem to have reached, is not so much that it engenders conflict. Conflict is ubiquitous. But its forms are many, and some forms resist solution more than others. The greatest danger of euphemism is its unrealism--the dramatic and symbolic character of the conflicts it encourages, and their resistance to factually grounded solutions.

Euphemistic rhetoric that avoids facing difficult issues adds one crucial, symbolic step on the way to confrontation over official "hypocrisy." It invites the de-bunking practised so well by critical intellectuals, and brands its users with deliberate attempts to manipulate the "communication" they profess to value. This "managing of the news" may be acceptable, even admirable, if realistic bases for implicit trust are present. But in the complex, impersonal, and formalized setting of the large modern university, the social distances are too great and the conflicts too salient for such assumptions of "good will" to hold. Once the myth of executives' neutral benevolence is broken, we have suggested, attempts to govern by euphemism simply add fuel to the fires of disrespect.

CURRENT TRENDS TO "POLITICIZATION"

The prospect of continued public criticism, and of increased campus factionalism, will not likely appeal to many present univer-

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*Unlike some of his modern admirers, Durkheim (1933) saw clearly this recurrent primacy of what he called the "lively, concrete impressions" formed in particular human activities. Just as he believed that philosophy could not integrate the "anomic" divisions among the intellectual disciplines, he argued that a central government could never integrate society by a formal, abstract "social contract" of cooperation. Real interests and values must be worked out, he insisted, among the performers of social "functions" who are "sufficiently in contact" for their mutual accommodations to rest in concrete, particular knowledge of their own and others' needs. Government, he thought, should provide the formal framework within which this "spontaneous consensus of parts" could occur, but should concern itself mainly with the encouragement of concretely grounded moral rules through which empirical accommodations could be "expressed" [Pp. 4-7, 359-364].

sity executives. Nonetheless, there are signs that some academic administrators are already moving toward more openly "political" stands, forced by current crises inside and outside the campus.

Mediation and Collective Bargaining

One development, still in embryo, may have long-lasting import for the future. This is the introduction of outside "mediators" (amateur and professional) into disputes between student protestors and campus executives. In most cases, this mediation so far has been aimed at crisis-resolution, not at smoothing negotiations between officially recognized bargaining entities. However, the public shift of "mediating" responsibilities from campus executives to outside parties is a recognition that, in present circumstances at least, "the Administration" is no neutral and disinterested arbiter, but the representative of specific interests among those that are in dispute.

If present trends continue toward collective bargaining* by faculty members, teaching assistants, other public employees, and students, the place of outside mediation and of "institutional" representation by campus executives will likely continue also. The probable effects include further specification of "contract" terms for individuals in relation to the official university, and a kind of "policed managerialism (Otten, 1968)" in areas where the contract terms are left unspecified.

Administrators as a Status-group

Another development which undermines the posture of academic administrators as autonomous individuals is the surfacing of collective actions taken by campus executives as groups.

Thus, when Chancellor Young of the University of California at Los Angeles stated publicly that other University Chancellors might resign if he were fired over the Angela Davis case (Sellards, 1969), he was invoking no random assortment of friends: Chancellors of the University's campuses meet monthly with its President, building mutual confidence and resolving problems of concern to them *as academic executives*. A similar threat of mass resignation by Chancellors was credited by news media with preventing the dismissal of Berkeley's Chancellor Heyns during the "People's Park" crisis of early 1969. Here, collective action by *campus executives as such* emerged visibly as one important element in a complex political controversy.

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*Caffrey (1968) found in a national survey that "more than nine out of ten administrators" see a trend toward collective bargaining for faculty salaries as "undesirable or detrimental," and "more than half" of the responding AAUP chapter presidents agreed. "About two out of five" in both groups "feel such bargaining is almost certain or very likely" in the future. In the same national survey, "a little more than half" of the campus administrators and "two out of three faculty respondents" regarded it as "almost certain or very likely" that students in the future will increasingly "use direct-action methods to assert their demands for changed conditions." "More than nine out of ten administrators, however, regard this possibility as undesirable or detrimental, whereas seven out of ten faculty respondents take the opposite view. (Faculty are even more approving than are students!)" Faculty respondents were all AAUP chapter heads; student respondents were "National Student Association leaders" [Pp. 129, 140-141].

It seems improbable that academic administrators will, like policemen (Skolnick, 1969), organize themselves explicitly as an interest-group. However, it may not be far amiss to say that they already are organized, implicitly, within the many institutional-membership associations in which executives "represent" their universities. Some of these groups, like the American Association of Universities (AAU), have long been known as "presidents' clubs," which function as informal sources of shared opinion for campus chief executives and their deputies (Selden, 1968). Some, like the American Council on Education (ACE) and the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, operate as *de facto* lobbies in the Federal government for the perceived organizational interests of academic institutions--as defined by the academic executives who "represent" their campuses in these associations' councils (Bloland, 1969). Until recently, most efforts of these groups have focussed on the amount, distribution, and earmarking of Federal funds for universities and colleges. However, student groups by 1969 had called public attention to the administrative domination of these associations, in challenging the purposes of a large-scale ACE research project on the dynamics of student protests.

The Relevance of "Outside" Issues

Still another trend involves university executives more than ever in controversial issues of the "outside" society, such as race and war. Thus, the appointment of black and chicano administrators to head many campus programs does not indicate that the millennium of "color-blindness" has come in American race relations. It signals precisely the opposite: that the relevance of race to executive decisions is being recognized. Again, when seventy-nine presidents of highly prestigious private colleges and universities wrote to President Nixon urging "a stepped-up timetable for withdrawal from Vietnam," they were no chance collection of "individuals who work with young men and women (Semas, 1969)." Their executive titles and the eminence of their institutions provided both the rationale of their common message and the principal hope of its having an impact. By 1970, also, prominent campus executives like President Kingman Brewster of Yale had become nationally-known spokesmen on issues concerning civil disobedience, the military draft, and the American involvement in Vietnam (see Brewster, 1970).

It may be argued, of course, that these are matters relevant to Brewster's concern with "academic" affairs. Yale students include many young men who face military conscription and possible death in an unpopular war; some are participants in the civil disobedience of their generation. But, that is precisely the point: An increasing number of "outside" issues are now relevant to university affairs, even in such a bastion of prestigious "private" learning as Yale. To deal with their "administrative" problems, therefore, academic executives increasingly must deal with "political" ones.

These few examples may be extremes, or they may be merely harbingers of things to come. But for the present, at least, it would seem that some academic executives are responding to the pressures upon them by becoming more overtly involved in highly "political" controversies. They have found that many groups, inside and outside the campus, neither avow a posture of neutral rationality nor accept it when avowed by university executives. In such a situation, the neutral posture adopted by university executives operates only to increase others' power over them, and to foreclose a whole range of actions and pressures that the executives might otherwise use in pursuing the interests and values to which they are committed. They are less effective executives, with less affirmative support from their constituents, because they insist on maintaining stoutly that their "neutrality" is real, and necessary for institutional survival.

Issues in the "outside" society may be more pressing and difficult for university executives to deal with today than in some future, more "normal" time. Some immediate issues will change if the Vietnam war ends soon. However, social analysts are hard put to descry any forces that will soon make our lives less public, our universities more cloistered, our collective "unrest" over social inequalities less dramatic or important. Thus, divisive social issues are likely to impinge on university affairs for the foreseeable future.

It is possible that the formal leaders of some universities will turn their energies to setting examples for the rest of society in the principled way that they approach their institutions' "politics."

INSTITUTIONAL BASES OF LEADERSHIP

It might be asked perhaps too naively: If statesmanship is not to be found among the leaders of universities at the pinnacle of their public success and affluence, where may we look for it in society? Such a question would ignore, however, most of the considerations discussed in this study. The problem of university executives, we have suggested, is that they lack the institutional bases of leadership even within their own organizations. If universities are to become "institutions" that are susceptible of meaningful leadership, some of the focus must be taken from the problem of leadership as such, and directed to the requisites of an institution that is understood and valued by its constituents.

It may not be possible for the large university to achieve deep personal loyalty and commitment from its members, given its lengthening history of growing size, impersonality, fractionation, and formality, its abandonment of discourse for the mass processing of individuals. If not, then economically rational characterizations of universities as bureaucratic "knowledge industries" will, no doubt, become increasingly accurate. But the alternatives are not an impossible "academic community" on the one hand and a bloodless rule-machine on the other. The bases for institutional commitment admit of many degrees, and also of qualitative variations. Some problems lie in the present relations of teachers and students, of scholars among themselves, of academic traditions and "outside" demands for ever-more-diversified "service." However, there are problems of institution-building that are much closer to the peculiar functions of leadership, of administration, and of governance more broadly defined. One way that university executives might begin to attack these problems is simply to place greater reliance on explicit policies as the bases of their decisions.

Shortcomings of Executive "Freedom"

University members today rarely have much assurance that the "good reasons" officially used to explain an executive act have much to do with the "real reasons" on which it was based. This fact alone, we suggest, does much to sap the confidence of university members in those who aspire to lead. Executives who habitually refuse to commit themselves publicly to principled courses of action may win support as long as they can manage to "make things come out right" for the great majority of their followers. But they inspire little of the respect and trust that leaders need. These latter qualities depend in part on followers' knowing where their leaders stand.

In some cases university executives today avoid explaining their decisions in order to protect the privacy of individuals--as when "personal problems" of individual student protestors affect decisions on campus discipline. Such reasons for being silent are held with perfect, albeit paternalistic sincerity by many campus executives. In other cases, the issues behind a decision may be thought too complex for intelligible public discussion--as when executives have considered the expected effects of a new program on budgets, staffing, enrollments, classroom space, public support, and so on. In many cases, executive silence undoubtedly rests on the fact that the decision-makers themselves do not know why a decision "really" was made. Especially in an executive group that has worked for some time as a unit, intuitive knowledge of members' personal styles and commitments may render verbal explication of "reasons" unnecessary. There is an inherent temptation to find a "solution" that satisfied the "judgment" of members in the executive group, without the time-consuming and frustrating process of considering aloud the decision's policy implications.

For many executives, it is a logical extension of these facts that there is little use in trying to explain to the diverse constituents outside the executive chambers on what bases specific decisions were reached. In the view of some, executive skill consists precisely in "getting people to do the same thing for different reasons." Many believe that this also serves their "institution" best.

But current trends suggest that this approach, also, may have been carried too far. Executive secrecy and deviousness on major issues are now _independent_ sources of mistrust among university members. Moreover, reliance on unexamined discretion deprives would-be university leaders of their major hope for affirmative legitimacy under the conditions of the modern campus. For the university today is a large, diverse, formalized, and inescapably public organization. It is not a community of scholars, a family, or a gentleman's club. Most of its members are not united by strong affective ties built on personal associations, traditional beliefs, ethnicity, or "naturally" coincident interests. The university is not even a private "voluntary association," as some would have it--its members self-selected by "free" and fully informed choice, and encouraged to participate actively in decision-making or leadership elections. But it is increasingly a _public_ enterprise close to the mainstream of modern society, and its members increasingly feel justified in _claiming_ rights of participation in its governance.

The size, importance, diversity and publicity of the university have been viewed by most university executives as precisely the facts demanding more discretion, trust, covert maneuvering, and ambiguity in administration. But those tendencies have helped to produce the present crisis. Our suggestion is that we need instead a new and more processual view of administration as a part of university governance. The task of university leadership now is not the more efficient administration of a machine-like organization, or a return to the nostalgia of a simple community that never was. Academic leaders must build new conceptions of the institution if it is to have more than formal integrity. But they are not likely to achieve that goal by following their present course.

The crisis of legitimacy among university authorities can be seen as partly a reflection of growing cynicism among young people about the validity of official rationalizations in general. As Weber (1954) noted, when many subordinates "see" that ennobling myths are used to maintain social inequalities, the reaction frequently is a vigorous attack on the myth themselves, and especially on those that support the power of leaders. The disillusion following the "unmasking" of supposedly neutral and rational authority can lead to a generalized mistrust of all power-holders--who universally claim to use their power only for the common good.

The Need for "Working" Abstractions

Part of the credit for this result may be due to an official perspective that sees institutional unity in abstract and intentionally ambiguous platitudes, or in an over-arching interdependence of functional interests. That perspective ignores the importance of collective ideals that make a difference in the experience of university members. To hold the loyalties and enlist the efforts of their members, diverse organizations have need of "socially integrating myths (Selznick, 1957)" which give meaning to their purposes and activities. But these myths must have some recurrently plausible relation to the immediate experiences and impressions of members, and to the decisions of organizational leaders, if they are to perform their integrating function. To be respected, myths must appear to describe reality--and this is especially true in an organization that purports to pursue explicit goals, enforcing a "rational" division of labor for that purpose. More generally, myths that will not "do work," by helping to set priorities members can judge fair and reasonable, are more likely to draw those members' skepticism or scorn than to elicit solid loyalty and support. Such myths are prime candidates to be labelled as after-the-fact rationalizations, or even as the self-serving ideologies of a ruling elite.

To avoid such conclusions under today's conditions, we suggest, university executives must abandon their illusion that they are "keeping in position for effective choice (Mooney, 1963)" by refusing public commitments on the many controversial issues of university policy. Leadership may be more difficult for leaders out of office; however, it is impossible for office-holders who perennially conserve their resources, waiting always to fight another day. It is impossible, also, for executives who consume their days with _ad hoc_ and reactive decisions, or with covert negotiations conducted behind bland masks of euphemism. Quite a different set of risks, but also new opportunities, would be involved if academic leaders undertook independently to raise controversial issues themselves, and took explicit public part in the resulting debates.

The policies developed in such a process should be neither as abstract as the university's most lofty ideals nor as specific as individual decisions on programs, budgets, staffing, and procedures. Instead, policies must move between these extremes, giving purposive meaning to decisions of official agencies without disappearing into vagueness when openly challenged. They need not be everlasting, formalized rules, but when they are changed or significantly "re-interpreted" this should be made known and fully discussed. Otherwise, their purpose of building new clusters of shared meanings between leaders and members will be lost.

To provide a basis for leadership, however, policies must have more than an intelligible relation to members' concrete experiences; they must also give concrete meaning to avowed ideals and goals of the university as a specific institution. Thus, if a university is devoted to knowledge openly shared by all mankind, then university policies that permit massive, secret research projects are at the very least good candidates for suspicion. Similarly, in an institution committed to conclusions based on precise and accurate facts, summary procedures for disciplining students are hard to justify, no matter what the demands of time and expedient "efficiency."

To the degree that institutional leaders rest content with such *prima facie* discontinuities of ideals and practices, they encourage the belief that their institution's official myths are only fine-sounding rationalizations. Once raised to popular awareness, such beliefs may be hard to erase without demonstration by some "hard" cases that the university's leaders *follow* principles and policies, and do not simply construct them freely on the spot.

Thus, like all values, institutional ideals and policies matter most when they are followed despite the presence of important *competing* values. Right or wrong, there is a question in many intelligent young persons' minds today whether universities' avowed ideals matter at all. Equally important, they have succeeded in raising to awareness similar doubts that have long been latent in the minds of many other persons.

Institutional Uses of "Policy"

By committing themselves publicly, and by encouraging general debate on difficult issues, university executives might make a new beginning on the one problem that all agree exists: the problem of "communication."

In the large university with its advanced division of labor, the academic executive has little chance to learn the facts he needs by the sort of informal, interpersonal contacts that sufficed for an earlier day. Dependence on such contacts tends to assure that his information will come primarily from his executive associates, whose work brings them most often into his purview. "Open door hours" for students or faculty members work but little better: Because of sheer numbers and the semi-random assortment of visitors, complaints received in such hours bear no special resemblance to the concerns of campus constituents in general. Such casual methods of communication have helped lead to the present position of academic executives as distant figureheads and convenient targets of resentment.

To regain some sense of their constituents' genuine moral and political concerns, university executives who aspire to lead must take the leap of making more of their communications public. This need not mean frequent, mass meetings with students or faculty--although such meetings have sometimes produced lively and informative debate. But we suggest that it must involve campus officials' much more frequently going before their constituents, in speech and in print, with well-reasoned statements of policies about the serious, major issues of university life. Such communications, far more than occasional consultations and ritual appearances at commencement ceremonies, could be used by university leaders to make themselves known to the majority of their constituents. From more frequent and general debates on policy, leaders may gain some realistic sense of their constituents' views on issues that are critical for the university's development. Leaders will also need foreknowledge of what likely reactions will be, and reasonably stable constituencies whose support can be intelligently sought. Those are among the standard tools of leadership. But, by more forthright communication and debate on major policies, the mutual knowledge of university leaders and members might be substantially increased.

This is important partly because few grand solutions to institutional problems are likely to spring full-blown from the minds of "naturally talented" executives. The task of hammering out policies that are grounded in members' concrete experiences, and which reasonably interpret institutional goals, must involve many university members in continuing debate and negotiation. However, executives can help by arranging and stimulating debate, and can assure that an overview of institutional ideals leavens the mixture of special and partial interests. Where executive decisions are taken, the very need to justify those decisions in public can improve the decision-making process, by increasing the explicitness with which policies must be considered.

In other words, if university executives are to surmount their own dilemmas of legitimacy and leadership, they must squarely face their ambiguous and ambitious task: to help rebuild the university as an institution with more than a formal integrity. If the modern American university continues its evolution into an outsized, bureaucratic conglomerate of diverse "academic" pursuits, it may or may not enjoy financial support from the society. But it seems likely to become even more ungovernable.

The unity founded solely on an abstract interdependence of economic interests is a brittle unity, lacking in resilience. Social orders thus are vulnerable to breakdown if they have few implicitly shared meanings, few common standards tested by use in daily action. Abstractions as such are not unimportant: An institution worthy of the name involves both patterns of action and an ongoing process of communication about their meanings. It is the sharing of such meanings, and their dependable assignment to actions, that make the "institution" more than a structure of coercive power. But the maintenance of common symbols and meanings takes effort, time, and talent--especially in complex social orders where diverse activities continually compete for members' loyalties. Thus, we have suggested, the major task of the modern university executive must be to bring some newly visible connections between the university's avowed ideals, its leadership myths, and the decisions of its official agencies.

Those connections, we suggest, must be made visible in specific universities, and must involve personal, public commitments by specific leaders. Thus, which issues are critical ones, when they should be debated, and when executive decisions should be made and justified--these issues themselves must be worked out by leaders and leadership groups in particular university contexts. It is fundamental, however, that there be a shift from the official perspective that despairs of public discourse, placing the burden of its reliance on discretionary manipulations by an executive elite. The new perspective must take far greater account of the large increase in scale, and the inescapably public character, of the modern university. Today, the legitimacy of both the university and its leaders depends upon developing policies that are viable in open, public debate.

To develop such policies, university executives must begin to _ask_ openly for support _because of_ their forthright stands on moral and political issues, rather than hope for that support _despite_ stands reluctantly taken, and expected to satisfy no one. Thus new traditions of discourse and leadership must be founded in the modern university, if that institution is to regain the confidence that its autonomy and integrity have meaning. Such new traditions, our study suggests, will require substantial changes in the perspective of most academic executives.

APPENDIX A

CROSS-TABULATIONS DISCUSSED IN CHAPTER V

(Tables 7-33)

TABLE 7: Perspectives of Job-Groups on Rule-Following by Administrators and Others (% Agree or Strongly Agree)

Item	Presidents	Academics	Student Affairs	Business & Finance
2. Flouting of rules is always wrong[a]	74% (34)	49% (85)	56% (45)	80% (97)
31. Take a stand against all lawbreaking[b]	89% (35)	72% (90)	82% (44)	87% (99)
5. Selective enforcement of rules is justified[c]	78% (37)	68% (82)	78% (41)	82% (85)
24. Officials must know when to ignore rules[d]	93% (30)	85% (89)	77% (44)	68% (88)
21. On *this* campus, officials give a reasonable hearing to grievances[e]	79% (34)	55% (82)	55% (40)	68% (88)
27. "Due process" is mainly a legalistic obstacle[f]	5% (39)	7% (89)	4% (46)	24% (84)

Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level:

a = President(P)/Academics(Ac); Business & Finance(BF)/Academics; Business & Finance/Student Affairs(SA)

b = P/Ac; BF/Ac

c = Ac/BF

d = P/BF; Ac/BF

e = P/Ac; P/SA

f = BF/P; BF/Ac; BF/SA

TABLE 8: Perspectives of Job-Groups on the Institution as an End (% Agree or Strongly Agree)

Item	Presidents	Academics	Student Affairs	Business & Finance
20. Interests of the institution are primary	95% (39)	90% (89)	83% (42)	89% (99)
23. Faculty avoid controversial political speeches[a]	21% (38)	24% (91)	20% (44)	51% (95)
38. Give special weight to "publics" whose support is needed[b]	58% (33)	34% (87)	45% (44)	64% (89)
10. Review faculty for university "citizenship"[c]	84% (31)	62% (69)	63% (35)	70% (81)
6. No interest-conflicts between university and individual members[d]	36% (33)	15% (93)	14% (44)	32% (93)
22. Universities reflect our society, and this is no problem[e]	36% (36)	29% (77)	34% (41)	44% (87)

Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level:

a = President(P)/Business & Finance(BF); Academics(Ac)/Business & Finance; Student Affairs(SA)/Business & Finance

b = P/Ac; Ac/BF; SA/BF

c = P/Ac

d = P/Ac; P/SA; BF/Ac; BF/SA

e = BF/Ac

TABLE 9: Perspectives of Job-Groups on the University as a Community (% Agree or Strongly Agree)

Item	Presidents	Academics	Student Affairs	Business & Finance
11. "The faculty" and "the administration are not separate	76% (38)	65% (89)	72% (43)	67% (99)
28. Universities reach decisions by consensus, not by heirarchy[a]	57% (35)	48% (82)	27% (41)	48% (92)
7. Administrative decisions are pre-determined by the "logic of facts" uncovered by consultation[b]	74% (35)	53% (88)	55% (40)	72% (92)
14. Large, impersonal universities understandably have trouble with faculty-student support[c]	36% (39)	54% (90)	65% (46)	46% (95)
15. The multiversity is an inconsistent institution, without coherence or unity[d]	25% (36)	27% (83)	45% (44)	21% (84)

Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level:

a = President(P)/Student Affairs(SA); Academics(Ac)/Student Affairs; Business & Finance(BF)/Student Affairs

b = P/Ac; BF/Ac; BF/SA

c = Ac/P; SA/P; SA/BF

d = SA/P; SA/Ac; SA/BF

TABLE 10: Perspectives of Job-Groups on the University as a Bureaucracy (% Agree or Strongly Agree)

Item	Presidents	Academics	Student Affairs	Business & Finance
9. The university is primarily a business[a]	8% (37)	5% (93)	11% (46)	38% (99)
1. Clearly delegated authority is a major university problem	68% (38)	66% (88)	74% (47)	68% (101)
35. Organize the university for testable effectiveness	82% (33)	73% (75)	71% (41)	81% (89)
25. Consent of the governed is irrelevant in universities[b]	40% (30)	31% (75)	51% (43)	43% (81)
13. Administration is "democratic", since it represents the public[c]	45% (31)	13% (85)	18% (45)	40% (91)

Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level:

a = Business & Finance(BF)/President(P); Business & Finance/Academics(Ac); Business & Finance/Student Affairs(SA)

b = SA/Ac

c = P/Ac; P/SA; BF/Ac; BF/SA

TABLE 11: Perspectives of Job-Groups on Power and "Pressures" in University Life (% Agree or Strongly Agree)

Item	Presidents	Academics	Student Affairs	Business & Finance
3. Administrators have very little power[a]	50% (38)	32% (93)	38% (47)	32% (99)
26. Administrators seldom allow pressures to affect their decisions	14% (36)	11% (89)	9% (45)	12% (93)
4. Administrators do what is best without organized "pressure"[b]	80% (35)	57% (83)	67% (42)	78% (89)
16. Show of "student power" is sometimes necessary[c]	50% (38)	74% (95)	77% (44)	61% (95)
19. Civil disobedience can sometimes rejuvenate a campus[d]	23% (40)	41% (87)	37% (43)	27% (93)
12. Faculty or student collective bargaining is destructive[e]	87% (31)	44% (81)	51% (37)	47% (88)
36. Policy discussions are not disinterested dialogues[f]	39% (36)	45% (84)	51% (41)	65% (93)

Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level:

a = President(P)/Academics(Ac); President/Business & Finance(BF)

b = P/Ac; P/Student Affairs(SA); Ac/BF

c = P/Ac; P/SA; Ac/BF; SA/BF

d = P/ac; BF/Ac

e = P/Ac; P/BF; P/SA

f = BF/P; BF/Ac

TABLE 12: Perspectives of Job-Groups on Academic Executives' Competence (% Agree or Strongly Agree)

Item	Presidents	Academics	Student Affairs	Business & Finance
8. When a faculty member becomes an administrator, he acquires a more responsible viewpoint	97% (35)	86% (87)	85% (40)	86% (90)
34. Administrators tend to be more loyal to their institution than faculty or students[a]	74% (39)	59% (79)	70% (40)	74% (89)
29. Top administrators judge best because they have more relevant information[b]	85% (34)	59% (81)	54% (46)	85% (92)
33. University executives have more natural talent for decision-making[c]	88% (33)	49% (80)	74% (35)	77% (94)
30. The president is the most nearly impartial decision maker on the campus[d]	52% (33)	29% (81)	24% (42)	36% (89)

Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level:

a = Business & Finance(BF)/Academics(Ac)

b = President(P)/Ac; President/Student Affairs(SA); BF/Ac; BF/Student Affairs

c = P/Ac; BF/Ac; SA/Ac

d = P/Ac; P/SA; BF/Ac

TABLE 13: Perspectives of Job-Groups on Academic Executives' Trustworthiness (% Agree or Strongly Agree)

Item	Presidents	Academics	Student Affairs	Business & Finance
37. Some matters vitally affecting university policy should not be raised publicly[a]	53% (36)	53% (78)	32% (41)	75% (94)
17. A university executive sometimes must believe one thing but say another publicly	46% (37)	53% (83)	52% (44)	53% (85)
18. Presidents generally should take firmer stands against public pressures	59% (29)	66% (71)	79% (38)	69% (81)
32. University administration requires compromising one's morals	5% (39)	11% (93)	19% (47)	12% (99)

Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level:

a = Business & Finance/President; Business & Finance/Academics; Academics/Student Affairs; Business & Finance/Student Affairs

TABLE 14: Perspectives on University Authority, by Highest Earned Degree (% Agree or Strongly Agree)

Item	Earned Doctorate	No Earned Doctorate
2. Flouting of rules is always wrong	61% (283)	76% (203)*
31. Take a stand against all lawbreaking	84% (289)	84% (207)
5. Selective enforcement of rules is justified	74% (272)	80% (183)
24. Officials must know when to ignore rules	84% (276)	69% (192)*
27. "Due process" is mainly a legalistic obstacle	7% (286)	19% (187)*
10. Review faculty for university "citizenship"	53% (270)	55% (197)
23. Faculty avoid controversial political speeches	28% (293)	44% (199)*
3. Administrators have very little power	35% (296)	30% (213)
26. Administrators seldom allow pressures to affect their decisions	11% (289)	13% (199)
4. Administrators do what is best without organized "pressure"	69% (275)	71% (195)
16. Show of "student power" is sometimes necessary	65% (298)	66% (206)

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 14, cont'd.

Item	Earned Doctorate	No Earned Doctorate
11. "The faculty" and "the administration" are not separate	70% (289)	69% (210)
28. Universities reach decisions by consensus, not by heirarchy	51% (279)	45% (191)
7. Administrative decisions are pre-determined by the "logic of facts" uncovered by consultation	59% (275)	68% (188)*
14. Large, impersonal universities understandably have trouble with faculty-student support	55% (292)	49% (202)
15. The multiversity is an inconsistent institution, without coherence or unity	27% (269)	23% (184)
25. Consent of the governed is irrelevant in universities	35% (257)	45% (177)*
13. Administration is "democratic", since it represents the public	27% (267)	32% (191)
29. Top administrators judge best because they have more relevant information	68% (274)	76% (202)*
33. University executives have more natural talent for decision-making	65% (265)	71% (200)

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 14, cont'd.

Item	Earned Doctorate	No Earned Doctorate
34. Administrators tend to be more loyal to their institution than faculty or students	73% (264)	73% (195)
17. A university executive sometimes must believe one thing but say another publicly	53% (270)	56% (190)
37. Some matters vitally affecting university policy should not be raised publicly	57% (265)	64% (197)
32. University administration requires compromising one's ethics or morals	14% (300)	13% (212)

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 15: Perspectives on University Authority, by Academic Specialty in Graduate School (% Agree or Strongly Agree)

Item	Arts & Sciences	All Others & None
2. Flouting of rules is always wrong	60% (243)	75% (243)*
31. Take a stand against all lawbreaking	82% (252)	84% (253)
5. Selective enforcement of rules is justified	78% (229)	75% (226)
24. Officials must know when to ignore rules	84% (238)	71% (230)*
27. "Due process" is mainly a legalistic obstacle	10% (244)	14% (229)
10. Review faculty for university "citizenship"	49% (236)	59% (231)*
23. Faculty avoid controversial political speeches	29% (255)	40% (237)*
3. Administrators have very little power	36% (262)	30% (247)
26. Administrators seldom allow pressures to affect their decisions	12% (249)	12% (239)
4. Administrators do what is best without organized "pressure"	66% (231)	74% (239)*
16. Show of "student power" is sometimes necessary	68% (257)	63% (247)

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 15, cont'd.

Item	Arts & Sciences	All Others & None
11. "The faculty" and "the administration" are not separate	68% (253)	71% (246)
28. Universities reach decisions by consensus, not by heirarchy	51% (239)	47% (232)
7. Administrative decisions are pre-determined by the "logic of facts" uncovered by consultation	59% (240)	67% (223)
14. Large, impersonal universities understandably have trouble with faculty-student support	57% (253)	47% (241)*
15. The multiversity is an inconsistent institution, without coherence or unity	26% (230)	26% (223)
25. Consent of the governed is irrelevant in universities	37% (219)	41% (215)
13. Administration is "democratic", since it represents the public	22% (234)	36% (224)*
29. Top administrators judge best because they have more relevant information	68% (234)	75% (242)
33. University executives have more natural talent for decision-making	64% (230)	71% (235)

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 15, cont'd.

Item	Arts & Sciences	All Others & None
34. Administrators tend to be more loyal to their institution than faculty or students	71% (234)	75% (225)
17. A university executive sometimes must believe one thing but say another publicly	55% (233)	53% (227)
37. Some matters vitally affecting university policy should not be raised publicly	59% (224)	61% (238)
32. University administration requires compromising one's ethics or morals	12% (258)	15% (254)

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 16: Perspectives on University Authority, by Experience in Full-Time Teaching and Research (% Agree or Strongly Agree)

Item	One or More Years	No Full-Time Experience
2. Flouting of rules is always wrong	62% (315)	78% (171)*
31. Take a stand against all lawbreaking	83% (322)	87% (174)
5. Selective enforcement of rules is justified	75% (299)	78% (156)
24. Officials must know when to ignore rules	80% (306)	73% (162)
27. "Due process" is mainly a legalistic obstacle	10% (320)	16% (153)*
10. Review faculty for university "citizenship"	52% (306)	57% (161)
23. Faculty avoid controversial political speeches	29% (324)	44% (168)*
3. Administrators have very little power	32% (332)	33% (177)
26. Administrators seldom allow pressures to affect their decisions	11% (322)	12% (166)
4. Administrators do what is best without organized "pressure"	69% (308)	73% (162)
16. Show of "student power" is sometimes necessary	34% (333)	36% (171)

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 16, cont'd.

Item	One or More Years	No Full-Time Experience
11. "The faculty" and "the administration" are not separate	70% (325)	67% (174)
28. Universities reach decisions by consensus, not by heirarchy	51% (307)	45% (164)
7. Administrative decisions are pre-determined by the "logic of facts" uncovered by consultation	62% (306)	64% (157)
14. Large, impersonal universities understandably have trouble with faculty-student support	54% (322)	48% (172)
15. The multiversity is an inconsistent institution, without coherence or unity	26% (300)	25% (153)
25. Consent of the governed is irrelevant in universities	36% (286)	45% (148)*
13. Administration is "democratic", since it represents the public	26% (300)	34% (158)
29. Top administrators judge best because they have more relevant information	68% (305)	78% (171)*
33. University executives have more natural talent for decision-making	65% (299)	71% (166)

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 16, cont'd.

Item	One or More Years	No Full-Time Experience
34. Administrators tend to be more loyal to their institution than faculty or students	72% (297)	74% (162)
17. A university executive sometimes must believe one thing but say another publicly	51% (302)	58% (158)
37. Some matters vitally affecting university policy should not be raised publicly	59% (301)	63% (161)
32. University administration requires compromising one's ethics or morals	12% (336)	18% (176)*

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* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 17: Perspectives on University Authority, by Years in Academic Administration (% Agree or Strongly Agree)

Item	More Than Ten Years	Ten Years Or Less
2. Flouting of rules is always wrong	73% (301)	59% (181)*
31. Take a stand against all lawbreaking	87% (305)	80% (188)*
5. Selective enforcement of rules is justified	78% (278)	73% (174)
24. Officials must know when to ignore rules	78% (287)	78% (177)
27. "Due process" is mainly a legalistic obstacle	15% (289)	7% (180)
10. Review faculty for university "citizenship"	56% (291)	51% (173)
23. Faculty avoid controversial political speeches	37% (298)	31% (190)
3. Administrators have very little power	34% (310)	30% (195)
26. Administrators seldom allow pressures to affect their decisions	11% (298)	12% (186)
4. Administrators do what is best without organized "pressure"	72% (290)	66% (176)
16. Show of "student power" is sometimes necessary	62% (307)	70% (193)*

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 17, cont'd.

Item	More Than Ten Years	Ten Years Or Less
11. "The faculty" and "the administration" are not separate	75% (306)	60% (189)*
28. Universities reach decisions by consensus, not by heirarchy	48% (292)	50% (175)
7. Administrative decisions are pre-determined by the "logic of facts" uncovered by consultation	68% (279)	55% (180)*
14. Large, impersonal universities understandably have trouble with faculty-student support	49% (298)	57% (192)
15. The multiversity is an inconsistent institution, without coherence or unity	22% (279)	31% (170)*
25. Consent of the governed is irrelevant in universities	41% (265)	36% (165)
13. Administration is "democratic", since it represents the public	34% (271)	22% (183)*
29. Top administrators judge best because they have more relevant information	74% (290)	68% (182)
33. University executives have more natural talent for decision-making	71% (287)	62% (174)*

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 17, cont'd.

Item	More Than Ten Years	Ten Years Or Less
34. Administrators tend to be more loyal to their institution than faculty or students	73% (288)	73% (168)
17. A university executive sometimes must believe one thing but say another publicly	51% (280)	59% (176)
37. Some matters vitally affecting university policy should not be raised publicly	60% (280)	61% (180)
32. University administration requires compromising one's ethics or morals	13% (313)	14% (196)

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 18: Perspectives on University Authority, by Present Involvement in Teaching (% Agree or Strongly Agree)

Item	Presently Teaching	Not Presently Teaching
2. Flouting of rules is always wrong	61% (128)	70% (358)*
31. Take a stand against all lawbreaking	81% (134)	86% (362)
5. Selective enforcement of rules is justified	75% (123)	77% (332)
24. Officials must know when to ignore rules	87% (126)	75% (342)*
27. "Due process" is mainly a legalistic obstacle	10% (136)	13% (337)
10. Review faculty for university "citizenship"	52% (123)	54% (344)
23. Faculty avoid controversial political speeches	28% (137)	37% (355)
3. Administrators have very little power	33% (137)	33% (372)
26. Administrators seldom allow pressures to affect their decisions	11% (133)	12% (355)
4. Administrators do what is best without organized "pressure"	60% (126)	74% (344)*
16. Show of "student power" is sometimes necessary	78% (135)	61% (369)*

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 18, cont'd.

Item	Presently Teaching	Not Presently Teaching
11. "The faculty" and "the administration" are not separate	65% (132)	71% (367)
28. Universities reach decisions by consensus, not by heirarchy	47% (128)	49% (343)
7. Administrative decisions are pre-determined by the "logic of facts" uncovered by consultation	57% (123)	65% (340)
14. Large, impersonal universities understandably have trouble with faculty-student support	64% (134)	48% (360)*
15. The multiversity is an inconsistent institution, without coherence or unity	35% (124)	22% (329)*
25. Consent of the governed is irrelevant in universities	42% (114)	38% (320)
13. Administration is "democratic", since it represents the public	21% (125)	32% (333)*
29. Top administrators judge best because they have more relevant information	64% (122)	74% (354)*
33. University executives have more natural talent for decision-making	61% (118)	69% (347)

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 18, cont'd.

Item	Presently Teaching	Not Presently Teaching
34. Administrators tend to be more loyal to their institution than faculty or students	68% (123)	75% (336)
17. A university executive sometimes must believe one thing but say another publicly	53% (122)	54% (338)
37. Some matters vitally affecting university policy should not be raised publicly	60% (119)	60% (343)
32. University administration requires compromising one's ethics or morals	12% (137)	14% (375)

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 19: Perspectives on University Authority, by Attendance at Regional or National Conferences of Administrators
(% Agree or Strongly Agree)

Item	One or More in the Past Year	None in the Past Year
2. Flouting of rules is always wrong	69% (418)	56% (68)*
31. Take a stand against all lawbreaking	84% (425)	83% (71)
5. Selective enforcement of rules is justified	76% (390)	80% (65)
24. Officials must know when to ignore rules	78% (402)	77% (66)
27. "Due process" is mainly a legalistic obstacle	12% (409)	8% (64)
10. Review faculty for university "citizenship"	54% (407)	53% (60)
23. Faculty avoid controversial political speeches	35% (424)	28% (68)
3. Administrators have very little power	33% (437)	35% (72)
26. Administrators seldom allow pressures to affect their decisions	11% (420)	16% (68)
4. Administrators do what is best without organized "pressure"	71% (405)	65% (65)
16. Show of "student power" is sometimes necessary	64% (434)	73% (70)

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 19, cont'd.

Item	One or More in the Past Year	None in the Past Year
11. "The faculty" and "the administration" are not separate	71% (432)	55% (67)*
28. Universities reach decisions by consensus, not by heirarchy	50% (404)	40% (67)
7. Administrative decisions are pre-determined by the "logic of facts" uncovered by consultation	64% (401)	52% (62)*
14. Large, impersonal universities understandably have trouble with faculty-student support	50% (424)	69% (70)*
15. The multiversity is an inconsistent institution, without coherence or unity	24% (386)	37% (67)*
25. Consent of the governed is irrelevant in universities	38% (373)	43% (61)
13. Administration is "democratic", since it represents the public	29% (395)	29% (63)
29. Top administrators judge best because they have more relevant information	72% (413)	70% (63)
33. University executives have more natural talent for decision-making	69% (399)	59% (66)

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 19, cont'd.

Item	One or More in the Past Year	None in the Past Year
34. Administrators tend to be more loyal to their institution than faculty or students	73% (397)	73% (62)
17. A university executive sometimes must believe one thing but say another publicly	53% (397)	62% (63)
37. Some matters vitally affecting university policy should not be raised publicly	59% (399)	70% (63)
32. University administration requires compromising one's ethics or morals	13% (440)	18% (72)

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 20: Perspectives on University Authority, by Political Preference (% Agree or Strongly Agree)

Item	Republican	Democrat
2. Flouting of rules is always wrong	78% (167)	59% (234)*
31. Take a stand against all lawbreaking	90% (166)	79% (244)*
5. Selective enforcement of rules is justified	79% (156)	73% (220)
24. Officials must know when to ignore rules	73% (161)	80% (226)
27. "Due process" is mainly a legalistic obstacle	15% (151)	9% (237)
10. Review faculty for university "citizenship"	59% (159)	48% (223)*
23. Faculty avoid controversial political speeches	46% (164)	26% (243)*
3. Administrators have very little power	35% (174)	30% (245)
26. Administrators seldom allow pressures to affect their decisions	16% (165)	9% (241)*
4. Administrators do what is best without organized "pressure"	82% (162)	58% (226)*
16. Show of "student power" is sometimes necessary	58% (172)	73% (243)*

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 20, cont'd.

Item	Republican	Democrat
11. "The faculty" and "the administration" are not separate	75% (173)	63% (235)*
28. Universities reach decisions by consensus, not by heirarchy	50% (161)	47% (230)
7. Administrative decisions are pre-determined by the "logic of facts" uncovered by consultation	73% (157)	55% (229)*
14. Large, impersonal universities understandably have trouble with faculty-student support	49% (168)	57% (242)
15. The multiversity is an inconsistent institution, without coherence or unity	21% (155)	26% (226)
25. Consent of the governed is irrelevant in universities	45% (148)	34% (213)*
13. Administration is "democratic", since it represents the public	36% (159)	23% (222)*
29. Top administrators judge best because they have more relevant information	77% (166)	68% (228)*
33. University executives have more natural talent for decision-making	71% (164)	65% (225)

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 20, cont'd.

Item	Republican	Democrat
34. Administrators tend to be more loyal to their institution than faculty or students	77% (160)	71% (223)
17. A university executive sometimes must believe one thing but say another publicly	52% (155)	60% (219)
37. Some matters vitally affecting university policy should not be raised publicly	63% (158)	60% (221)
32. University administration requires compromising one's ethics or morals	16% (171)	13% (248)

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 21: Perspectives on University Authority, by Religious Preference (% Agree or Strongly Agree)

Item	Catholic & Protestant	Others & None
2. Flouting of rules is always wrong	70% (362)	60% (124)*
31. Take a stand against all lawbreaking	86% (361)	79% (135)*
5. Selective enforcement of rules is justified	79% (333)	69% (122)*
24. Officials must know when to ignore rules	78% (340)	78% (128)
27. "Due process" is mainly a legalistic obstacle	12% (344)	12% (129)
10. Review faculty for university "citizenship"	58% (347)	43% (120)*
23. Faculty avoid controversial political speeches	39% (356)	21% (136)*
3. Administrators have very little power	32% (375)	36% (134)
26. Administrators seldom allow pressures to affect their decisions	13% (352)	8% (136)
4. Administrators do what is best without organized "pressure"	73% (343)	61% (127)*
16. Show of "student power" is sometimes necessary	63% (370)	72% (134)*

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 21, cont'd.

Item	Catholic & Protestant	Others & None
11. "The faculty" and "the administration" are not separate	74% (367)	57% (132)*
28. Universities reach decisions by consensus, not by heirarchy	48% (345)	50% (126)
7. Administrative decisions are pre-determined by the "logic of facts" uncovered by consultation	64% (345)	59% (118)
14. Large, impersonal universities understandably have trouble with faculty-student support	49% (363)	62% (131)*
15. The multiversity is an inconsistent institution, without coherence or unity	24% (336)	30% (117)
25. Consent of the governed is irrelevant in universities	42% (320)	30% (114)*
13. Administration is "democratic", since it represents the public	33% 9##8)	16% (120)*
29. Top administrators judge best because they have more relevant information	74% (357)	65% (119)*
33. University executives have more natural talent for decision-making	68% (348)	65% (117)

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 21, cont'd.

Item	Catholic & Protestant	Others & None
34. Administrators tend to be more loyal to their institution than faculty or students	75% (342)	66% (117)*
17. A university executive sometimes must believe one thing but say another publicly	51% (335)	62% (125)*
37. Some matters vitally affecting university policy should not be raised publicly	63% (339)	52% (123)*
32. University administration requires compromising one's ethics or morals	13% (373)	16% (139)

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 22: Perspectives on Authority, by Religiosity

Item	Deeply or Moderately Religious	Indifferent or Opposed to Religion
2. Flouting of rules is always wrong	71% (342)	59% (117)*
31. Take a stand against all lawbreaking	87% (342)	78% (129)*
5. Selective enforcement of rules is justified	78% (319)	71% (114)
24. Officials must know when to ignore rules	77% (321)	75% (122)
27. "Due process" is mainly a legalistic obstacle	12% (328)	13% (117)
10. Review faculty for university "citizenship"	58% (330)	44% (114)*
23. Faculty avoid controversial political speeches	40% (338)	25% (126)*
3. Administrators have very little power	33% (355)	30% (125)
26. Administrators seldom allow pressures to affect their decisions	13% (336)	8% (125)
4. Administrators do what is best without organized "pressure"	73% (333)	61% (114)*
16. Show of "student power" is sometimes necessary	62% (352)	72% (125)*

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 22, cont'd.

Item	Deeply or Moderately Religious	Indifferent or Opposed to Religion
11. "The faculty" and "the administration" are not separate	72% (348)	61% (124)*
28. Universities reach decisions by consensus, not by heirarchy	50% (328)	48% (118)
7. Administrative decisions are pre-determined by the "logic of facts" uncovered by consultation	64% (328)	61% (114)
14. Large, impersonal universities understandably have trouble with faculty-student support	49% (348)	60% (120)*
15. The multiversity is an inconsistent institution, without coherence or unity	25% (319)	23% (114)
25. Consent of the governed is irrelevant in universities	42% (304)	32% (107)*
13. Administration is "democratic", since it represents the public	34% (322)	17% (113)*
29. Top administrators judge best because they have more relevant information	75% (338)	66% (116)*
33. University executives have more natural talent for decision-making	68% (333)	66% (111)

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 22, cont'd.

Item	Deeply or Moderately Religious	Indifferent or Opposed to Religion
34. Administrators tend to be more loyal to their institution than faculty or students	75% (324)	68% (112)
17. A university executive sometimes must believe one thing but say another publicly	53% (314)	58% (120)
37. Some matters vitally affecting university policy should not be raised publicly	64% (324)	53% (111)*
32. University administration requires compromising one's ethics or morals	12% (356)	18% (128)

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 23: Perspectives on University Authority, by Age

Item	50 Years & Older	Less Than 50 Years
2. Flouting of rules is always wrong	74% (285)	58% (199)*
31. Take a stand against all lawbreaking	89% (291)	78% (203)*
5. Selective enforcement of rules is justified	78% (265)	74% (189)
24. Officials must know when to ignore rules	79% (269)	76% (197)
27. "Due process" is mainly a legalistic obstacle	14% (275)	8% (196)*
10. Review faculty for university "citizenship"	59% (272)	46% (194)*
23. Faculty avoid controversial political speeches	40% (286)	27% (205)*
3. Administrators have very little power	35% (296)	29% (211)
26. Administrators seldom allow pressures to affect their decisions	12% (280)	12% (206)
4. Administrators do what is best without organized "pressure"	77% (274)	61% (194)*
16. Show of "student power" is sometimes necessary	59% (292)	74% (210)*

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 23, cont'd.

Item	50 Years & Older	Less Than 50 Years
11. "The faculty" and "the administration" are not separate	74% (294)	62% (208)*
28. Universities reach decisions by consensus, not by heirarchy	48% (274)	49% (196)
7. Administrative decisions are pre-determined by the "logic of facts" uncovered by consultation	68% (269)	55% (192)*
14. Large, impersonal universities understandably have trouble with faculty-student support	54% (285)	49% (207)
15. The multiversity is an inconsistent institution, without coherence or unity	26% (272)	25% (179)
25. Consent of the governed is irrelevant in universities	41% (248)	36% (185)
13. Administration is "democratic", since it represents the public	34% (254)	22% (202)*
29. Top administrators judge best because they have more relevant information	73% (276)	69% (198)
33. University executives have more natural talent for decision-making	72% (272)	61% (191)*

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 23, cont'd.

Item	50 Years & Older	Less Than 50 Years
34. Administrators tend to be more loyal to their institution than faculty or students	75% (273)	70% (184)
17. A university executive sometimes must believe one thing but say another publicly	54% (263)	54% (195)
37. Some matters vitally affecting university policy should not be raised publicly	61% (264)	60% (196)
32. University administration requires compromising one's ethics or morals	11% (296)	17% (214)*

* Differences statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 24: Highest Earned Degrees, by Executive Job-Groups

HIGHEST EARNED DEGREE	Total Respondents N = 526	Presidents N = 41	Academics N = 97	Business & Finance N = 101	Student Affairs N = 47
Earned Doctorate	59%	81%	96%	13%	66%
Masters and First Professional	23%	7%	3%	41%	28%
Baccalaureate Level	14%	0%	1%	42%	4%
All Others and None	4%	12%	0%	5%	2%

SSD's*, Earned Doctorate vs. No Earned Doctorate:

President/Academics; President/Business & Finance

Business & Finance/Academics; Business & Finance/Student Affairs

Academics/Student Affairs

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* SSD = **Difference statistically significant at .05 confidence level.**

TABLE 25: Academic Specialty in Graduate School, by Executive Job-Groups

ACADEMIC SPECIALTY IN GRADUATE SCHOOL	Total Respondents N = 526	**Presidents** N = 41	Academics N = 97	Business & Finance N = 101	Student Affairs N = 47
Arts and Sciences	51%	61%	86%	23%	49%
Humanities	18%	32%	36%	8%	19%
Social Sciences	20%	22%	25%	11%	30%
Natural Sciences	14%	7%	25%	4%	0%
Education	13%	7%	4%	7%	38%
Engineering, Business, Agriculture	16%	7%	4%	28%	4%
Other	7%	17%	5%	6%	6%
None	13%	7%	1%	37%	2%

SSD's*, Arts and Sciences vs. All Others and None:

President/Academics; President/Business & Finance

Academics/Business & Finance; Academics/Student Affairs

Business & Finance/Student Affairs

* SSD = Difference statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 26: Experience in Full-Time Teaching and Research, by Executive Job-Groups

YEARS OF FULL-TIME TEACHING AND RESEARCH	Total Respondents N = 526	Presidents N = 41	Academics N = 97	Business & Finance N = 101	Student Affairs N = 47
Over 20 Years	18%	24%	36%	4%	11%
7 to 20 Years	33%	46%	57%	8%	26%
1 to 6 Years	15%	17%	7%	15%	19%
None	34%	12%	0%	73%	45%

SSD's*, Some Full-Time Experience vs. None:

President/Academics; President/Business & Finance; President/Student Affairs

Business & Finance/Academics; Business & Finance/Student Affairs

Academics/Student Affairs

*** SSD = Difference statistically significant at .05 confidence level.**

TABLE 27: Years in Academic Administration, by Executive Job-Groups

TOTAL YEARS IN COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION	Total Respondents N = 526	Presidents N = 41	Academics N = 97	Business & Finance N = 101	Student Affairs N = 47
3 Years or Less	11%	12%	5%	11%	13%
4 to 10 Years	28%	12%	42%	19%	21%
11 to 20 Years	36%	46%	35%	31%	32%
Over 20 Years	26%	27%	18%	40%	34%

SSD's*, Over 10 Years vs. 10 Years or Less:

President/Academics

Business & Finance/Academics

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* SSD = Difference statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 28: Present Involvement in Teaching, by Executive Job-Groups

PRESENTLY TEACHING?	Total Respondents N = 526	**Presidents** N = 41	Academics N = 97	Business & Finance N = 101	Student Affairs N = 47
No (Including No Response)	73%	90%	49%	90%	28%
Yes	27%	10%	51%	9%	19%

SSD's*, Presently Teaching vs. Not Presently Teaching:

President/Academics; President/Student Affairs

Business & Finance/Academics; Business & Finance/Student Affairs

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* SSD = Difference statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 29: Attendance at Inter-University Conferences of Administrators, by Executive Job-Groups

ATTENDANCE DURING PAST YEAR AT REGIONAL OR NATIONAL CONFERENCES OF ACADEMIC ADMINISTRATORS	Total Respondents N = 526	Presidents N = 41	Academics N = 97	Business & Finance N = 101	Student Affairs N = 47
None	14%	7%	16%	16%	6%
1 or 2	45%	27%	44%	52%	32%
3 or More	41%	66%	39%	33%	62%

SSD's*, Attendance at 3 or More Conferences vs. Attendance at Fewer or None:

President/Academics; President/Business & Finance

Student Affairs/Academics; Student Affairs/Business & Finance

* SSD = Difference statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 30: Political Preferences, by Executive Job-Groups

POLITICAL PREFERENCE	Total Respondents N = 526	**Presidents** N = 41	Academics N = 97	Business & Finance N = 101	Student Affairs N = 47
Republican	34%	24%	15%	51%	28%
Democrat	49%	54%	70%	33%	60%
Independent	12%	15%	10%	10%	6%
Other	6%	7%	4%	7%	6%

SSD's*, Republican vs. Democrat:

President/Business & Finance

Business & Finance/Academics; Business & Finance/Student Affairs

* SSD = Difference statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 31: Religious Preferences, by Executive Job-Groups

RELIGICUS PREFERENCE	Total Respondents N = 526	Presidents N = 41	Academics N = 97	Business & Finance N = 101	Student Affairs N = 47
Catholic	11%	12%	9%	15%	9%
Protestant	62%	66%	54%	71%	62%
Jewish	2%	0%	2%	0%	2%
Other	6%	5%	7%	6%	4%
None	19%	17%	28%	8%	23%

SSD's*, Catholic and Protestant vs. All Others and None:

Business & Finance/Academics; Business & Finance/Student Affairs

SSD's*, Catholic vs. Protestant:

None

* SSD = Difference statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 32: Religiosity, by Executive Job-Groups

RELIGIOSITY	Total Respondents N = 526	Presidents N = 41	Academics N = 97	Business & Finance N = 101	Student Affairs N = 47
Deeply or Moderately Religious	70%	73%	56%	77%	70%
Indifferent or Opposed to Religion	25%	17%	36%	20%	23%

SSD's*, Deeply or Moderately Religious vs. Indifferent or Opposed to Religion:

President/Academics

Business & Finance/Academics

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* SSD = Difference statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

TABLE 33: Age, by Executive Job-Groups

AGE	Total Respondents N = 526	Presidents N = 41	Academics N = 97	Business & Finance N = 101	Student Affairs N = 47
Less Than 40 Years	10%	0%	1%	15%	15%
40 to 49 Years	31%	24%	41%	30%	34%
50 to 59 Years	41%	51%	39%	35%	38%
60 Years and Older	18%	22%	19%	21%	13%

SSD's*, 50 Years and Older vs. Less Than 50 Years:

President/Business & Finance;
President/Academics
President/Student Affairs

* SSD = Difference statistically significant at .05 confidence level.

APPENDIX B

METHODS OF THE STUDY

THE SURVEY OF PERSPECTIVES, BACKGROUNDS AND INVOLVEMENTS

In the spring of 1968, 869 questionnaires were mailed to executives of sixty-nine major universities in the United States. (See Table 34 for specific institutions.) These universities included the forty U.S. members of the Association of American Universities and fifty-seven institutions that had reported 750 or more faculty and other professional staff members in the most recent Federal survey then available (U.S. Office of Education, 1963). The resulting list of institutions was expected to include the largest and most prestigious universities in the nation, with many institutions falling into both categories.*

Executives who were sent questionnaires within specific universities were those shown by catalogues available in early 1968 to occupy the "top" ten to fifteen official positions in the university administration. (See Horn, 1962.) In a few universities, unusual constellations of titles and/or changes of incumbents resulted in mailing more than fifteen questionnaires to a single institution; however, the differences in response rates were slight. In several institutions, because of ambiguous relations between campuses and university "systems," questionnaires were sent to system-wide executives as well as campus officers. Respondents of both types were classified for purposes of the job-group analyses in their "functional" categories; e.g., both the chief of a university system and the chief of a campus within that system were classified as "Presidents." Of the 526 useable replies, however, only seven were from executives of multi-campus university systems.

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*In January, 1968 a pre-test questionnaire was sent to thirty-one executives at two Western state universities; twenty-seven responded, but were not included in the analysis reported here. Four universities (Boston, Pittsburgh, Puerto Rico, and Wisconsin) were omitted from the main survey mailing because appropriate catalogues were unavailable at the time.

For purposes of the job-group analyses, two sub-groups of approximately 100 respondents each were created: One group, called "Academics," combined Academic Vice-Presidents and deans of "arts and science" colleges; the other, called "Business and Finance officials," combined executives concerned with university "business" or finance with those responsible for planning, development, and/or physical facilities. (See Table 38.) These groups were compared with each other, with the Presidents, and with the Student Affairs executives on each of the thirty-eight opinion items and on selected measures of background characteristics and current involvements. As indicated in Chapter V, the Academics proved to be higher on measures of "academic" background and current involvement, and to hold less "institutionally conservative" views, than the group of respondents as a whole. Thus, while the present study lacks a control group of faculty members who are not involved in administration, the data do suggest that academic executives as a group would differ from a sample of such faculty members even more than most of our respondents differ from the Academics in their own number.

The comparisons presented in Tables 35-37 suggest that the 526 useable replies may be considered broadly representative of the 869 executives who were sent the questionnaire. Those comparisons reveal that New England and Middle Atlantic states are somewhat under-represented, while the Plains and Mountain states are over-represented (Table 35); that public institutions are slightly over-represented as compared with private ones (Table 36); and that among the job-groups there is some under-representation of Presidents, Administrative Vice-Presidents, Public Affairs officials, and Executive Staff members (Table 37). However, these differences are not dramatic. By contrast, the two most divergent job-groups mentioned above, the Academics and the Business/Finance officials, comprise almost exactly equal numbers and proportions of the responses. In addition, it should be considered that the sixty-per-cent overall response rate is a strong majority of the population of primary interest, rather than of a small, proportional sample.

THE COMPLEX SOURCES OF ADMINISTRATIVE PERSPECTIVES

In this study we have been able only to begin the task of de-

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fining an official perspective characteristic of large-university executives, and of explaining its major variants within the administrative subculture. Considering only the variables employed here, it seems clear that each executive group's responses are the product of many cross-cutting pressures and tendencies, some of which counteract one another. On the rule-"flouting" issue (#2), for example, nine of the ten background and involvement variables produced significant differences of response, as did the job-group variable. Presidents and BF officials showed greater tendencies to affirm the item, as did those executives without earned doctorates, with non-A&S specialties, without full-time teaching-research experience, with long years in campus administration, without present teaching involvements, with Republican political sympathies, with conventional religious ties, and with advanced age. Yet as we have seen, the Presidents and BF officials are alike on some of these dimensions and unlike the Academics; on others the Presidents and Academics are more alike than either is like the BF officials; and on at least one (age) the Presidents stand alone in contrast to the other two groups. Variations on other items in the opinion survey suggest similarly interwoven influences, which will require further analysis for their unravelling.

Detailed study of partial associations among the opinion items, job-groups, and background/involvement variables may further illuminate the relative importance of these and other influences on executives' views of authority. In addition, control of variables not included in our analyses may be expected to reveal further dimensions of the variations among campus executives' perspectives. Such variables include, for example, institutional size, prestige, geographic region, and public or private charter. However, such analyses are beyond the scope of the present study.

It seems probable that the important influences on campus executives' views are much more complex than any simple association of opinions and background variables might suggest. The importance of age, political preference and religious involvement, for example, points to the need for more refined theoretical notions: Why are older executives more conservative? What, specifically, have political conservatism and religious involvement to do with conservatism toward institutional rules and interests in the academic setting? Why are such traditionally salient differences as those between Catholics and Protestants not important for these issues of university authority? Speculation about "generation gaps" and institutional "cooptation" is not lacking today, but careful studies informed by such concerns still are relatively few.

On a broader analytic front, the present study has not analyzed separately the possible effects of "personality" variables in determining major similarities and differences of perspective among academic executives. Thus it is possible that most persons who enter academic administration are of a personality type different from those who remain in more purely academic pursuits. Different personality types may be selected by society and selves to different paths at early points in their careers--to the study of business and finance, for example, instead of the humanities, and hence to eventual positions as campus comptrollers rather than as academic vice-presidents.

Equally important, however, solutions to the riddle of official perspectives probably must await better identification of the critical interaction processes within which individuals of different personal tendencies attempt to make sense of the complex social and cultural situations that they encounter. It seems particularly important for future research to try identifying the processes that sustain executives' subjective experience of personally "taking responsibility" for the "best interests" of something they call "the institution," and their apparently sincere experience of engaging only in neutral and "rational" problem-solving. Further investigation is needed of the processes requiring and allowing supposedly high-minded public officials to "believe one thing and say another publicly," while denying any moral or ethical "compromise."*

Explanatory models which associate static categories of opinion with background/involvement variables necessarily miss much of the dynamic and subtle process by which academic executives form, communicate, maintain, and change their perspectives, especially on such fundamental issues as the sources and nature of their authority. In addition, as has been noted for some years (Blumer, 1955), social scientists are on shaky ground in assuming any simple correspondence between attitudes and actions. Research strategies that envision an ongoing interaction of each actor's perspective with his chosen commitments to courses of action and to specific social groups are still relatively rare in modern sociology. But they would seem to have more promise than current "structural" models for further research on the place of perspectives in modern organizational life.*

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*Weber's theory of authority as positional power sustained by "beliefs" would seem to be especially coherent with some version of the "cognitive consistency" theories now current. This suggestion is supported by his few psychologically oriented statements seeming to suggest a universal "need" of persons to justify their social advantages [1954, P. 335], and by his well-known dictum that "Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct [1958, P. 280]." However, current "consistency" theories still involve substantial difficulties of their own. Cf. Rokeach (1960), Feldman (1966), and Abelson (1968).

*For more interactional approaches, see Becker, Geer, Hughes, and Strauss (1961), and Kornhauser (1962b). Such strategies pose substantial problems of data-gathering, however, especially in dealing with executives and other public figures. Cf. Dalton (1959, 1964) for discussions of the practical and moral difficulties in securing detailed facts about executives' actions and intentions in business firms.

APPENDIX C

(Tables 34-38)

TABLE 34: Universities Included in the Survey of Executives

Arizona, University of	Tucson, Arizona 85721
Brown University	Providence, R. I. 02912
California Institute of Technology	Pasadena, Calif. 91109
California, University of	
Berkeley	Berkeley, Calif. 94720
Davis	Davis, Calif. 95616
Irvine	Irvine, Calif. 92664
Los Angeles	Los Angeles, Calif. 90024
Riverside	Riverside, Calif. 92505
Santa Barbara	Santa Barbara, Calif. 93106
San Diego	San Diego, Calif. 92038
Santa Cruz	Santa Cruz, Calif. 95060
Catholic University of America	Washington, D.C. 20017
Chicago, University of	Chicago, Ill. 60637
City University of New York	
Brooklyn College	Brooklyn, New York 11210
City College	New York, N. Y. 10031
Hunter College	New York, N. Y. 10021
Cincinnati, University of	Cincinnati, Ohio 45221
Clark University	Worcester, Mass. 01610
Colorado, University of	Boulder, Colo. 80302
Columbia University	New York, N. Y. 10027
Connecticut, University of	Storrs, Conn. 06268
Cornell University	Ithaca, New York 14850

Duke University	Durham, N. Carolina 27706
Florida, University of	Gainsville, Fla. 32601
Georgetown University	Washington, D. C. 20007
Harvard University	Cambridge, Mass. 02138
Illinois, University of	Urbana, Ill. 61801
Indiana University	Bloomington, Indiana 47405
Iowa State University	Ames, Iowa 50010
Iowa, University of	Iowa City, Iowa 52240
Johns Hopkins University	Baltimore, Md. 21218
Kansas, University of	Lawrence, Kansas 66044
Kentucky, University of	Lexington, Ky. 40506
Louisiana State University	Baton Rouge, La. 70803
Marquette University	Milwaukee, Wisc. 53233
Maryland, University of	College Park, Md. 20742
MIT (Massachusetts Inst. of Tech.)	Cambridge, Mass. 02139
Michigan State University	East Lansing, Michigan 48823
Michigan, the University of	Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104
Minnesota, University of	Minneapolis, Minn. 55455
Missouri, University of	Columbia, Missouri 65202
Nebraska, University of	Lincoln, Nebraska 68508
New York University	New York, N. Y. 10003
New York, State University, Buffalo	Buffalo, N. Y. 14214
North Carolina, University of	Chapel Hill, N. C. 27514
Northwestern University	Evanston, Illinois 60201
Ohio State University	Columbus, Ohio 43210
Pennsylvania State University	University Park, Pa. 16802
Pennsylvania, University of	Philadelphia, Pa. 19104

Princeton University	Princeton, New Jersey 08540
Purdue University	Lafayette, Indiana 47907
Rochester, University of	Rochester, New York 14627
Rutgers, The State University	New Brunswick, N. J. 08903
San Jose State College	San Jose, Calif. 95114
Southern California, University of	Los Angeles, Calif. 90007
Southern Illinois University	Carbondale, Ill. 62901
Stanford University	Stanford, Calif. 94305
Syracuse University	Syracuse, N. Y. 13210
Temple University	Philadelphia, Pa. 19122
Tennessee, University of	Knoxville, Tenn. 37916
Texas, University of	Austin, Texas 78712
Tulane University of Louisiana	New Orleans, La. 70118
Vanderbilt University	Nashville, Tenn. 37203
Virginia, University of	Charlottesville, Va. 22903
Washington University	St. Louis, Mo. 63130
Washington, University of	Seattle, Wash. 98105
Wayne State University	Detroit, Mich. 48202
Western Reserve University	Cleveland, Ohio 44106
Yale University	New Haven, Conn. 06520

TABLE 35: Distribution of Mailed Questionnaires and Useable Replies, by Geographic Region

Region	Questionnaires Sent No.	Questionnaires Sent % of N=869	Useable Replies No.	Useable Replies % of N=526	Useable Replies % of No. Sent
New England (Maine, Vt., Conn., Mass., RI, New Hamp.)	79	9%	41	8%	52%
Middle Atlantic (N.Y., N.J., Pennsylvania)	167	19%	89	17%	53%
Southeast (District of Columbia, Virginia, W. Virginia, Deleware, Md., N. Carolina, S. Carolina, Ga., Fla.)	111	13%	72	14%	65%
Midwest (Ohio, Indiana, Ill., Mich., Wisc., Minn.)	166	19%	99	19%	60%
South Central (Kentucky, Tenn., Ala., Miss., La., Arkansas, Okla., Texas, Missouri)	116	13%	70	13%	60%
Plains and Mountain (N. Dakota, S. Dakota, Iowa, Nebr., Kansas, Alaska, Arizona, New Mexico, Colo., Wyoming, Utah, Nevada, Montana, Idaho)	71	8%	53	10%	75%
Pacific (Wash., Ore., Calif., Hawaii)	159	18%	101	19%	64%
Not Ascertainable			1	-	-

TABLE 36: Distribution of Mailed Questionnaires and Useable Replies, by Institutional Charter (Public or Private)

Charter	Questionnaires Sent No.	Questionnaires Sent % of N=869	Useable Replies No.	Useable Replies % of N=526	Useable Replies % of No. Sent
Public	543	62%	347	66%	64%
Private	326	38%	178	34%	55%
Not Ascertainable			1	-	-

TABLE 37: Distribution of Mailed Questionnaires and Useable Replies, by Executive Job-Group

Job-Group	Questionnaires Sent No.	 % of N=869	Useable Replies No.	 % of N=526	 % of No. Sent
Presidents	83	10%	41	8%	49%
VP-Administration	50	6%	28	5%	56%
VP-Academic	72	8%	48	9%	67%
VP-Business	113	13%	72	14%	64%
VP-Planning	42	5%	29	6%	69%
VP-Public Affairs	49	6%	23	5%	49%
VP-Research	27	3%	20	4%	74%
Dean, Graduate Studies	60	7%	39	7%	65%
Dean, Arts and Sciences	66	8%	49	9%	73%
Dean, Business or Engineering	48	6%	30	6%	63%
Registrar-Admissions Director	105	12%	62	12%	60%
Student Affairs Executives	78	9%	47	9%	60%
Executive Staff	67	8%	29	6%	43%
Institutional Research Directors	9	1%	8	2%	89%
Not Ascertainable			1	-	-

TABLE 38: Types of Titles Included in Each Job-Group

President	President, Chancellor
VP-Administration	Dean of Administration, VP or Vice Chancellor for Administration, Vice President, Executive VP
VP-Academic	VP or VCh. for Academic Affairs, Provost of University, Dean of Faculties, Assistant to President or Chancellor in Academic Affairs
VP-Business	VP or VCh. for Business and/or Finance, Business Manager, Comptroller, Treasurer, Accounting Officer
VP-Planning	VP, VCh., or Director of Planning and/or Development; Planning Officer, VP-Building and Campus Development, Director of Physical Facilities and Planning
VP-Public Affairs	VP, VCh., or Director of University Relations, Community Relations, Public Information, Public Affairs, Public Relations; Special Assistant in Gifts, Director of Alumni Affairs, Executive Secretary of Alumni Council
VP-Research	VP, VCh., or Director of Research; Coordinator of Research Contracts, Research Administrator
Dean, Graduate Studies	Dean of Graduate School or Graduate Division, Dean of Graduate Studies and Research
Dean, Arts and Sciences	Dean of College of Arts & Sciences, of Letters and Sciences, or of Natural Sciences and Mathematics; Dean or Provost of college within university (where liberal arts main emphasis)
Dean, Business or Engineering	Dean of College of Business and/or Engineering, Dean of Business and Public Administration
Registrar-Admissions Director	Registrar, Director of Admissions or of Admissions and Records
Student Affairs Executives	VP or VCh. for Student Affairs, Dean of Students, Dean of Men or Women, Associate Provost for Student Affairs

TABLE 38: Types of Titles Included in Each Job-Group (continued)

Executive Staff	Assistant, Executive Assistant, or Special Assistant to President or Chancellor; VP-Special Programs, Secretary of University or of Board, Secretary General
Institutional Research Director	Director of Institutional Research, Institutional Studies, or Analytic Studies

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